

BIBLIOTHECA

FF. PRÆDICATORUM

CONVENTUS

CIVIT. BENITIÆ

Lit.

Pl.


RT. REV. EUGENE O'CONNELL,

LOS ANGELES,

CAL.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024



ESSAYS

CHIEFLY THEOLOGICAL.

BY THE

ST. ALBERT'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

REV. PATRICK MURRAY, D.D.,

Professor of Dogmatic and Moral Theology in the Royal College of
St. Patrick, Maynooth.

"Credo in Unam, Sanctam, Catholicam, et Apostolicam Ecclesiam".
Symbol. Nicæn.

Credo " Sanctam Apostolicam sedem et Romanum Pontificem in universum orbem tenere principatum, et ipsum Pontificem Romanum successorem esse Beati Principis Apostolorum, et verum Christi vicarium, totiusque ecclesiæ caput, et omnium Christianorum Patrem et Doctorem existere; et ipsi in Beato Petro pascendi, regendi, et gubernandi universalem ecclesiam, a Domino nostro Jesu Christo plenam potestatem traditam fuisse".

Concil. Florentin.

FOURTH SERIES.

DUBLIN:

GERALD BELLEW, 79 GRAFTON STREET.

1853.

J. F. FOWLER, PRINTER,
3 CROW STREET, AND 24 TEMPLE LANE,
DUBLIN.

CONTENTS.

Introduction.

	Page.
Reasons for coming to an end	3
Apology for past errors	5
The New Theology and its Doctors	9
Invincible ignorance of many out of the Church	13
Specimen, from the Council of Chalcedon, of the Proof of the Papal Supremacy drawn from tradition	16
Taking a short vacation	19
Fish sauce and Sir Francis Head	20
Head's tremendous dashes	21
His furious driving	23
His dash at the Irish peasantry	24
His dash at Maynooth College	25
The dash of the Priests' Protection Society at the same	27
Maynooth during vacation	29
Phrenology of Head's head	31
"No connection with any other Firm"	32

Supremacy of St. Peter, etc.

[CONTINUED]

ARGUMENTS FROM MATTHEW, XVI.

III. THE POWER OF BINDING AND LOOSING.

§ 2. *Extent of the power of binding and loosing promised to Peter.*

The power universal as to <i>place</i>	36
And as to <i>things</i>	37
And as to <i>persons</i>	38

§ 3. *What is signified by the power of binding and loosing.*

This power is the plenitude of spiritual jurisdiction	41
Proved from context	<i>ib.</i>
The power supreme <i>in genere suo</i>	43
Different interpretations of the metaphor	45
Supremacy <i>implied</i> in first class of interpretations	46
Second interpretation more probable	48
Objections answered	52
Supremacy proved from this interpretation	54

§ 4. *General Conclusion from the whole text of Matthew.*

Force of repetition	58
-------------------------------	----

CHAPTER II. ARGUMENT FROM LUKE, XXII.

§ 1. *Some Critical remarks on the text.*

§ 2. *Dogmatical exposition of the text.*

FIRST PROPOSITION. To Peter and to him alone, is committed the office of confirming his brethren, etc.	67
1. An office instituted: Peter appointed to it	<i>ib.</i>
2. Peter's office a means of confirming his brethren	69
3. The office committed to Peter alone	70

CONTENTS.

v

4. The office that of confirming all the Apostles . . .	70
5. And of confirming the whole Church	<i>ib.</i>
6. And of confirming against all assaults	71
SECOND PROPOSITION. Peter in the aforesaid appointment received sovereign jurisdiction	72

CHAPTER III. ARGUMENT FROM JOHN, XXI.

§ 1. *Critical remarks on the text.*

§ 2. *What is signified by the words sheep and lambs.*

All members of the Church included	78
Proved from Scriptnre usage	<i>ib.</i>
Other Proofs	81

§ 3. *What is signified by feeding the lambs and sheep.*

Supreme authority is signified	84
Proved from the import of the metaphor	<i>ib.</i>
From Scripture usage	87
From Classic usage	93

§ 4. *General Review of preceding texts.*

CHAPTER IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

§ 1. *Objections against the argument from Matthew, xvi.*

I. THE ROCK.

OBJECTION I. The words metaphorical, therefore ambiguous	101
ANSWER I. Metaphorical language has fixed meaning . .	102
II. Often less ambiguous than literal language . . .	104
III. More forcible	105
IV. Used by our Lord	<i>ib.</i>
V. Present metaphor not ambiguous	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION II. Disagreement of the Fathers	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION III. The Apostles did not understand our Lord's words of the Primacy; otherwise they would not have contended about it	106

ANSWER I. Apostles slow of understanding	107
II. Expected institution of the Primacy implied in the contention	110
III. Primacy implied in the words used by our Lord in stopping the contention	114
IV. And in the cessation of the contention	116
OBJECTION IV. From our Lord's replies to questions regard- ing superiority	117
ANSWER , ...	118
OBJECTION V. <i>Being a rock</i> does not denote government	119
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION VI. Our Lord's words not exclusive in regard to other Apostles	120
ANSWER I. They are exclusive	122
II. Not applied to any other	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION VII. Apostles not built on Peter	123
ANSWER I. Whole Church built on Peter	124
II. How the Apostles were built on him	<i>ib.</i>
III. Ambiguity of <i>foundation</i>	125
OBJECTION VIII. St. Peter only the prime instrument, etc., in propagating the Gospel	126
ANSWER I. Difference between <i>being</i> and <i>being appointed</i>	127
II. Peter's greater zeal connected with the Primacy	128
III. The words mean more than objection allows	129
OBJECTION IX. Peter had a previous primacy	131
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION X. Peter a foundation or pillar in conjunction with others	132
ANSWER	133
OBJECTION XI. No resemblance between a rock and governor	<i>ib.</i>
ANSWER	123
OBJECTION XII. Peter the Rock, <i>i. e.</i> he commenced the Church by first converting Jews and Gentiles	136

CONTENTS.

vi

ANSWER	136
OBJECTION XIII. Succession of men cannot be each a foundation	138
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>

II. THE KEYS.

OBJECTION XIV. The metaphor of the keys only signifies the opening of the Church to unbelievers	141
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XV. Peter could not exercise the power of the keys in respect of the other Apostles	142
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XVI. Peter not peculiarly empowered to <i>catch men</i> : not more peculiarly invested with the power of the keys	143
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XVII. Keys not always a symbol of authority	146
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>

III. THE POWER OF BINDING AND LOOSING.

OBJECTION XVIII. The power of binding and loosing is merely the power of remitting and retaining sins .	148
ANSWER I. This disproved before	<i>ib.</i>
II. Disproved from comparison of John, xx. 21 .	<i>ib.</i>
III. And from Scripture usage	149
OBJECTION XIX. <i>Bind</i> and <i>loose</i> merely signify command and permit	151
§ 2. <i>Objections against the argument from Luke, xxii.</i>	
OBJECTIONS XX. and XXI.	153
§ 3. <i>Objections against the argument from John, xxi.</i>	
OBJECTION XXII. These words might be said to any Apostle	154
ANSWER	155

OBJECTION XXIII. The words are indefinite and not universal	156
ANSWER I. Two ways in which words are indefinite: words of text indefinite in neither way	<i>ib.</i>
II. Words of the text universal in sense	157
III. Argument from parallel text answered	158
OBJECTION XXIV. No new power here conferred	159
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XXV. The words merely admonitory: therefore not collative of power	160
ANSWER I. Inference denied	161
II. Assertion denied	<i>ib.</i>
III. Peter's office peculiar to him	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XXVI. The Apostles guided and taught by God himself: therefore, not fit objects for Peter's guidance and teaching	162
ANSWER I. Divine guidance of Apostles	<i>ib.</i>
II. Did not render them unfit for other guidance	<i>ib.</i>
III. Inference of objection denied	163
IV. And assertion denied	164
OBJECTION XXVII. It is impossible that St. Peter himself should feed the whole flock. Bellarmine's expedient, that he feeds them, partly by himself, partly by others, inadmissible	165
ANSWER I. Not impossible	167
II. A fact in the Roman Pontiff	<i>ib.</i>
III. Bellarmine's answer sound	168
OBJECTION XXVIII. St. Peter never exercised the Primacy	170
ANSWER I. Inference denied. 1°. Primacy sufficiently revealed in the promise and institution	171
2°. Very little of what Apostles did recorded in Scripture	172
3°. Many reasons why Peter would not have exercised the Primacy	175

II. Assertion denied	177
OBJECTION XXIX. Interpretation of <i>sheep</i> and <i>lambs</i> uncertain	178
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XXX. Peter's distinction one of inferiority	179
§ 4. <i>Objections against the Perpetuation of the Primacy, and the Scripture argument for it.</i>	
OBJECTION XXXI. Peter's Primacy grounded on personal acts	180
ANSWER	181
OBJECTION XXXII. The words addressed to Peter purely personal	<i>ib.</i>
ANSWER	182
OBJECTION XXXIII. The Apostolic office extraordinary and not to continue: Peter had no other office	184
ANSWER. Powers imparted for founding the Church, and powers imparted for administration of it	185
Different powers and privileges of the Apostles	186
The Apostolate as such	188
What power belonged to the Apostolate as such	190
The Primacy of Peter distinct from the Apostleship	193
And perpetual	194
OBJECTION XXXIV. The Apostolate ceasing to exist, there would be no Head of the Apostles	195
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XXXV. Primacy no more derived from Peter to his successors than his other privileges	196
ANSWER	<i>ib.</i>
OBJECTION XXXVI. Bishop of Rome succeeds Peter as other Bishops succeed Apostles	198
ANSWER. Further exposition of the difference between the	

ANSWER	263
OBJECTION LII. Peter sent by the other Apostles	268

Equivocation and Mental Reservation:

THIER LAWFULNESS CONSIDERED.

Charge of sanctioning equivocation brought against Maynooth, the Jesuits, and the Church	273
Difficulty of understanding doctrines of an opposite creed . .	275
Apparently greater for Catholics in reference to Protestant doctrine, than the contrary	277
Yet really greater for Protestants in reference to Catholic doctrine	279
Protestant doctrines more accurately reported by our theo- logians than Catholic doctrine by theirs	<i>ib.</i>
Misrepresentation of our doctrine not supposed intentional . .	283
General causes of it. First, want of acquaintance with our theology	284
Second, difficulty of understanding our theologians	287
Causes of our more accurate conception of Protestant doctrine	290
System of theological teaching in Maynooth	291
Scholastic questions, utility of	292
System on which our theological treatises are composed . .	298
Peculiar difficulty in understanding our Moral Theology . .	301
Question of Equivocation opened. General observations as to the meaning of words	303
Equivocation defined	306

CONTENTS.

xiii

Question stated	307
Different kinds of Equivocation	309
Circumstances determining the meaning of words	<i>ib.</i>
Illustrations	311
Mental Reservation	315

§ 1.

Undiscoverable Equivocations never lawful	316
They are lies	317

§ 2.

I. Unlawful to use equivocations in any language or country not recognized in that language and country	319
Equivocations may be discoverable in one language or country and not in another	320
Some discoverable equivocations common to all countries	321
II. Several cases in which discoverable equivocations are unlawful	322
Examples given	323
Reason of this	325
III. Discoverable equivocations not to be used habitually or on light grounds	326
What equivocations are lawful, and when	<i>ib.</i>
Illustrations	329
Objection answered	333
Proof of assertion	336
Objection answered: Not always unlawful to do what may be occasion of sin or error to others	338
Conditions required to justify such acts	340

§ 3.

General objection: Danger of abuse if any equivocation be allowed	343
Answer. I. Equivocation not a topic for pulpit exposition	346

II. Equivocations to be pronounced simply unlawful . .	347
III. Inconvenience and unpleasantness of introducing personal charges into controversy	350
But the controversialist sometimes forced to do so . . .	351
Maynooth not responsible	353
Testimonies as to the disregard of oaths in Oxford . .	356
Oxford University Commission	360
Testimonies as to the morality of Oxford	362
IV. Doctrine not be rejected because liable to be abused .	365
V. Not liable to be abused by theologians	369
Extract: Theological reasoning on Equivocation . . .	371

The Right of Resistance to the Supreme Civil Power :

IS IT IN ANY CASE ALLOWABLE ?

Modern writers on the subject	379
Doctrine of the Anglican Clergy	382
And of some French theologians	384

DOCTRINAL EXPOSITION.

§ 1.

Duty of obedience: revealed in Scripture	386
Taught by the Church	388

§ 2.

1. Duty of obedience irrespective of religion of Ruler . .	391
2. Obedience to Usurper	<i>ib.</i>
Usurped authority may become legitimate	392
3. Obedience to laws: Unjust laws of two kinds	392

§ 3.

Proposition condemned by Council of Constance	395
---	-----

§ 4.

Doctrine defined: doctrine not defined	396
Common opinion of theologians	398
Conditions of lawful resistance	<i>ib.</i>

The Christian Priesthood a true Priesthood:

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S OBJECTION.

Character of Dr. Whately's writings	411
OBJECTION. Title of <i>Hiereus</i> not used in Scripture, to designate the ministers of the New Law: these therefore not true priests	413
ANSWER. I. Argument not conclusive	415
II. Use of title might have led to error regarding the nature and functions of the Christian Priesthood	416
III. And also regarding the nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice	418
Objection: Christ <i>Hiereus</i> , though his sacrifice different from those of the Old Law	419
Answer: Christ called so only in one Epistle: explanation there given: inference	<i>ib.</i>
Objection: <i>Hiereus</i> used to designate Pagan Priest	421
Answer	<i>ib.</i>
Bossuet's Exposition of Eucharistic sacrifice	422

ERRATA.

Page 88 *note*, first line, *for* "veiga" *read* "verga".

„ 402 line 7, *for* "into" *read* "in".

Introduction :

CONTAINING GOOD PURPOSES, EXPLANATIONS, APOLOGIES, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS MATTER.

Introduction.

THIS volume closes, at least for the present, my annual labours. I at first intended to extend the series to five or six volumes: but the accumulation of work, professional and non-professional, renders it impossible for me to execute fully the original design, without serious danger to my health. A large and comprehensive Treatise on the Church has been announced, in each of the preceding volumes, as preparing for the press. Preparing it certainly has been, so far as a copious collection of notes (from which, by the way, the Essay on St. Peter's Supremacy, in the present and preceding volume, is written), begun several years ago, and enlarged from time to time, can be called a preparation. But beyond this, I have been as yet unable to do any thing. Now that my periodical toils are ended, and I shall be no longer compelled to write against time, for a given day or month of publication, I purpose, after a breathing space, to commence the work in earnest and vigorously. My

intention, as the advertisement alluded to sufficiently indicates, was to write in Latin, after the ordinary manner of Theological Prelections. Several weighty reasons, however, have been suggested to me which have ultimately determined my preference of the English language. I am speaking of intentions, not of promises: when I may commence the work, how long I may be engaged on it, when it is likely to be given to the world, are questions which, as I cannot resolve, it would be imprudent to come under any engagement to the public about them. One thing is sufficiently evident, that much labour, many long days of study and writing, will be required to execute so large and difficult a task, in the manner in which I purpose to perform it.

The reader will perceive that the Essay on the Supremacy, though occupying so large a proportion of the present and preceding volume, is still, even as regards the merely Scriptural argument, far from complete. I have not even opened the argument drawn from the peculiar manner in which St. Peter is spoken of and represented in several parts of the New Testament, and which, if properly evolved, would extend much farther than that drawn from the three texts of Matthew, Luke, and John.

As the same principles apply to different objections, or different forms of proof, in order to avoid repetition, frequent references are made from one part of this Essay to another. It will be often necessary for the reader who wishes to have the author's views fully on the point before him, to follow out those references.

So much for the present volume. With respect to the first and second volumes, I have a few words of explanation and retraction to offer, which would have appeared in the introduction to the third, but that I thought it better to reserve them for my farewell address. Had I to commence this series now, I would make an entirely different selection of matter for those two volumes, at least for the first. But this is not the fault for which I now wish to apologise: it is the harsh and contumelious tone which I assumed in both, but far more in the first, towards opponents of a different creed. If a man be, in all the known and tangible relations of life, an honourable and good man, he is entitled to respectful mention; nor does the fact of his being a member of an erring church, or the defender of an erring faith, deprive him of his claim to be treated with decency and courtesy in a book, any more than in private social intercourse. To assail

a man's positions with strong arguments is quite a different thing from assailing himself with strong invectives. These were indeed my convictions, though exercising so little practical influence over me, at the very time those volumes were written. It is not within the last two or three years I have come to the conclusion, that the cause of truth often gains less from the argumentative power of the advocate, than it suffers from his unreasoning intemperance; and that, in any case, charity and good feeling are sure to suffer: but I confess that, though the principle is not new to me, my observations and reflections for the short period that has elapsed since I committed those errors, have placed it in a far stronger and clearer light. So little was I myself conscious of my sinning at the time, so entirely free was I from all virulence of heart, that I suspect I would have remained unconscious to this day, but for the many admonitions and appeals which reached me, some of them from persons entitled to the very highest consideration, some from persons whom I would have supposed to be among the last to read me a friendly lecture (for it is only of friendly advices I speak), on over-acerbity of tone—they having been themselves accustomed to use far bitterer language than any I could suppose myself

capable of adopting. A writer is often, if not generally, about the very worst judge of the literary or other qualities of his productions: so I take it for granted, that the complaints forwarded to me were just. There was indeed a temptation near me* at the time, since removed for ever. But, besides, I may say that I never published any thing with my name until the appearance of these volumes. I had written before that, often enough in periodicals. The ephemeral nature of such publications, and the anonymous, are not unapt to generate a wanton and over-lively habit. A man whom nobody knows, and who is merely writing to entertain or strike for the moment, may say what he likes, and often does so, without observation. Sharp hits, pungencies, and vivacities, are expected if not preferred, on such occasions: the writer serves up his little dish of piquant relish; and, if it be found disagreeably tart, it is ordered off and another called for. A severe critic—not over-severe—is a great blessing to a certain class of young writers: but people have not time, or do not think it worth while, to criticise such productions as I am speaking of: like certain fish that fly up from the sea in sum-

* Not locally near me, it may be right to add, nor in any way whatever connected with Maynooth College.

mer, they drop back into the nothing whence they came, before one has leisure to examine them. It is a far different thing, as I now see, to write in this way, and to come before the world with a real volume, printed on fine paper and in bold type, claiming attention for something more than the passing hour, treating in whole or in part on grave subjects, with one's proper name in full, and in large capitals on the title page, and flanked on both sides with the grave titles of "Reverend" and "Professor of Dogmatic and Moral Theology in the Royal College of St. Patrick, Maynooth"! I hope the kind reader will not accuse me of too much impudence and impertinence, in adverting to this matter—as if it was of the smallest interest to any human being, whether I scribbled my "little volume of nonsense" in a temperate or intemperate tone. But as I know, from the exceedingly unmerited flattering reception I have met with from so many, that there are several who have been so foolishly indulgent as to take an interest in so small a matter, I wished to make this explanation, at least to *them*, at parting. The present and preceding volumes are, I trust, entirely free from any traces of what has been complained of in the first and second. My little romping with Mr. Spooner

in the article on Equivocation will not, I hope, be taken as an indication of the contrary. I entertain not the least ill-will towards the worthy gentleman—though I should prefer his not charging me with teaching immoral doctrines to the future clergy of Ireland: and it is not improbable that the levities alluded to would have been expunged, if the pages containing them had been for a few days longer in my hands. However, I conclude these observations by saying, that I abide by the third and fourth volumes of this series: with them I wish to stand or fall, and with them only.

I should not be at all surprised to find myself denounced by certain doctors of the New Theology as a *heretic*, for some expressions in the preceding paragraph: just as one of my learned colleagues (a professor of the *old* theology) was denounced as a *Protestant*, for saying of Lord Jeffrey, in the Dublin Review for last July, that he was “not only a great but a *good* man”. Now-a-days there are a few individuals who, with their heads hardly dry from the waters of baptism, come out with their frantic and infallible theories, and denounce every man as unsound in the faith, who does not square his language according to their consecrated standard of speech. I have read the life of Lord

Jeffrey through, and I declare that, on the evidence furnished there, he appears to me to have been not only a good, but a singularly and eminently good man, and a most estimable and loveable character. To deny moral virtues or natural goodness to persons not belonging to the Catholic Church, or to say that they do not exist except as the fruit of grace, is simple Jansenism, condemned repeatedly and in various forms by the Church. Thus, the following are, with others of a similar purport, among the condemned propositions of Baius:—

“That distinction of two-fold love, to wit, *natural*, whereby God is loved as the Author of nature; and *gratuitous* [supernatural], whereby God is loved as the Beatifier [author of grace], is idle and imaginary, and devised to throw ridicule on the Scriptures and the numerous testimonies of the ancients [fathers]”—*Prop. 34.*

“He argues with Pelagius [*i. e.* is a Pelagian], who acknowledges any natural good, that is, which proceeds from the mere faculties of nature”—*Prop. 37.*

“That distinction must be rejected according to which a work is said to be good in two ways, either because it is right and good from the object and all the circumstances (which used to be called

morally good); or because it is meritorious of the kingdom of heaven, as being the work of a living member of Christ through the Spirit of Charity"—*Prop. 62.*

"Any good, or not bad, exercise of free-will cannot be admitted without Pelagianism: and he who so thinks and teaches does injury to the grace of Christ"—*Prop. 65.**

So also among the condemned propositions of Quesnel:—

"The grace of Jesus Christ, the efficacious principle of good of whatsoever kind, is necessary to every good work; without it, not only nothing is done, but nothing can be done"—*Prop. 2.*

* "Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut Auctor naturæ, et gratuiti quo Deus amatur ut Beatificator, vana est, commentitia, ad illudendum sacris literis et plurimis veterum testimoniis excogitata.

"Cum Pelagio sentit qui bonum aliquod naturale, hoc est quod ex naturæ solis viribus ortum ducit, agnoscit.

"Illa quoque distinctio qua opus dicitur bifariam bonum, vel quia ex objecto et omnibus circumstantiis rectum est et bonum (quod moraliter bonum appellari consuevit); vel quia est meritorium regni æterni, eo quod fit a vivo Christi membro per Spiritum Charitatis, rejicienda est.

"Nonnisi Pelagiano errore admitti potest usus aliquis liberi arbitrii bonus, sive non malus, et gratiæ Christi injuriam facit qui ita sentit et docet".

“No graces are given but through faith”—*Prop.* 26.

“Faith is the first grace and fountain of all others”—*Prop.* 27.

“Out of the Church no grace is given”—*Prop.* 29.

“What else can we be but darkness, but aberration, but sin, without the light of faith, without Christ, and without charity?”—*Prop.* 48.*

The body of propositions of which the foregoing form a part, are condemned *in globo*, as rash, scandalous, heretical, etc.

Meek and gentle admonition is best suited to those who err through ignorance or even precipitance. But when a man who has yet the very elements of theological science to learn, thrusts himself forward into the Censor's chair, and deals out his anathemas on all about him, in the most dogmatical tone, he deserves, for the common good

* “Jesu Christi gratia, principium efficax boni cujuscumque generis, necessaria est ad omne opus bonum ; absque illa non solum nihil fit, sed nec fieri potest.

“Nullæ dantur gratiæ nisi per fidem.

“Fides est prima gratia, et fons omnium aliarum.

“Extra Ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia.

“Quid aliud esse possumus nisi tenebræ, nisi aberratio, et nisi peccatum sine fidei lumine, sine Christo, et sine charitate?”

as well as for his own, to be treated in a very different manner. "Who ever heard", says a great writer and a good man (though *not* a Catholic), "who ever heard of toleration for intolerance?" "An ironmonger", says the same writer, "is a respectable man, so long as he is merely an ironmonger—an admirable man, if he is a religious ironmonger; but a great blockhead, if he sets up for a bishop, and lectures on theology"; and, I would add, a great social nuisance too, if he lectures in a tone of arrogance, and damns every one whom, in his presumptuous ignorance, he fancies to be going astray from the right line of orthodoxy, when they are only diverging from *his* line of heterodoxy and uncharitableness.

How very different are the feeling and tone of Dr. Newman, in the following passage*—in the sentiment of which I, after long and deep reflection on the matter, fully and cordially agree with the eloquent lecturer!

"And in like manner, I suppose, as regards this country, as well as Greece and Russia, we may entertain most reasonable hopes that vast multitudes are in a state of invincible ignorance; so that those among them who are living a life really religious

* "Anglican Difficulties"—Lect. xi. p. 288.

and conscientious may be looked upon with interest and even pleasure, though a mournful pleasure, in the midst of the pain which a Catholic feels at their ignorant prejudices against what he knows to be true. Among the most bitter railers against the Church in this country, may be found those who are influenced by divine grace, and are at present travelling towards heaven, whatever be their ultimate destiny.....Nay while such persons think as at present, they are bound to act accordingly, and only so far to connect themselves with us as their conscience allows. 'When persons who have been brought up in heresy', says a Catholic theologian, 'persuaded from their childhood that we are the enemies of God's word, are idolaters, pestilent deceivers, and therefore, as pests to be avoided, they cannot, while this persuasion lasts, hear us with a safe conscience, and they labour under invincible ignorance, in as much as they doubt not that they are in a good way'—(*Busembaum*, vol. I., p. 54)".

I could supply Dr. Newman with a pretty long catalogue of theologians far more eminent than Busembaum, who hold the preceding opinion as to the fact of invincible ignorance prevailing to a very great extent. Thus Adam Tanner, a very able and, in his day, very distinguished German divine,

writes:—"Even among heretics and schismatics many simple persons may be excused from the sin of unbelief, in as much, as they trust their elders and pastors, and do not yet sufficiently see that they are in error".* He then cites as of the same opinion Victoria, Vega, Peter Soto, and Vasquez—all theologians of high character. Reiffenstuel, the celebrated canonist, thus writes, in his excellent Moral Theology:—"Material heretics (who, however, according to St. Augustine, *are by no means to be reckoned among heretics*), are those who err in faith, not from malice or pertinacity, but from simplicity or want of proper information. Of these there are many among the common people in heretical societies [*in vulgo hæreticorum*]. For in defect of pertinacity no one is formally a heretic, who is prepared to submit his judgment to the Church, is not aware that the true Church of Christ teaches the contrary, or is so disposed, at least habitually, that he would abandon his error if he knew it to be contrary to the true faith".† He then quotes Mastrius and others as of the same opinion: Mastrius was a profound theologian of the same school as Reiffenstuel—the Scotist. Not to load the page with quo-

* De Fide: D. 1, Q. 8, n. 10 (Tom., 3, p. 438).

† Theolog. Moral., T. 4, D. 4, n. 19.

tations, the same opinion is held by numerous other divines—and, I note as having peculiar significance and weight, from their peculiar position and opportunities of observation, by German divines, as Sporer, La Croix, etc., etc.

When the article on the Supremacy was sent to press, I directed the printer to begin with the third sheet. Whatever would remain of the two first, after the aforesaid apology and a few other prefatory remarks, I intended to occupy with an account of the strong and numerous (and they are, both strong and numerous) vestiges of the exercise of the Papal Supremacy and the open unreserved profession of the doctrine, which are contained in the acts and decrees of the great Council of Chalcedon. This Council was held about the middle of the fifth century, for the condemnation of the Eutychian heresy, and all the members of it, with the exception of five, were Bishops of the Greek Church. The celebrated letter which the Council addressed to Pope Leo, begging his confirmation of their acts, and calling him their Leader, their Head, the Guardian of the vine, etc., has been often referred to. But there are several other very striking indications of the belief of the Council in reference to this dogma

scattered through the acts, some of which I have never seen referred to by any theologian. For example, the Pope in his letter to the Council stated that he would preside, as he actually did preside, over it, in the persons of his legates.* Paschasinus, one of the Pope's legates opened the business of the Council by saying, "We have the commands of the most blessed and the apostolic Bishop of the city of the Romans, which is the head of all the churches,† in which [commands] he has thought fit to say that Dioscorus should not sit in the Council". Another of the Apostolic Legates then gave as a reason for the objection to Dioscorus that "he dared to hold a Council without the authority of the Apostolic throne, a thing which has never happened, or was lawful to happen".‡ At the close of this first session the Council passes a decree which it thus commences, "It appears just to us, according

* After stating that he could not appear personally, he adds:—
Πλην εν τούτοις τοις ἀδελφοῖς, τούτ' ἐστίν, ἐν Πασχασίνῳ κ. τ. λ.
... τοῖς ἀπεσταλμένοις ὑπο τοῦ θρόνου τῶν Ἀποστόλων, ἐμε τῆς
συνόδου προεδρεῖν ἢ ὑμῶν Ἀδελφότης ἡγείσθω. "Nevertheless let
your Brotherhood hold me as *presiding* in those brothers, namely
Paschasinus, etc., sent by the Apostolic See"—*Concil. Chal. Act.*
p. 49, Ed. Harduin.

† Κεφαλὴς ὑπαρχόντος πᾶσων τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν. p. 68.

‡ Ὅπερ οὐδεποτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ ἐξον γενέσθαι. *ibid.*

to what is pleasing to God, if it so seems to our most sacred and pious lord,* that the same punishment be inflicted on Dioscorus, etc.....all subsequent acts being referred to the sacred supremacy".† The charge of Ischyrius, a deacon of Alexandria, against Dioscorus, and which was read in a subsequent session, is thus inscribed, "To the most holy and blessed ecumenical archbishop‡ and patriarch of great Rome, Leo, and to the holy and ecumenical Council assembled at Chalcedon".

I had intended to quote at large both in English and in the original the numerous passages scattered through the acts of the Council, including the letter of the Council itself, above alluded to, which so strikingly illustrate the clear and public belief even of the Oriental Church, at that early period, in the Supremacy of the See of Rome. These extracts, accompanied by a brief running commentary, I would have put forth as a *specimen* of the proof of the Supremacy drawn from Tradition.

But there is such a glut of Greek and Dogmatic

* Εἰ παρασταῖη τῷ θειοτάτῳ καὶ εὐσεβεστάτῳ ἡμῶν δεσποτῇ.—*p.* 272.

† Παντῶν παρακολουθησαντῶν τῇ θείᾳ κορυφῇ γνωρίζουενων.—*ibid.*

‡ Οἰκουμενικῇ ἀρχιεπισκοπῇ.—*p.* 325.

and Moral Theology through all the rest of the volume, that I may as well reserve these lucubrations for the Treatise on the Church mentioned above, and squander the rest of this introductory paper in a more familiar conversation on some less ponderous subject. As the lawyer and the collegian are fairly entitled to vacation, after their respective Terms of heavy work ; so I think that, after having fixed St. Peter on the firm rock, and felled to the ground an army of his assailants, after having snubbed Spooner, and excommunicated all liars, and harmonized loyalty and liberty, and had a friendly parting pass of arms with Dr. Whately, I have a claim to the reader's indulging me in some "rambling scrambling" talk on some less engrossing theme or themes for the few pages that remain ; to his granting me the license of a "chartered libertine" for the brief span of an author's existence that lies before me in this little book. What is a man's book but a man's self in print? Joy and sadness, smiles and tears, light and darkness, work and recreation, war and peace, are the alternations which make up the sum of human life, from the king's to the peasant's: and high and low, wet and dry, light and heavy, fertile and barren, warm and cold, summer and winter, are the alternations of

nature. Why then should a book, unless the author chooses to make it so, like the philosopher who never laughed or the other philosopher who never wept—why should a book be all of one tenor and one complexion? Because I am a theologian, am I never to show myself except in my theological coat of mail, objection-proof, bristling with syllogism, and rigid with argument? Homer sang of war and the battles of the gods, and he also, or some mellifluous silver-tongued wag for him, sang the battles of the frogs and mice. Another great poet of our own age, who also sang of epic themes, once gave to the world a song, which the above-named Lord Jeffrey, lauding it very highly nevertheless, characterised as a piece of “desultory babbling about Italy and England, Turks, balls, literature, and fish sauce”.

Well, then, here is a specimen of “fish sauce”—for certainly there is nothing either of flesh or bone in it—presented to the public by Sir Francis Head on the first day of this present month of November, in the shape of an octavo volume, and under the railway title of “A Fortnight in Ireland.” I have read only something less than the first half of the volume attentively, and but

portions of the second part: it is therefore of the first part, or rather of one section of it, that I purpose to speak.

Sir Francis, who had never been in Ireland before, and (*page 4*) frankly avows his previous utter and absolute ignorance of the country, took a run over here, note-book in hand, about the middle of last August, dashed to the Model Schools of the National Education System in Dublin—then dashed to the Constabulary Depot in the confines of the same city—then dashed down to (I should rather say *at*) the Royal College of Maynooth, was shown all about the Establishment—then dashed at his note-book with the impetuous assiduity of all Dodson and Fogg's clerks together, when they heard one of their masters' footsteps on the stairs—then, having been previously invited to partake of the hospitalities of the College, dashed at “a large joint of mutton, a great dish full of fowls, ham, and vegetables of various sorts, then one immense fruit pie, with cheese, butter, and a slight dessert”, and then “superexcellent port and sherry” (*p. 94*), not forgetting a little whisky punch, of which, most ungratefully, no record is given (good whisky, by the way, is not so easily procurable in and

about Dublin as at Cork)—then, replete with fermenting solids and liquids, he dashed off into the very heart of Connaught, shot through towns, stormed police stations, whirled along desolate roads, by whole villages of roofless and deserted cabins, the wreck of recent evictions, through long tracts of rich tenantless country, devouring the ground in the speed and vehemence of his movements—until, lost for a moment behind some range of mountains, as we expect with straining eyes to see him every second emerging again, to our infinite amazement, we find him vanished with the velocity of thought, clear and clean out of Ireland altogether, dashing away, for aught we can tell, to the moon, or to some other planet quiet enough to write a book in. There never was such a journey since that of Phaeton, which nearly set the world on fire. There is a saying among the Irish peasantry, that “nothin’ bates the art of man barrin’ the bees”: nothing beats Head but electricity and light.

But this is not all. The journey is but miracle the first. In the course of two months appears miracle the second—a volume of four hundred pages in large octavo, written, printed, corrected in the proofs, folded, sowed, bound, and published, within that period, in which this prodigy of a

Head not only gives an account of his journey, which were but an ordinary feat of authorship, but, with unhesitating confidence and decisive authority, answers questions regarding the social condition of Ireland, and resolves difficulties, and investigates causes, which the ablest statesmen of England have been unable to answer, to resolve, or to investigate. All this by a man who, in the very commencement of his book, avows his ignorance of Ireland previous to this telegraphic - despatch journey! I merely state the fact. I do not propose to argue about his theories, as I have not carefully read this portion of the work, though I have glanced sufficiently through it to see what the theories and conclusions are. In any case I would not introduce such discussions here.

The book resembles nothing more than furious driving through a crowded street. It is always dashing—dashing at every thing, the creed of Pope Pius, the Council of Trent, Dens' Theology, Canon Law, Confession, Indulgences, Gregory the Sixteenth, the Index Expurgatorius, Dr. Doyle, and Dr. Murray—all within the space of a few pages of *one* "Fortnight in Ireland". This "Isle of destiny" has perplexed Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord John Russell, almost every English

politician and statesman who has ever meddled with it; but it has fairly turned Head's head.

Sir F. Head is fond of gossip. He gives numerous dialogues which he held with Irish peasants. The drollest feature in them—to me—are his ludicrous attempts at representing the peculiarities of Irish pronunciation. I once knew a gentleman who always laughed first at his own stories; and every one to whom he told them laughed also—as he thought, at them, but in reality at himself. If our facetious baronet should excite the laughter of any of his Irish readers, it will be in this way.

He has *gort* for *got*, *orf* for *off*, *starp* for *stop*, *arlways* for *always*, *Arn'r* for *Honour*, *knas* for *knees*, *jarb* for *job*, *auld* for *old*, *as* for *who*, *ut* for *it*, etc., etc. What is still more comical, he gives exactly the same peculiarities as prevailing in every part of Ireland he visited, in Mayo and Kildare, in Ballinrobe and in Dublin.

Now it is notorious that the dialects are as different in each of the four provinces, as the dialect of any one of them is different from that of Yorkshire or Edinburgh. But the best of it is that not one of the preceding peculiarities, not one in every ten noted by Head, exists in any part of Ireland, among any class. That *ut* for *it* may be sometimes heard in

the extreme Northern coast is not impossible, as along a narrow and broken strip of that coast pure Scotch is spoken by some; the same may be said of *auld* for *old*, which is Scotch; the peasant's pronunciation in Ireland being *owld*, as *cowld* for *cold*, *bowld* for *bold*, and the like. But as for the rest, that they are never heard anywhere I have no doubt. As for *who* is pure Cockneyism, as every reader of Dickens knows; it is utterly unknown in Ireland. I suspect that Head is a bit of a Cockney, and that his familiarity with the Cockney use of the canine letter put his ear out of tune. His specimens of Irish dialect had no existence out of his note-book; they are a mixture, and a very ill-compounded mixture, too, of the speech of Sairy Gamp and Larry O'Branigan, of Sir Francis Head and Judy O'Mulligan.

Sir Francis's account of his visit to Maynooth, though full of small inaccuracies, is upon the whole temperately and fairly written. He has nothing to state in any way discreditable to the institution. But when he comes, at the end of the volume, to draw his conclusion; when he bounds from facts and observation into speculation and induction, his inference is directly the opposite of that to which his premises lead—so far as they lead to anything.

He resembles a man who makes matter-of-fact statements regarding some measure, which are altogether favourable to it, but ends by voting against it. He sees with the eye, and hears with the ear, but reasons not with the understanding. It is remarkable that, though he takes laudable pains to inform his readers of the large number of Bibles in the College library, and though he gives two formal lists, one of the professors' chairs, another of the *curriculum* of studies, yet throughout he never once alludes to the chair of Scripture. I agree with him in what he says about the cemetery: it is very shameful that things are left as they are.

"On entering it [the cemetery], I was much surprised to find a very small space of ground, surrounded by an ordinary hedge, and choke full of long grass and thistles. There was no cross of any sort or kind; indeed, all that marked it to be a burial-ground were four flat stones, each resting on four plain pedestals about three feet high. One of these stones was surrounded by iron rails. All were to the memory of great Dons of this College, whose distinctions were detailed at unusual length in Latin. To the graves of the students—three or four only of which could I

manage to find out with my feet, so completely were they covered with weeds—there was neither epitaph, stone, cross, or any memorial whatever; indeed, when I reflected on the apparent omission, I could not but admit, that of the history of a poor student at Maynooth, who has not lived to be a priest, but little more could be written than—‘Here lies an Ecclesiastical Flower that never bloomed’.”

He complains that he could not get the students to enter into conversation with him, and that he found them “more serious and taciturn than he expected”. I should be glad to know what sort of questions Sir Francis put to the students he met: for I have known it to happen frequently that strangers visiting the College asked questions so impertinent and grossly offensive to religious feelings, that the only fitting answer would have been to get them immediately turned out. This has happened, I am bound to add, chiefly with Irish Protestant visitors, very rarely with English or Scotch, who, so far as I have ever observed, when they came in the garb of gentlemen, uniformly conducted themselves like gentlemen. Five or six weeks ago a batch of emissaries from the Priests’ Protection Society, I was sorry to hear with a few

clergymen among them, entered the College and, running into the library, commenced to belabour the students reading there with objections against clerical celibacy, etc.: some of them had the modesty to ask one of the professors of theology, without introduction of any kind, for leave to enter his lecture hall, and remain there, and probably open a public discussion, during the lecture hour. If half a dozen of Irish priests assailed the University of Dublin or of Oxford in this way?

He saw the students issuing from the refectory, after dinner. "None of them", he says, "appeared at all flushed, and I am therefore of opinion that their repast, whatever it may have been composed of, had been partaken of by them with great moderation". The repast, I can inform him, was composed of the same solid mutton for some, and beef for others, as he regaled himself on, a little later, with the professors, but *minus* the fowl and other accessories, and with small beer instead of "super-excellent port and sherry".

Before dinner he was introduced by the Vice-President (by whom he had been previously shown the College), to all the other "Principals", of whom he says that, "in appearance, and in reality, they were exceedingly clever-looking men". I was

out of College at the time—it being vacation—and, therefore, cannot share in the compliment. I was told that Sir Francis and the few of the professors who were there spent a very gay evening together, and enjoyed a good deal of hearty, harmless, genuine Irish fun.

Maynooth, during the summer vacation, that is from near the end of June to the beginning of September, must be a dull place to visit: I know it is shocking dull to live in. Deserted halls, deserted corridors, deserted rooms, deserted squares: the Board of Works in full operation, repairing the dilapidations of the past, and anticipating the wants of the coming academical year—scrubbing, sawing, plastering, boring, hammering, painting, glazing, and so forth: the hum and stir of life that fill every nook and corner during the season of study, subsided into stillness and stagnation. But a very small proportion of the students remain in College during vacation, at least during the whole of it. Their number is particularly small about the period which Sir Francis selected for his visit, probably under one tenth of the whole. The College has a drowsy and dusty aspect, and looks not very unlike a large house with but one or two care-takers living in it. The lecture halls are filled with

forms and tables stowed away and crowded together, though they are so soon to enclose so many healthy, juvenile, and, notwithstanding the serious and taciturn countenances which Sir Francis saw, or fancied he saw, really light-hearted, and by no means joke or laughter-hating, crowds of students. The professors' pulpits, in which those "great Dons" are, after a few weeks, to pour out their stores of erudition, and weave webs of mimic sophistry to catch their unwary pupils in, look like a room out of which a dead man was just taken to be buried—as if the living sounds which echoed there so oft before would never be heard in them again. The battery of spits, on which a whole army of sheep and bullocks are to be roasted before next Christmas, moves lazily round with its diminished burden—as if the College had lost its appetite in the hot weather. The long gravel walks and large fields, over which, by and by, so many hundreds of gowns and caps will swarm, present the show of a few small knots, withdrawn from the sun and reclining here and there under the shade of the trees, like wayworn travellers enjoying a green spot in the wide, wide desert. The College is in a kind of syncope, and nothing seems really to live in it except the old carpenter

with his great brown-paper cap and wallet of nails (he is never without them, and always has one ready as the general cure for any complaint under which any article of your furniture may labour), the painter, the mason, and the rest of that class. The summer vacation is not the time to see Maynooth, at least to see the living, breathing Maynooth—Maynooth in full life and action, working through all its depths, and boiling over with Theology and Scripture and syllogism and enthymeme and sorites.

Sir F. Head is a keen, shrewd observer, and, if he observed leisurely and calmly, might become an accurate one: but nothing could make him a sound reasoner, he is evidently deficient in the thinking faculty. His book is worthless: it is too superficial, too hasty, and therefore almost of necessity, too inaccurate in the statements: for the rest it is nothing. I do not speak of the documents which he collected about the Irish elections: if they are not authentic, those most interested would do well to deny them; if they are authentic, let them pass exactly for what they are worth. *Tantum valeant quantum valere debent.**

* I have said nothing of Sir F. Head's publishing the private and personal affairs of an institution with which he is totally uncon-

It may be right and proper to state here, in conclusion, that I am alone responsible for everything contained in this volume: that I have neither asked nor received advice, direction, suggestion, or commission of any kind from any human being, whether in Maynooth College or out of it, on any topic touched on in these pages. I deemed it becoming to ask permission of the gentleman concerned, to allude, as I have done above, to the authorship of the article on Lord Jeffrey: beyond this I had no communication with any one.

My little holyday is now over, and I return back to more serious work.

P. MURRAY.

ROYAL COLLEGE OF ST. PATRICK,
MAYNOOTH,

November 15, 1852.

nected. It would be no justification to say that he previously announced his intention of doing so; for no private individual has a right to put others to the alternative of either acting rudely, or of having their private affairs, the sort of meat and wine with which they entertain their guests, etc., paraded before the world. I know not what persons better acquainted with the conventional rules of decorum may think: but my feeling is, that I would grossly violate those rules, if I acted towards any similar institution, as Sir F. Head has acted towards Maynooth.

ST. ALBERT'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

Supremacy of St. Peter,

AND OF HIS SUCCESSORS THE BISHOPS OF ROME

[Continued from the preceding volume.]

Supremacy

OF SAINT PETER AND HIS SUCCESSORS.

BOOK I

PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE.

CHAPTER I

ARGUMENTS FROM MATTHEW, XVI.

[Continued from the preceding volume.]

III. THE POWER OF BINDING AND LOOSING.

§ 2. *Extent of the power of binding and loosing here promised to Peter.*

108. THAT Peter was to receive the power of binding and loosing is the direct assertion contained in our Lord's words. The power to bind and loose is, of course, a power to do something. Before we come to investigate what that power implies, it will be more convenient to examine previously the extent to which the right of exerci-

sing it was conferred on Peter—for, to speak in a somewhat scholastic phraseology, the *intensive* magnitude of the power may be more clearly ascertained after the question of its *extensive* magnitude shall have been settled.

109. I assert that it was a power extending over all the earth, extending over all persons and things on earth, in respect of whom and which the authority committed by Christ to his Church can be, according to Christ's law, exercised.

I have said "over all persons and things, in respect of whom", etc. For Christ in conferring authority fixed two limitations beside that already pointed out (*n.* 63). First, with regard to persons, none but those who have been baptized are subject to the laws of the Church: secondly, with regard to things, the power of the Church is purely spiritual.

110. I. As to *place*, the power promised to Peter extended over all the earth.

The word "earth", not being qualified by any thing in the context, must be understood in its widest acceptation, as meaning *the whole earth*. This is according to the common usage of speech. The usage of Scripture is clear and decisive, especially whenever, as in the text before us, the words

heaven and earth (*γη, οὐρανος* or *οὐρανοί*) occur together as contradistinguished one from the other.

“In the beginning God created heaven and earth”—*Genes.*, i. 1. So also ii. 1, 4; xiv. 19, 22; xxvii. 39.

“There is no other God either in heaven or earth”—*Deuteron.*, iii. 24. So also xxxi. 28; xxxii. 1.

“Let the heavens rejoice and the earth be glad”
—I. *Paralip.*, xvi. 31. So also xxi. 16; xxix. 11.
II. *Paralip.*, ii. 12; vi. 14.

“Hear, O ye heavens, and give ear, O earth”—*Isaias*, i. 2. So also xlix. 13; li. 13, 16; lv. 9; lxvi. 1, 22; etc.

In the New Testament—

“Amen I say to you, till heaven and earth pass”
—*Matth.*, v. 18. So also *ibid.*, 34; vi. 10; xi. 25; xxiv. 35; xxviii. 18; etc.

111. II. As to *things*, the promised power extends to all. For the word *whatsoever* (*ὅ*) is of the most universal extension, and is limited by no qualifying word or circumstance in the text. There is therefore nothing, in reference to which the spiritual power of binding and loosing can be exercised, exempt from the power of binding and loosing here promised to Peter.

112. III. As to *persons*, the promised power extends in like manner to all.

1°. Persons as well as things are included in the *whatsoever*. Nor does the circumstance that the word is in the neuter gender affect its extension, as Lightfoot and other Protestant writers have maintained, but on the contrary the universality of that extension would seem to be marked thereby more emphatically. There are in Scripture several examples wherein a universal term in the neuter gender not only includes, but specially if not exclusively includes persons. Thus "The Son of man is come to save *that which was lost*" (το απολωλος)—*Matth.*, xviii. 11. "Amen, amen I say to thee, unless *a man* (τις) be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. *That which is born* (το γεγεννημενον) of the flesh, is flesh; *that which is born of the spirit is spirit*"—*John*, iii. 5. "All (παν) that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and *him* that cometh to me (τον ερχομενον) I will not cast out.....This is the will of my Father that sent me, that of *all that* (παν ο) he hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should raise *it* (αυτο) up again in the last day. And this is the will of my Father that sent me, that *every one* (πας) who

seeth the Son and believeth in him may have life everlasting, and I will raise *him* (*αυτον*) up in the last day"—*John*, vi. 37, 39, 40. Here we see the masculine and neuter used indifferently to designate persons and persons only. "I pray for *them* [his disciples]; I pray not for the world, but for them whom thou hast given me; because they are thine, and *all mine* (*τα εμα παντα*) are thine, and thine are mine"—*John*, xvii. 9. Bloomfield remarks on this text, "The neuter *παντα* is here used to denote both *persons* and *things*". In the beginning of the same chapter (*ver.* 2) the neuter denotes persons exclusively. "As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he may give eternal life to all whom thou hast given him"; literally from the Greek (which the Vulgate follows), "that all *which* (*παν ο*) thou hast given him, he may give to *them* (*αυτοις*) eternal life".

2°. That *whatsoever* includes whatsoever persons necessarily follows from the universal extent of places and things already proved. For the spiritual power communicated by our Lord extends to places and things, not as such, not as considered apart from the men who live in those places, and whose actions affect those things or are affected by them. On the contrary, it was for the children of

- Adam and for them alone that all spiritual power was given, all divine institutions brought into existence, the whole work of redemption and all that is implied in it were begun, carried on, and consummated. Thus when our Lord said to his Apostles, "You shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the Earth"—*Acts*, i., he conferred or supposed as already conferred on them authority to preach the Gospel in all places whatsoever, not surely to streets and houses, not to hills and plains, but to the human beings found there. Now as Peter received the power of binding and loosing in all places and over all things, the meaning is that he received this power over all persons in all places whatsoever and in reference to all things whatsoever. Thus when we say that Victoria is Queen of England, we mean Queen of the inhabitants of England and of all the inhabitants. So when any one is said to be Bishop of a certain diocese, it is meant that he is Bishop over all who are subject to episcopal jurisdiction in that diocese.

§. 3. *What is signified by the power of binding and loosing?*

113. That some kind of power was here

promised to Peter is, as I have said, evident from the words, and, I believe, admitted by all. I now proceed to show that this power is nothing less than *the plenitude of spiritual jurisdiction*.

I. We have seen that the two preceding metaphors of the Rock and the Keys implied this plenitude of authority. It would be a falling off—a lowering—a sinking, if after having commenced his address in a style of eulogy and benediction so sublime, “Blessed art thou, Simon son of Jonas”, etc., if after having then promised to raise Peter to so high an eminence of power, if after having conveyed the prediction and promise under two different types so grand and expressive, if after all this our Lord closed his address with a third symbol of far inferior dignity and compass. It would have been to confer the lesser after having conferred the greater containing it, to invest with inferior office after having bestowed the crown and sceptre of royalty, to array with a smaller glory after having clothed with the sun. “I will make thee the one supreme ruler and commander of the whole army of my Church, its principle of strength unconquerable against all the powers of hell for all time: I will place in thy hands the symbol of undivided sovereignty, and thou shalt be the monarch and

legislator of my kingdom on earth: I will make thee"—what shall we suppose Christ to have added here in conclusion but what would be in keeping with the splendour and magnitude of what precedes? What shall we suppose but the same great idea and nothing less reproduced under another type* as ample in significance as either of the preceding?

114. II. The words of this member of the text, each joined to each, and all weighed together as one whole, that is as they really proceeded from the divine lips, do naturally and forcibly convey the idea of immense unbounded authority. For, to Peter is here promised the power not only of binding but of loosing, and the promise is marked by the emphatic distinction of the two parts—"whatsoever thou shalt *bind*—whatsoever thou shalt *loose*". Moreover it is a power not restricted to this or that thing or class of things, but in express terms pronounced unlimited—"whatsoever thou shalt bind—*whatsoever* thou shalt loose". Farther, it is a power not restricted to place, and, as we have seen, therefore not restricted to persons, but in express terms extended to all the earth and to all that

* See below n. 125. SUAREZ, Defens. Fid. 1. 3. c. 10. n. 13.

are on the earth—"whatsoever thou shalt bind *on earth*—whatsoever thou shalt loose *on earth*". Yet still farther, it is a power whose exercise was to be ratified in heaven, as if that exercise were heaven's own work, not ratified in part or figuratively, but wholly and really—"it shall be bound also *in heaven*—it shall be loosed also *in heaven*": what Peter binds God binds, what Peter looses God looses. Finally, the promise is made directly and immediately by God himself, from whose mouth no idle word can fall—"and *I* say to thee".

Certainly the accumulation of terms so explicit and so unlimited in their meaning would seem to imply that the power which they signify is an unlimited power.

115. III. The preceding reflections are of a general character and founded on a *prima facie* consideration of the text. Let us now proceed to a more minute examination of the words, and try to ascertain their precise import.

First. Whatever be the precise meaning of the phrases "to bind and to loose", and granting that they signify only power of a particular species, yet the power which they do signify is here promised to Peter in supreme degree. That is to say, the

- power is in its own sphere (as we say in the schools *in genere suo*) supreme: there is no power *of the same kind* above it, all such power is subordinate to it. This follows from what has been proved, that all things, places, and persons are subject to it. All power of the kind is under it, none is above it or coördinate with it. This may be illustrated from our British constitution. The sovereign, at least in theory, possesses supreme executive authority: but the supreme legislative authority is vested in the sovereign and the two houses of parliament. Here then is an individual having supreme authority in one department, though not in another. In the same way the power of binding and loosing in Peter, restrict it as you will in respect of the matter about which it can be exercised, is still supreme within those limits of restriction. This, though not enough for the fulness of our doctrine, proves quite enough against the doctrine of our opponents, who will not admit any real sovereign authority by divine right in St. Peter or his successors.

116. *Secondly.* Among the several opinions of writers, whether Catholic or Protestant, on the exact import of the metaphor of binding and loosing, there are only two possessing any degree of probability. Such of the rest as are worth

notice will be refuted hereafter under the head of objections.

The first of those two opinions is that *to bind and loose* signifies *to command and permit*. Perhaps I should rather speak of the first *class* of opinions: for, according to some, the words signify *to enact and to abrogate—to establish any rule or ordinance so as to make it obligatory or binding (to bind), to abolish or forbear to enact some rule, to leave men exempt, released, loosed from the observance of it (to loose)*. According to others they signify *to forbid, to interdict (to bind), to pronounce lawful, concede, permit, direct, constitute, etc.* Others again say that *to bind* signifies *to pronounce or determine to be binding or obligatory; to loose* signifies *to pronounce or determine not to be binding, etc., etc.** If the reader should try to arrange these several meanings under their two heads respectively, he will find it not an easy task to reconcile some of them together. However, as they all agree substantially, in the same general idea of commanding or enacting, on one hand, and of permitting or abrogating (*i. e.* withdrawing a command) on the

* I have transcribed these meanings from the works of respectable Protestant theologians: some of our theologians adopt the same meanings, at least in part.

other, we may proceed on this interpretation—taking, for brevity's sake, *command* and *permit* as the literal meaning of the metaphor of *binding* and *loosing*. The chief grounds of this opinion will be briefly noticed hereafter (n. 121, 122).

117. According to this interpretation of the metaphor, Peter received *power unlimited* (n. 109, etc.) *of commanding and permitting in reference to persons, places, and things*. Now this power involves the fulness of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

I. It involves or rather *is* the power of enacting laws and issuing precepts through the whole Church, and of dispensing in all ecclesiastical laws and edicts.

II. It implies the power of teaching the whole Church, of pointing out what doctrine shall be held as sound, and what doctrine shall be rejected as unsound. It is a power given for the wellbeing and stability of the Church, and, being unlimited, must extend to that on which the well-being and stability of the Church primarily depends, that is, to the matter of faith (n. 66). Peter was empowered to command and permit in matters of doctrine, that is, to command certain doctrines to be held as sound, and certain doctrines to be rejected as unsound, and to permit other doctrines to be freely

discussed as not appertaining to the deposit of faith. The faith of men as Christians is at least as intimately connected with the wellbeing of the Church as the public conduct of men as citizens is connected with the wellbeing of the state. He who has supreme power of commanding and permitting in the state, for the welfare of the state, has by the fact supreme power of regulating the actions of the people in all that appertains to the welfare of the state. So he who has supreme power of commanding and permitting in the Church for the welfare of the Church, has supreme power of regulating the faith of the people.

III. For the same reason the unlimited power of commanding and permitting implies a general power of inspecting, admonishing, punishing, appointing to offices and removing therefrom, making or modifying arrangements in particular cases, etc. For it is evident that an unlimited power of commanding and permitting through the whole Church of God, could not be exercised with effect for the end for which it was given, could not be a real *bona fide* power, but a mere barren, inoperative power, unless it involved authority to do all those things, that is, unless it involved the plenitude of jurisdiction.

118. The second opinion is that the words "whatsoever thou shalt bind", etc., not only *imply* but *directly signify* that to Peter was promised the plenitude of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; that not only the power of commanding and permitting, of enacting and abrogating, but all power whatsoever of jurisdiction given by Christ to his Church, was here not merely by implication but formally, though in a general form, promised to him.

This opinion appears to me much the more probable of the two.

It is not by laws or special commands alone that men are bound, nor is it from them alone that men may be loosed. There is nothing which prevents free action, nothing which in any way prevents change, keeps in a state of permanence, or necessitates change, or by overruling influence fixes or moves or alters or affects in any way, that may not be conceived under the image of binding, or the removal thereof under the image of loosing. Of course, according to the genius of a language, and the habits and imaginative tendencies of different nations, this metaphor will, in the common usage of speech, be extended to a greater or lesser variety of things. Thus we read of the bondage of the law, the bond of friendship, the ties of kindred, the

chains of death; one poet has the "chain of repose" and "the cold chain of silence", another "the living chain of interwoven agency" heaved round the earth by the action of conflicting elements. So we speak of men being bound by law, by conscience, by honour, by shame, by custom, by habit, by affection, by circumstances. It is evident that the metaphor is not restricted to laws or commands, but is equally applicable to an endless variety of other subjects.

119. How then are we to know what particular kind of binding or loosing is meant in any particular text? I answer, from the context. In the context I include circumstances well known to the speaker or writer, and supposed to be equally well known to the hearer or reader, and, as a matter of course, not necessary to be expressed. Thus, if a man is addressing another about a fact well known to both, he will not give a detailed account of it, but, supposing this to be superfluous, proceed to state such speculations or inferences as his purpose requires.

That the particular kind of binding or loosing intended by the writer must be ascertained from the context, is evident from the common usages of speech in all languages and at all times. Thus if I

want to say that a man is bound in the most literal sense of the word, viz. by chains or cords, either the express words of my context or the obvious circumstances in which I speak, must define this particular meaning; otherwise I will not be understood. If I speak of binding a book, a kerchief, a wheel, the words *book*, *kerchief*, *wheel*, determine the specific meaning of the word. So if I wish to convey the idea of binding in a metaphorical sense, and say that 'John is bound to do so and so', the bare words leave it undetermined whether he is bound by law, or contract, or promise, etc. This is true of all words which have different meanings in common use, whether the diversity be between one literal meaning and another, or between a literal and metaphorical meaning. It is the context which in all cases must determine the particular meaning of the word and its extension. •

120. If we look to the usage of Scripture in reference to the words under examination, we shall find this plain principle confirmed. The word *bind* (δεω) is used in a metaphorical sense in the following passages.

"And now behold, being bound in the spirit, I go to Jerusalem"—*Acts*, xx. 22. Here we know from the context and from what revelation else-

where tells us of the way in which the Holy Spirit acts upon the soul, that *bound* signifies *impelled*—the knowledge having been supernaturally infused into the soul of Paul, that it was God's will that he should go to Jerusalem.

“The woman that hath a husband, while her husband liveth, is bound to the law”: or rather, “is by the law bound to her husband while he liveth”—*Rom.*, ii. 2. Here the word is determined to the meaning of legal obligation. So also in I. *Corinth.*, vii. 27 and 39.

To these texts others might be added.

The word *loose* (*λυω*) is used in a metaphorical sense, or, at least in a sense different from the primary and common, in the following passages—to which also others might be added.

“The king sent, and he loosed him, the ruler of the people”—*Psalms*, civ. 20. That is, “he released him”, as the Douay version has it, and as the context and other parts of Scripture plainly determine.

“He therefore that shall loose [break] one of these least commandments”, etc.—*Matth.*, v. 19. Here the context determines the meaning to a violation of a law.

In the same way is the meaning determined in the following texts.

“Loose [destroy] this temple”—*John*, ii. 19.

“Because, he did not merely loose [break] the Sabbath”—*ib.*, v. 18, *also* vii. 23.

“And the Scripture cannot be loosed [cannot speak falsely, or cannot be disregarded]”—*ib.*, x. 35.

“Whom God hath raised up, having loosed [overcome, or banished away] the sorrows of hell”—*Acts*, ii. 24.

“When the synagogue was loosed [broken up—as we say, the meeting *dissolved*]”—*ibid.*, xiii. 43.

“Art thou bound [not united in marriage to] a wife?”—*I. Cor.*, vii. 27.

We may here observe, that *bind* and *loose* in their figurative sense, are not frequently found together in the same context, whether in Scripture or the classical writers.

121. Jahn* and others bring numerous examples from the Rabbinical writers, in which the meaning of the words is clearly to *command*, or *establish* (bind), and to *abrogate*, or *pardon*, or *settle a dispute*, or *arrange any affair* (loose). I observe on this, 1^o that the prevalence of this restricted (and perhaps I might call it *technical* or

* Enchirid. Hermeneut. § 22.

class) meaning in the Rabbinical writings, does not prove in any way, or with any degree of probability, that the words possessed that class meaning in the time of our Lord; still less, that they had only this particular meaning, when used metaphorically. Nor, even supposing that Rabbinical meaning to have been more commonly intended and understood on occasions when the Rabbinical phraseology would be adopted, does it follow, that our Lord conformed himself to that usage on the present occasion. 2°. It is evident, even from the passages of Scripture just quoted, that no such restricted meaning was in use in our Lord's time: *there are no traces whatever of it in the Bible.* 3°. I maintain that in every example taken from the Rabbinical writings, the context plainly determines the restricted meaning which the words have in those examples; and that they do not furnish sufficient evidence for concluding that, even among the Rabbinical writers themselves, a single metaphorical meaning was so fixed to the words, that it would be at once understood without reference to the context.

122. Some writers have attempted to prove from certain derivations, that the figurative meaning of *bind* and *loose* was restricted to the idea of

commanding, permitting, and the like. Thus, they say, אָסַר (*ēsār*) (*Dan.*, vi. 7), which signifies a *prohibition*, is derived from אָסַר (*āsār*) to bind; also certain words which imply *duty* or *obligation* come from roots which signify *to bind*, as δεῖ from δεω, *lex*, *obligatio*, *religio*, etc., from *ligo*. All this is very true, but any one who glances into this department of word tracing, will quickly see that the derivative not only need not, but commonly does not, exhaust the meaning of the root, nay in general participates but very slightly therein—the parent, in this case as in others, having often a large offspring with striking marks of dissimilarity between them and him, and between each other. Doctrinal arguments, based on derivation, are generally showy, sometimes solid, but always to be carefully examined.

123. This, then, is the sum of the matter. The words *to bind* and *to loose* have a very wide figurative sense. Whenever they are in Scripture taken in a more restricted figurative sense, and of some particular kind of binding and loosing, this restriction proceeds from the context, and is indicated by it. In the text before us *there is no restriction, or shadow of restriction whatever*—on the contrary, every word conveys the idea of universality, of un-

limited amplitude. From all which it follows, that the words are to be here understood in the widest extent, limited only by the boundaries already indicated. In other words, I conceive that the power here *formally* expressed and promised, is not a particular species of spiritual power, a power to do any one thing in particular, *e. g.* a power to command or permit, a power to legislate, a power to teach, a power to forgive sins, etc.; in short, that the words do not signify any one department or function of spiritual jurisdiction, but the fulness thereof, all departments, all functions expressed in general terms. What that jurisdiction involves in detail, we know from other parts of revelation expressly, or by necessary implication from a consideration of the divine constitution of the Church, of the end of that constitution, of the powers and privileges and instruments which God has given to her, for working out that end. Thus, if a person is appointed with the full powers of a judge or vicerent of a sovereign in a place, he thereby has full powers as judge or vicerent; but what these powers are, we know from the constitution of the country, as fixed by written fundamental law, or acknowledged inviolable usage.

124. Whatever powers of jurisdiction the Apos-

ties and other pastors of the Church are represented in the sacred writings as exercising or commending the exercise of; whatever powers of jurisdiction were expressly or impliedly bestowed by Christ upon his Church, whether the inspired volume exhibits traces of the exercise thereof or not—all were promised to Peter, and in all their fulness. Is the Church a real society, complete and independent, and therefore, like every such society, composed of men,* to consist of gradations, and to be governed by laws, by superintendence, by judicial investigations, by penal enactments against evil-doers, by appointing to offices and removing from them,† etc.? Then did Peter receive the power of legislating through the whole Church, of superintending, of deciding, of punishing, of appointing to offices and removing from them, etc. Is there a power in the Church to teach, to determine what is sound, what is unsound doctrine, etc.? Then Peter received this power. Has power been given to absolve from sin, to loose the bonds of iniquity in those who are properly disposed, according to the dispositions defined and required by God, or power

* See SUAREZ, de Legibus.

† See Archbishop WHATELY's Essays on the Kingdom of Christ. Essay 2.

to retain sin, to refuse to loosen the bond of sin in those who are not properly disposed? Peter received this power. Has power been given to bind the consciences of the faithful to the observance of certain fasts and of certain festivals? Peter received this power. Has power been given to remit the temporal punishment due to sin, after the sin itself had been remitted? Peter received this power. Has the dispensation of certain spiritual gifts been entrusted to the Church, with power to deprive scandalous and contumacious sinners of participation in those spiritual gifts? Peter received the power of thus dispensing and depriving. All those powers, and all other spiritual powers he received, and received in all their fulness, and received with a right of exercising them everywhere through the whole Church.

The other doctrinal conclusions, The Centre of Unity in the Primacy, its Perpetuity, etc., are, *mutatis mutandis*, developed from this member of the text of St. Matthew by a process of reasoning similar to that adopted in reference to the preceding members.

§ 4. *General conclusion from the whole text of Matthew.*

125. We have seen that each member of this momentous text, taken separately, conveys the idea of supreme jurisdiction. But there is, moreover, a cumulative force in all taken together not unworthy of notice. When men wish to convey their ideas in a more impressive way, when they wish to clothe the object of their praise or invective in the strongest colours of beauty or grandeur or horror or infamy, and so to make it appear and be taken by others, they accumulate epithet on epithet, metaphor on metaphor, image on image, stroke on stroke. This is true of men in all times and in all countries. And when a writer or speaker expresses himself in this way, he is universally understood as thereby intending to convey a far stronger idea of the magnitude of the qualities he is ascribing to the subject of his discourse, than if he contented himself with a single epithet or image or simple proposition. When literal language is deserted for metaphorical, the effect is still more heightened, especially if the metaphor be of a bold or striking kind. The truth of these remarks will be at once admitted by every one who has turned his attention to the laws of

language as an exponent of ideas and emotions. Thus if I say of a child, "It is a sweet, mild, gentle creature", or of a soldier, "He is a bold, daring, fearless man", or adopting metaphor, "He is a man of lion heart, of adamantine purpose, his mind in action is an overpowering hurricane"; or if I say of a very wicked man, "He is a scoundrel, he is a ruffian, he is a villain", or in metaphor, "His heart is an abyss of darkness, his mind is a laboratory of mares, he is ideal wickedness become real and embodied in human form"—I certainly express my opinion of the individuals far more strongly than if I used only one of these epithets or metaphors. The Scriptures abound in examples of this kind. The prophecy of the destruction of Babylon in the thirteenth chapter of Isaiah is an example, so is the description of the glories of the Church of the New Law, in the sixtieth chapter, and so indeed is every chapter in that sublime book. In reading the following passage from Jeremiah, one is forcibly reminded of the very text from St. Matthew under discussion, so strong in several points is the resemblance between the imagery of both. "Lo, I have set thee this day over the nations, and over kingdoms, to rear up and to pull down, and to waste and to destroy, and to

build and to plant.....Be not afraid at their presence, for I will make thee not to fear their countenance. For behold I have made thee this day a fortified city, and a pillar of iron, and a wall of brass, over all the land, to the kings of Juda, to the princes thereof, and to the priests, and to the people of the land. And they shall fight against thee, and shall not prevail, for I am with thee, saith the Lord, to deliver thee"—*Jerem.*, ii. 10, 17, etc. The following is an example from the *Lamentations* of the same prophet (ii. 2, etc.). "The Lord hath cast down headlong, and hath not spared all that was beautiful in Jacob: he hath destroyed in his wrath the strongholds of the virgin of Juda, and brought them down to the ground: he hath made the kingdom unclean, and the princes thereof. He hath broken in his fierce anger all the born of Israel: he hath drawn back his right hand from before the enemy; and he hath kindled in Jacob as it were a flaming fire devouring round about. He hath bent his bow as an enemy, he hath fixed his right hand as an adversary, and he hath killed all that was fair to behold in the tabernacle of the daughter of Sion, he hath poured out his indignation like fire"—and so on through several verses succeeding.

But there would be no end to this "flower

gathering" in the sacred gardens. We may now suppose the remarks made above as admitted: their application to the text before us is obvious. "Blessed art thou—Flesh and blood hath not revealed, but my Father—And I say to thee, that thou art Rock—And upon this Rock I will build my Church—And the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it—And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven—And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth—And whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth". Each succeeding metaphor, though conveying but the same general idea when literally interpreted, yet conveys it with increasing energy, and fulness, and splendour, until the mind becomes overawed and still, under the stupendous revelation, and bows down in silent love and adoration, captivated unto blind obedience in faith, by the almighty voice announcing to all creation again—and again—and again—that great truth on which, as on an unfailing rock, the whole edifice of the Church is built, and rests secure, and rises up—the waves of hell fiercely and ever, but ever vainly, beating against her battlements below, while the stars of heaven circle her pinnacle on high, pure, serene, and brightening, like a golden glory woven by the hand of the Most High for the brow of his immaculate spouse.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT FROM LUKE, XXII.

126. AFTER the Last Supper, while our Lord and his disciples were yet sitting at the table—

“There was a strife amongst them, which of them should seem to be greater. And he said to them: The kings of the gentiles lord it over them, and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so; but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger, and he that is the leader as he that serveth. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth; and you are they who have continued with me in my temptations: and I dispose to you, as my Father has disposed to me, a kingdom: that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and may sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. *And the Lord said, Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail thee not; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren.* Who said to him, Lord, I am ready to

go with thee both into prison and to death. And he said, I say to thee, Peter, the cock shall not crow this day, till thou thrice deniest that thou knowest me"—*Luke*, xxii. 24, 34.

The object for which I have transcribed the whole of this passage, will appear hereafter (n. 159, etc.) The portion marked in Italics is that which we now proceed to examine; it runs thus in the Greek.

Εἶπε δὲ ὁ Κύριος· Σίμων, Σίμων, ἰδοὺ ὁ Σατα-
νας ἐξηγησατο ὑμᾶς, τοῦ σινιασαι ὡς τὸν σιτον·
ἐγὼ δὲ ἐδεσθην περὶ σου, ἵνα μὴ ἐκλείπῃ ἡ πίστις
σου· καὶ σὺ ποτὲ ἐπιστρέψας στηριξὼν τοὺς ἀδελφούς
σου.

§ 1. *Some critical remarks on the text.*

127. I. Among the Hebrews, grain was separated from the stalks and from the clay adhering to it by threshing, or by the treading of the hoofs of oxen, and by winnowing or sifting.* Threshing is often used in the Old Testament as a figurative expression for the most grievous persecution, and the infliction of terrible calamities. The same figure is common with us in colloquial language, but its force

* See DIXON, General Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures; Diss. 17, c. 3.

of expression is comparatively insignificant. Sifting is used in a similar figurative sense in the text before us, and in *Amos*, x. 9. "I will sift the house of Israel among all nations, as corn is sifted in a sieve". The word *συνιζω* which we have in the text of Luke, does not, it is said, occur in any other part of the Old or New Testament, or in any of the ancient Greek writers. All are agreed as to the purport of the metaphor here. See texts referred to in *Jahn, Archeol.*, n. 64, 65.

128. II. The Greek word (*επιστρεψας*) which is translated *being converted*, may bear two other and different significations. 1°. It may be taken as a Hebraism, and rendered *again* or *in turn*, so that the words will mean, "As I have confirmed thee, do thou in thy turn confirm thy brethren", or, "Do thou in thy turn, after my death, confirm thy brethren whom I living have confirmed". 2°. It may signify *turning to*, *directing attention to*, denoting pastoral vigilance. The Vulgate translation *conversus* is ambiguous and may bear any one of the three meanings. As the question is purely critical, the dogmatical bearing of the text being in no way affected, whatever meaning be taken, it would be quite idle to enter farther into the subject. Should the reader prefer the common translation,

the meaning will be, "Do thou, when, after thy fall, thou art converted and confirmed by me", etc.

129. III. We find this word confirm (στηριζω or επιστηριζω) frequently used in the New Testament in reference to spiritual confirming, or strengthening against temptations and sufferings. "They returned again to Lystra and to Iconium and to Antioch, *confirming* the souls of the disciples, and exhorting them to continue in the faith, and that through many tribulations we must enter into the kingdom of God"—*Acts*, xiv. 21. "Judas and Silas being prophets also themselves, with many words comforted the brethren and *confirmed* them"—*ibid.*, xv. 32. "And he [Paul] went through Syria and Cilicia, *confirming* the Churches"—*ibid.*, 41. "[Paul] went through the country of Galatia and Phrygia in order, *confirming* all the disciples"—*ibid.*, xviii. 23. "I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual grace, to *strengthen* you"—*Rom.*, i. 11. "We sent Timothy our brother, and the minister of God in the gospel of Christ, to *confirm* you, and exhort you concerning your faith"—*I. Thessal.*, iii. 2. "But God is faithful, who will *strengthen* and keep you from evil"—*II. Thessal.*, iii. 2, etc., etc., etc.

§ 2. *Dogmatical Exposition of the text.*

130. *First.* From the words of our Lord it appears, 1^o. that Satan sought the utter ruin of the Apostles—this being, as we have seen, the meaning of the metaphor—their utter ruin in any way, but of course their spiritual ruin above all: 2^o. that Satan sought the destruction of *all* the Apostles, not of Peter only, or of any other individual, or section of them, but of all—“Satan hath desired to have *you*,* to sift as wheat”.

131. *Secondly.* To avert this ruin of the Apostles, our Lord does two things, one of which is a preparation for the other. He establishes a means for the protection of the Apostles, and he provides for the efficient operation of the means. He first *prays* that the faith of Peter may not fail, he then *commands*, and in commanding appoints Peter thus confirmed in the faith, to confirm his brethren.

I now assert and proceed to establish, the two following propositions, from which the supremacy of St. Peter follows as a matter of course.

* On account of the ambiguity of the English word *you*, which is used equally for the singular and plural number, it is just possible that it may be necessary to remind some readers that in the Greek the word is in the plural number.

FIRST PROPOSITION. To Peter, and to Peter alone, is here committed by Christ, the office of confirming the rest of the Apostles and all the faithful, of protecting them against the assaults of the devil in faith or morals, or both.

SECOND PROPOSITION. So to appoint him to such office is, by the very fact, to confer on him supreme spiritual jurisdiction over the Apostles and the whole Church.

First Proposition proved.

132. *First.* There is an office instituted to which Peter is appointed.

For it is not of one solitary assault of Satan that our Lord speaks, but of his habitual and permanent attitude of hostility and attack. "Satan hath sought". How often hath he sought? How often seeketh he still?—he who "goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour"—I. *Peter*, v. 8. Did he make but one essay, now when he witnessed the signs of the beginning of the long foretold, long dreaded kingdom that was to overcome his own—but one essay against those who were engaged in founding that kingdom—but one essay, and then relinquish the field? Not at all. The Apostles were undoubtedly the objects of his

special fury from first to last. Again, what hath he sought? "To sift as wheat". Were the Apostles sifted as wheat by suffering one attack, or a few attacks of temptation, and on one occasion, or on few occasions? Not at all. Their whole existence on earth was one continual warfare, offensive and defensive, with the devil. See how St. Paul was sifted by the devil—directly by the devil himself, and through his ministers among men. "In many more labours, in prisons more frequently, in stripes above measure, in deaths often. Of the Jews, five times did I receive forty (stripes) save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once I was stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a day and a night I was in the depths of the sea. In journeying often, in perils of water, in perils of robbers, in perils from my own nation, in perils from the gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren", etc.—I. *Corinth.*, xi. 23. And again. "There was given me a sting of the flesh, an angel of Satan, to buffet me: for which thing, thrice I besought the Lord, that it might depart from me, and he said to me, my grace is sufficient for thee"—*ibid.*, xii. 7. And again. "We would have come unto you, I Paul indeed once and again; but Satan hath hindered us"—I.

Thessalon., ii. 18. Surely our Lord spoke of the unrelaxing hostility of the devil against the Apostles.

This being so, the means which he instituted for overcoming those assaults—which, as we shall see immediately, was the power given to Peter of confirming his brethren—was not a solitary act of confirming, but a power to confirm, when necessary, that is, in other words, a permanent office for this end.

133. *Secondly.* The authority conferred on Peter to confirm his brethren, was given as a means of preserving them against the assaults of the devil. For the two things, the announcement of the danger and the command to confirm, are so placed together, that the latter is manifestly given in reference to the former. “Satan has sought to have you to sift as wheat, but I have prayed for thee..... and do thou”, etc. Thus, if I say, “John is in imminent danger, but James will watch over him”, I am understood to mean that James will watch over him against *that* danger, that James’s vigilance will be the security for John’s safety. This is made, if possible, more manifest by the particle *but*. “Satan hath sought to have you, *but* I have prayed”, etc. In all things, then, wherein the Apostles were sifted

by Satan, Peter was commanded and authorised to strengthen them, and in this lay the principle of their strength, and the pledge of their triumph.

134. *Thirdly.* This office was committed to Peter alone. For 1°. Peter is expressly addressed, and the only one addressed in the command. “Do *thou* confirm”. 2°. There is a marked distinction drawn between Peter and the rest: he was the confirmer, they the persons to be confirmed. “Do *thou* confirm thy *brethren*”. 3°. For Peter alone was the special prayer offered up in reference to this office. “I have prayed for *thee* that *thy* faith fail not”.

135. *Fourthly.* The office conferred on Peter was that of confirming *all* the other Apostles. For 1. the words “thy brethren” include all without exception: his brethren were all the Apostles, all the Apostles were his brethren, and all alike. 2. Peter was appointed to confirm those whom the devil sought to ruin, that is, all the Apostles. “Satan hath desired to have *you*”.

136. *Fifthly.* Though the Apostles alone are expressly named, the whole Church is necessarily included, as the lesser power is implied in the greater. Moreover, in confirming the Apostles, Peter really confirmed those whom the Apostles

confirmed; as that which supports the foundation stones of a house, thereby supports the house itself.

137. *Sixthly.* The office of Peter extended to the protection of the Apostles and the faithful against all assaults of the devil, whether aimed at their faith or morals, or both. Of course the enemy would, where he hoped for success, direct his attacks above all against faith. For, with the loss of faith, not only is grace lost, but the very means of reconciliation with God are lost. While a man has faith, if he sins against any other virtue, he has still in his hands the means of recovering his position; but when faith is abandoned, if he falls into other sins, he must return to faith before he can hope to rise from them, as faith is the root of all justice, and without it we cannot please God. Nevertheless, it is not only by destroying faith that the devil succeeds in destroying souls, in hampering the action of the Church, in impeding or beating back the march of the gospel; but by seducing into impurity, intemperance, pride, vengeance, and all other sins; by causing scandals in high places; by exciting the hatred and persecution of the world; by sharpening its sword to wound by blows, by sharpening its tongue to wound by slander, by sharpening its intellect to wound by specious argument, by sharpening

its wily purposes to wound by ensnaring and betraying. It is in each and all of these ways that the devil "desireth to have" men, and hold them in his power, and "sift them as wheat". It is against each and all of these that Peter received power to confirm his brethren, and confirm all.

Second Proposition proved.

138. Peter, in this appointment to confirm his brethren, received supreme jurisdiction over the whole Church.

He received power to confirm—strengthen—steady—consolidate—secure his brethren, and all the members of the Church, in faith and in every other Christian virtue, against all the assaults of their spiritual enemies. Weak vessels they were by nature, and ever exposed to the most violent attacks. The members of the Church scattered over the whole earth, though gathered into the one fold, Jew and gentile, barbarian and Greek; the barren one become fruitful, and enlarging the place of her tent, and stretching out the skins of her tabernacles, and lengthening her cords, and passing on to the right hand and to the left;* the kingdom of Christ

* Isaias, liv.

widening and widening, like a rapidly advancing tide, like the coming light of the rising sun—the multitude of the sea converted to her, the strength of the gentiles come to her;* the congregation of the faithful swelling into thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands and thousands of thousands, divided by place, by diversity of language, of civil institutions, by all diversities that exist among men—all were put under Peter's charge, Apostle and disciple, priest and layman: he received a divine command as well as divine authority to secure them all, to keep them firm and unfailing against all the powers of Hell.

Momentous commission this was, and given for an end not more momentous than it was arduous of attainment. Of course, then, and of necessity, Christ, in imparting this authority and imposing this command, gave to Peter all that without which the authority could not be exercised or the command executed, and not only exercised and executed, but *fully* and *effectively* exercised and executed. Here then comes in the same plain train of reasoning which we have pursued in a previous part of this Essay (n. 64 to n. 70). Peter was to *become*

* Isaias, lx.

the Rock of the Church, he was *to be* invested with power and authority to consolidate and secure the Church against the attacks of the devil (*Matth.*, xvi.). Here he *becomes* the Rock, here he *is* invested with that very power and authority. What is there promised is here given, to be exercised in the fulness of time. Take off the metaphorical garb in which the idea is clothed in the two texts, and the naked literal eternal truth is exactly the same in both—as the king in his undress and in his royal robes is exactly the same person. In *Matthew*, it is the enemies of the Church under the image of the gates of hell warring against it: in *Luke*, it is the enemies of the Church, under the image of the prince of hell sifting and winnowing the Apostles, as men sift and winnow wheat. In *Matthew*, it is Peter the strengthener and protector of the Church, under the image of the rock: in *Luke*, it is Peter the strengthener and protector of the Church without any veil or image at all. In *Matthew*, Christ promises, in *Luke*, Christ fulfils his promise: in this lies the difference and all the difference.

Peter was appointed to strengthen his brethren in the virtue of faith against the attacks of Satan. How is this effected? How did the Apostles effect it? How do, how *must* all pastors effect it among

their respective flocks, and according to the measure of their respective jurisdictions? How, but by teaching and defining the true faith, by pointing out and condemning false doctrine. Peter was appointed to strengthen his brethren in faith and in all virtues. How is this effected, but by teaching, inspecting, warning, legislating, appointing sound pastors and removing unsound ones, in one word, by carrying out the whole of that legislative and executive system which has been already briefly described, and briefly proved to be the very system established by God, and carried out in its details by the Apostles, as the very means for accomplishing this very object of confirming the whole Church in all virtue, in all inward and outward holiness? If the reader will turn back to the paragraphs just referred to (*n.* 64, etc.), he will there find anticipated all that I would think necessary to say here for the complete developement of the argument from the text before us.

In like manner, it may be proved, by a process of reasoning similar to that adopted in the same section, that Peter was appointed the centre and principle of unity, etc.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT FROM JOHN, XXI.

139. "THIS is now the third time that Jesus was manifested to his disciples, after he was risen from the dead. When therefore they had dined, Jesus saith to Simon Peter: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these? He saith to him: Yea, Lord, thou knowest that I love thee. He saith to him: Feed my lambs. He saith to him again: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me? He saith to him: Yea, Lord, thou knowest that I love thee. He saith to him: Feed my lambs. He said to him the third time: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me? Peter was grieved, because he had said to him the third time, Lovest thou me? And he said to him: Lord, thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee. He said to him: Feed my sheep"—*John*, xxi. 14, 17.

Λεγει τῷ Σιμωνι Πιτρῷ ὁ Ἰησους· Σιμων Ἰωνα, αγαπας με πλειον τουτων; λεγει αὐτῷ Ναι, Κυριε· συ οιδας ὅτι φιλω σε. Λεγει αὐτῷ· Βοσκε τα αρνια μου· Λεγει αὐτῷ παλιν δευτερον· Σιμων Ἰωνα, αγαπας με; λεγει αὐτῷ· Ναι, Κυριε· συ οιδας ὅτι

φιλω σε. Λεγει αυτω· Ποιμαινε τα προβατα μου. Λεγει αυτω το τριτον· Σιμων Ιωνα, φιλεις με; Ελυπηθη ὁ Πετρος, ὅτι ειπεν αυτω το τριτον· Φιλεις με; και ειπεν αυτω· Κυριε, ὅςυ παντα οιδας· συ γινωσκεις οτι φιλω σε. Λεγει αυτω ὁ Ιησους· Βοσκει τα προβατα μου.

§ 1. *Some critical remarks on the text.*

140. I. The reader in looking at the Greek text, will perceive, that in the first charge to Peter, our Lord speaks of *lambs*, in the second and third, of *sheep*; whereas the Vulgate has lambs in the two first instances. Commentators have given some probable conjectures as to the origin of this discrepancy, which is not, however, in reference to our present purpose, of the slightest moment.

II. The word *feed* represents a different Greek word in the second charge from that which occurs in the first and third. In the former it is ποιμαίνω, which signifies *to tend as a shepherd, to discharge the duties of a shepherd*; in the latter, it is βοσκω, which signifies *to feed*. But the latter is plainly, and by a very common figure of speech, identical in meaning with the former.

§ 2. *What is signified by the words sheep and lambs?*

141. That by *sheep* and *lambs* are here signified the faithful, the members of Christ's Church who then were, or afterwards were to become so, is evident, and, I suppose, universally admitted. The only question is, whether *all* the faithful without exception, Apostles and the rest, bishops, priests, and laity, are all alike included.

The members of the Church of God are frequently represented, as well in the Old as in the New Testament, under the image of sheep, or a flock of sheep. Sometimes, the simple faithful alone are indicated under this designation, sometimes their pastors or rulers, sometimes all together. On the scriptural use of the metaphor, I note two things: first, that the context everywhere sufficiently determines the extension of the term; secondly, that the term commonly, if not invariably, used is *sheep*, or *lambs*, or *flock*.*

“O God.....why is thy wrath enkindled against the sheep of thy pasture?”—*Psalm*, lxxiii. 1.

* The word *ram* does not occur at all, in any sense, in the New Testament.

“He took away his own people as sheep, and guided them in the wilderness like a flock”—*Psalm*, lxxvii. 52. Here the metaphorical form of language is dropped, and the comparison (which is implied in every metaphor) directly expressed.

“We thy people, and the sheep of thy pasture, will give thanks to thee for ever”—*Psalm*, lxxviii. 13.

“He is the Lord our God, and we are the people of his pasture and the sheep of his hand”—*Psalm*, xciv. 7.

So in other passages of the Psalter.

The metaphor is carried out in a most striking manner through the whole of the thirty-fourth chapter of Ezechiel, to which we have to refer more specifically hereafter (*n.* 146, 147).

In *Zacharias*, xiii. 7, occurs the prophecy quoted in *Matthew*, xxvi. 31, “Strike the shepherd and the sheep shall be scattered”.

“Go ye rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.....Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves”—*Matt.*, x. 6, 16.

“The God of peace who brought again from the dead the great shepherd of the sheep”—*Hebrews*, xiii. 20.

See also the well known passage *John*, x. 1., etc

“Behold the Lord God shall come with strength He shall feed his flock like a shepherd, he shall gather together the lambs with his arm”—*Isaias*, xl. II.

“Behold I send you as lambs among wolves”—*Luke*, x. 3.

“Fear not, little flock”—*Luke*, xii. 32.

“Take heed to yourselves, and to the whole flock.....Ravening wolves will enter in among you, not sparing the flock”—*Acts*, xx. 28, 29.

“Feed the flock of God which is among you..... being made a pattern of the flock from the heart’—*I. Peter*, v. 2, 3.

From these passages—and others to the same effect might be quoted—it appears that either of the words *sheep* and *lambs* might have been used to designate the faithful. Our Lord in the text before us uses both. So far as any doctrinal conclusion is concerned, they may be taken as, in their figurative import, synonymous; both conveying the same idea, that is, the members of the spiritual sheepfold, all of which are alike sheep or alike lambs, in reference to the supreme shepherd. Nevertheless, it seems very probable that the distinction was intended in the things typified (the members of the Church), which so plainly exists in the type (lambs

and sheep); that is, the distinction between the weaker and the stronger, the lesser and the greater, the lambs who required the nursing care of the sheep, and the sheep themselves, both being fed and tended by the shepherd. So that the lambs and sheep would typify the ruled and the rulers, the simple faithful and the priesthood in its different gradations of authority. I do not however insist on this argument, nor do I require it in order to prove the point stated above—that all the members of the Church, high and low, comprising the Apostles themselves, are here included. For

142. I. In *each* charge, Christ says, “*my lambs*”, or “*my sheep*”. This form of phrase, unrestricted as it is by any qualification, necessarily signifies all the lambs, all the sheep of Christ. For *his* lambs and sheep did not comprise a mere section of his flock, but all his flock—each member thereof being alike his. Now the Apostles and other rulers in the Church, though truly shepherds in respect of those placed under them, were as truly in reference to Christ, lambs and sheep, were truly of *his* sheep, of his flock (see texts just quoted from *Matth.*, x., etc., n. 141). When, therefore, he says, “*my lambs, my sheep*”, the Apostles are of course included, unless he expressly excludes them, and indicates by

the context that he excludes them (see *n.* 37, 38).

143. II. But supposing that he intended to designate directly and expressly only the simple faithful, still the charge given to Peter must have indirectly, yet really, included the Apostles and other rulers. For, as I shall immediately prove, supreme jurisdiction was here given to Peter. Now, if one particular ruler is appointed to govern the subjects of a number of other rulers, he thereby necessarily receives jurisdiction over those rulers, and they are thereby necessarily subjected to him, not only as inferior in rank, but subordinate in authority. For the one ruler, as he has a substantive and not a shadowy authority over the subjects of the others, can legislate for those subjects, superintend them, dispense or abrogate the laws of their immediate superiors, etc. What is all this, but to exercise jurisdiction over the rulers themselves? This idea might be developed at much greater length, but I pass on.

144. III. Our interpretation of the words, is but a plain illustration of a common and universal usage of speech. If a king says, "my subjects, my empire", he is at once understood to mean all his subjects, his whole empire; and if he wishes to

be understood as speaking only of a part, he must signify this in some way, and add some qualifying term, if the plain circumstances of the case do not qualify for him, as, “my Irish subjects, my Indian empire”. So if a teacher says “my scholars”, a parent “my children”, a master “my servants”, an employer “my workmen”, etc.

There are indirect arguments establishing this point, but it is unnecessary to go into them.

§ 3. *What is signified by feeding the lambs and sheep?*

145. Of course, *feed* and *tend* as a shepherd are here taken metaphorically, as well as *lambs* and *sheep*, and signify spiritual feeding and tending. Now, I assert that the charge given to Peter, under the metaphor of feeding and tending the whole Church as a shepherd, is nothing less than appointing him as supreme head and ruler, and—to use the word which, though taken originally from this kind of metaphor, has with us completely lost its metaphorical character—supreme *pastor* over the whole Church.

146. I. The metaphor itself, immediately and on the very surface, suggests all this; its simple and obvious meaning put into literal language is just this, and all this. For Peter is appointed spiritual

shepherd of the whole Church, to feed and tend it *spiritually*, and *as a Church*, just as a faithful shepherd feeds and tends his sheep *as sheep*, and for their *corporal* safety and improvement. Peter is appointed to act towards the Church, as a faithful shepherd would towards his flock. How does the latter act? What is his plain duty? To provide his sheep with sufficient food and with wholesome food; to feed them at such times and in such manner as will best improve their bodily condition; to watch himself, and when or where his eye cannot be over them, to appoint others to watch and take all the necessary precautions against the thief and the wolf; to search for and bring back those that may have wandered from the fold, to heal those that may have received injury within it.

It is with reference to the discharge or neglect of those duties, that the faithful shepherd is everywhere in Scripture contrasted with the faithless shepherd and the hireling. "I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. But the hireling, and he that is not the shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, seeth the wolf coming and leaveth the sheep, and flieth, and the wolf catcheth and scattereth the sheep. And the hireling flieth because he is a hireling", etc.—

John, x. 11, etc. “Therefore, thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel, to the pastors that feed my people, you have scattered my flock, and have driven them away, and have not visited them...I will gather together the remnant of my flock...and I will make them return to their own fields, and they shall increase and be multiplied. And I will set up pastors over them”, etc.—*Jerem.*, xxiii. 2. “Wo to the shepherds of Israel...The weak you have not strengthened, and that which was sick you have not healed, and that which was broken you have not bound up, and that which was driven away you have not brought back.....I will feed my sheep, and I will cause them to lie down, saith the Lord God. I will seek that which was lost; and that which was driven away I will bring back again; and I will bind up that which was broken; and I will strengthen that which was weak; and that which was fat and strong I will preserve, and I will feed them in judgment”, etc., etc.—*Ezekiel*, xxxiv., throughout. Here we have the sum of the faithful pastor’s duties detailed, as I have detailed them.

If, then, Peter was appointed to act as the shepherd of the whole Church, he was thereby appointed to supply the whole Church with wholesome pasture and to keep it from unwholesome pasture,

that is, to teach the whole Church, to feed it with sound doctrine, which is the aliment of its spiritual life; to judge between sound and unsound doctrine, to point out, and condemn, and withhold the faithful from the latter, which is the principle of spiritual disease and death. In short, to avoid repeating the same form of argument over and over again, he was appointed to discharge all the offices of a supreme spiritual pastor, to exercise every function, executive and legislative, which, according to the divine ordinance, would contribute to the spiritual safety, and wellbeing, and extension, and beauty, and triumph, and glory of the whole Church, and of all its parts (*n.* 66, etc.). For, if Peter did not receive those powers, how could he be, as he was appointed to be, truly the Shepherd of the whole Church? How can he be called shepherd—shepherd, in the amplest sense—supreme shepherd of the flock, who does not possess authority to do all that belongs to a shepherd's duty for the safety and welfare of the flock? But to have those powers is simply to be, in the words of the Council of Florence, the true Vicar of Christ, and the Head of the whole Church, and the Father and Teacher of all Christians—to have the Primacy over the whole

earth—to have full power of Feeding, Ruling, and Governing the universal Church.

147. II. The words *to feed—to tend as a shepherd—to be a shepherd*, occur in the Scriptures, in both literal and metaphorical senses. Whenever they are used metaphorically and of men, in reference to men, that is, whenever a man is said, in a metaphorical sense, to be a shepherd of men, to feed or tend them as a shepherd, it is thereby invariably signified that he has authority over them; and if he be the one shepherd, of course that he has supreme jurisdiction over them. The sovereignty of God, of the Messias, of earthly monarchs, was thus designated.

“Then all the tribes of Israel came to David in Hebron, saying: Behold, we are thy bone and thy flesh; moreover yesterday also and the day before, when Saul was king over us, thou wast he that did lead out and bring in Israel, and the Lord said to thee: Thou shalt feed (ποιμανεις) my people Israel, and thou shalt be prince (εις ἡγουμενον) over Israel”—II. *Kings*, v. 1, 2. The same I. *Paralipom.*, xi. 2. See also II. *Kings*, vii. 7; I. *Paralip.*, xvii. 6.

“The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son,

this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt rule* (ποιμανεις) them with a rod of iron, and shalt break them in pieces like a potter's vessel"—*Psalm*, ii. 7, etc.

"The Lord ruleth† (ποιμαίνει) me, and I shall want nothing"—*Psalm*, xxii. 1.

"Save, O Lord, thy people, and bless thy inheritance; and feed (ποιμανον — *Vulg.* 'rule') them, and exalt them for ever"—*Psalm*, xxvii. 9.

"For this is God, our God unto eternity, and for ever and ever; he shall rule us for evermore". (ποιμανει ἡμας εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας)‡—*Psalm*, xlvii. 15.

"He chose his servant David and took him from the flocks of sheep.....to feed (ποιμαίνειν) Jacob his servant, and Israel his inheritance; and he fed (εποιμανεν) them in the innocence of his heart"—*Psalm*, lxxvii. 70, etc.

* "*Reges eos in veiga ferrea et tanquam vas figuli confringes eos*"—*Vulgate*. "Thou shalt *break them* with a rod of iron, thou shalt dash them in pieces, like a potter's vessel"—*Authorized Protestant version*.

† "*Dominus regit me*"—*Vulg.* "The Lord is my shepherd"—*Author. Vers.*

‡ "He will be our guide (even) unto death"—*Author. Vers.*, xlviii. 14.

“ Give ear, O thou that rulest (art the shepherd of—ὁ ποιμαίνων) Israel, thou that leadest Joseph like a sheep ”—*Psalm*, lxxix. 2.

“ Behold the Lord God shall come with strength, and his arm shall rule.....He shall feed his flock like a shepherd ” (ὡς ποιμην ποιμανεῖ το ποιμνιον αὐτου)—*Isaias*, xl. 10, 11.

“ And I will give you pastors (ποιμενας) according to my own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine ” (καὶ ποιμανουσιν ὑμας ποιμανοντες μετ’ ἐπιστημης)—*Jeremias*, iii. 15.

“ Is this man Jechonias an earthen and a broken vessel?.....Thus saith the Lord, write this man barren.....for there shall not be a man of his seed that shall sit upon the throne of David, and have power any more in Juda. Wo to the pastors (ποιμενες) that destroy and tear the sheep of my pasture. Therefore, thus saith the Lord the God of Israel to the pastors that feed (ποιμαίνοντας) my people, you have scattered my flock.....I will set up pastors over them, and they shall feed them (ποιμενας οἱ ποιμανουσιν αὐτους).....And I will raise up to David a just branch, and a king shall reign (καὶ βασιλευσε βασιλευς)”—*Jeremias*, xxii. 28, etc.; xxiii. 1, etc.

“ Prophecy concerning the shepherds (ποιμενας)

of Israel.....Wo to the shepherds of Israel that feed (βοσκουσι) themselves: should not the flocks be fed (βοσκουσι) by the shepherds.....My flock you do not feed (βοσκετε).....I will feed (βοσκησω) my sheep, and I will cause them to lie down, saith the Lord God.....And I will set up one servant over them, and he shall feed them, even my servant David: he shall feed them, and he shall be their shepherd. And I the Lord will be their God, and my servant David the prince in the midst of them. (Και αναστησω επ' αυτους ποιμενα ένα, και ποιμανει αυτους, τον δουλον μου Δαυιδ, και εσται αυτων ποιμην; και εγω Κυριος εσομαι αυτοις εις Θεον, και Δαυιδ αρχων εν μεσω αυτων)". I might quote the whole chapter in full, for every verse of it shows in the clearest manner that the idea of shepherd of men involved that of general authority, superintendence, etc.

In *Micheas*, v. 2, etc., occurs the celebrated prophecy regarding the Messias. "And thou Bethlehem Ephrata, art a little one among the thousands of Juda. Out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be the ruler (αρχοντα) in Israel: and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.....And he shall stand and feed in the

strength of the Lord (*και ποιμανει το ποιμνιον*)"—See *Matthew*, ii. 6.

"Feed (*ποιμαινε*) thy people with thy rod, the flock of thy inheritance"—*Micheas*, vii. 14.

See also *Zacharias*, xi., etc., etc., etc.

"Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops to rule the Church (*ποιμαινειν την εκκλησιαν*) of God"—*Acts*, xx. 28.

"Feed (*ποιμανατε*) the flock of God which is among you, taking care [of it] not by constraint, but willingly"—*I. Peter*, v. 2.

"And she brought a man-child who was to rule (*ποιμαινειν*) all nations with an iron rod"—*Apoc.*, xii. 5. See also xix. 15, etc., etc.

The word shepherd is frequently used with a similar metaphorical import in both the Old and New Testament. It is now unnecessary to quote farther, as the usage of Scripture language in respect of this metaphor must be abundantly evident from the citations already made. We have seen that to be the shepherd of men is, everywhere, to be the ruler of men; that the authority of prophets, of kings, and even of the Deity himself, is constantly symbolized by this metaphor. To appoint

Peter, therefore, to be the shepherd of the whole Church, is to appoint him to be ruler and pastor of the whole Church.

148. III. The use of this metaphor was not so common among the ancient Greeks, and still less among the Romans. This, no doubt, arose partly from the fact, that the nomadic life which formerly prevailed in the East, and to this day prevails in several parts of Asia, was unknown to the Greeks and Romans. It arose also from the fact, that in the East, the head of the tribe was also a shepherd, possessing immense flocks, as we see in the case of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Hence, and also because of his relationship with the members of the tribe, and from other circumstances, his sway was regarded as of a paternal and pastoral kind; and his cruelties and other violations of duty were represented as violations of the office of a good shepherd. On the contrary, regal authority in Greece and Rome was the prize of superior cleverness or brute force, and had nothing of the father or shepherd associated in idea with it. So that the word (*τυραννος*) which was frequently used to signify an absolute sovereign, signified also a tyrant; and from it our word *tyrant* is derived. Nevertheless, in the most ancient of Greek writers—at that period

when the traces of oriental imagery and phraseology were less faint than in after times—we find the metaphor not unfrequently used.* Thus—

Agamemnon is called the shepherd of the people :
 Ὡς φάτο, νεικείων Ἀγαμεμνονα ποιμένα λαων.
 —*Il.*, II. 243. So also IV. 414: XIX. 35, 251:
Odyss., IV. 532: XIV. 497.

Menelaus—

Βη δε δια προμαχων περι γαρ διε ποιμενι λαων.
 —*Il.*, V. 566. So also 570. *Odyss.*, IV. 24.

Atreus—

Αυταρ ὁ αὐτε Πελοψ δωκ' Ἀτρεΐ ποιμενι λαων.—
Il., II. 105.

Nestor—

Οἱ δ' επανεστησαν, πειθοντο τε ποιμενι λαων.—
Il., II. 85. So also XXIII. 411: *Odyss.*, XV
 151.

Achilles—

Πατροκλος δ' Ἀχιλῆϊ παριστατο ποιμενι λαων.—
Il., XVI. 2. So also XIX. 386.

Hector—

—Ἀλλ ουτις εδυνησατο ποιμενα λαων
 Ουτασαι, ουδε βαλειν.
Il., XIV. 423. So also XV. 262: XXII. 277.

* “ This term of *feeding as a shepherd feeds his flock*, is one of the oldest and most universal metaphors to express a supreme and at

Æneas—

Ἦκε, καὶ ἐν στηθεσσι μενος βάλε ποιμενὶ λαῶν.—
Il., V. 513. So also *XX.* 110.*

148. IV. As to modern usage, we deal very sparingly in metaphors of this kind, nor are kings or other civil rulers to us, any more than they were to the ancient Romans, in the light of fathers or shepherds. Moreover, the office of shepherd, so highly honourable among the ancient Eastern nations, is with us purely menial. Hence, it is not to be wondered at, that we do not use this metaphor in speaking of regal or other exalted power. The only public office, with which, in our minds, is associated the idea of shepherd or father, is the priesthood. We call bishops and others who have the care of souls, *pastors*; though, as I have already remarked, the word is really no longer metaphorical, and coming to us in the consecrated traditional language of earlier times, rather witnesses to the former use of the metaphor, than furnishes an example of its modern use.

the same time a beneficent government"—ARNOLD, *Fragment on the Church*, c. 2 (page 26).

* For further references see DAMM (*Lexic. Homeric. sub voc.*) who adds "*Ποιμὴν λαῶν* est titulus non tantum magui alicujus regis, sed et cujusvis principis viri qui habet subditos, aut curæ suæ creditos homines multos".

149. From all this it clearly follows, that Peter received the power of governing and teaching the whole Church; that he received the plenitude of jurisdiction over the whole Church. From the fact, that this power was neither promised, nor given to any other individual than Peter, it immediately follows that no other individual possessed it, that no other individual was equal to him, that he *alone* was supreme ruler of the whole Church. This point shall be treated more largely, when we come to examine the leading scriptural objection which our Protestant theologians have brought against it (*n.* 244, etc.)

§ 4. *General review of the preceding texts.*

150. We have already (*n.* 125) adverted to the additional weight an idea receives from being repeated over and over again on the same occasion.* The text just examined from St. John, furnishes another illustration of this. In the same strong manner in which the gift was promised, is it bestowed. Thrice, on one occasion, was the promise

* A passage in point has been quoted from Aristophanes, *τουτοις αυδω, καυθις απαυδω, καυθις το τριτον μαλ' απαυδω* (*Ran.* 354. *Ed. Mitchell*). This editor quotes a parallel passage from Euripides (*Hel.* 1437.) *αυθις κελευω, και τριτον γε.*

made to Peter that he would become the sovereign ruler of the Church: thrice, on one occasion, was the sovereign authority placed on his shoulders. "Lovest thou me more than these? Feed my lambs—Lovest thou me? Feed my lambs—Lovest thou me? Feed my sheep".

But there is another circumstance of equal if not greater importance, in the manner in which this doctrine was revealed by our blessed Lord. First, he foretells and promises the institution of the primatial office: afterwards, on the evening before his death, he institutes and confers the office—not to be immediately set to working, but only after a certain defined period ("thou being converted"): finally, on the eve of his departure from this world, he in the most formal manner again confers it. Now these solemn and repeated revelations of one and the same thing forcibly declare the magnitude thereof in the designs of God. What we most value, what most concerns us, and is of most importance in our eyes, we recur to again and again, bring out and enforce from time to time, as fresh occasions present themselves. This is a law, a *habit* of our mental constitution, like that other of which we have spoken; or rather both are the same,

manifesting itself in different ways. What we are deeply interested about, and wish to interest and impress others about, we repeat over and over on the same occasion, and return to on subsequent occasions. Thus, if I wish to publish a doctrine which I believe to be of great importance to have firmly impressed on men's minds, I will not be satisfied with a single announcement; I will publish it again and again, and my doing so will be taken by all as a clear evidence, if not of the value of my announcement, at least of my firm persuasion of its value and of my anxiety to impress others with the same persuasion. If I am sending a person on an important mission, I will charge him emphatically, and before he starts I will charge him again, and have "more last words" with him when he is setting out. This is the natural tendency of men on all sorts of occasions, private and public, familiar and solemn; a tendency whose manifestations are interpreters of our anxiety and our designs. God, in speaking to us, does not change the constitution of our minds to fit them for understanding a language which it would be otherwise impossible for them to understand. He addresses us as men, and in the words of human speech, and leaves his

language to be interpreted as language always is interpreted. So the Scriptures in every page declare to us. Christ calls a stone a stone, and a tree a tree. When he scourged the traffickers out of the temple, he meant to express disapproval; when he prayed on the cross for his executioners, he meant to show his disposition to forgiveness and mercy; when he used words of chiding, he meant to chide; when he used words expressive of love, he meant to express love. Otherwise, not only would he have been misunderstood, but the mistake would have been chargeable upon him. When God called Abraham, he revealed to him the great promise of the mighty nation and of the Saviour that were to spring from him (*Genes.*, xii. xiii.). He again renewed the promise in whole or in part (xv.), and again (xvii.), and again (xxii.). So the revelation of other momentous events and doctrines—the sufferings of the Redeemer, the call of the gentiles, the leading characters of the Church of the New Law, etc., was repeated on different occasions. And so on three different occasions, Jesus Christ reveals this doctrine of the special powers and prerogatives of St. Peter, thereby indicating the importance he wished it to be invested with in the minds of men, thereby indicating it to be, as it

really is, the fundamental doctrine among all that regard the external constitution of the Church—its rock-foundation, its principle of life, and endurance, and power for all time.

CHAPTER IV.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

151. THE objections raised by writers of different creeds and sects, against the doctrine laid down in the preceding chapters and against the arguments advanced in support of it, are infinite in number; the far greater proportion of them being, however, so utterly frivolous as not to merit any notice—at least after the more serious difficulties have been fairly and thoroughly answered. I have not as yet touched on the proof of the Primacy drawn from Ecclesiastical Tradition: nor have I as yet gone beyond one of the two sections into which the Scripture argument divides itself (*see n. 1*). Even of the objections levelled against that one section of proof, it would be an endless task to notice all. Nor is it at all necessary for the end of full and fair investigation; for most of them rest more or less on

certain leading objections, or on certain gratuitous assumptions, which having been disposed of, they, of course, fall to the ground

The ablest argumentative work that has, so far as my knowledge extends, appeared in our language against the Primacy of St. Peter and his Successors, the Bishops of Rome, is the "Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy" by Dr Isaac Barrow. It was first published after his death by Dr. Tillotson, who says of it that "It is not only a just but an admirable discourse on this subject; which many others have handled before, but he hath exhausted it: insomuch that no argument of moment, nay, hardly any consideration properly belonging to it, hath escaped his large and comprehensive mind. He hath said enough to silence the controversy for ever, and to deter all wise men, of both sides, from meddling any further with it". It is indeed an acute, learned, and, so far as the defence of a wrong cause would admit, a solid book. It is, I believe, universally considered by divines of the Established Church, as the standard work on the subject, and is the great storehouse from which subsequent writers of that communion, and I suppose of every other—when they really purpose to reason, and not merely to declaim, falsify, and vituperate—have drawn

their materials of attack. I shall therefore take Dr. Barrow's work * as the text for objections, inserting and subjoining whatever I find worthy of notice in such other works of Protestant divines as have fallen into my hands. Objections drawn from passages of the Fathers are, for reasons already stated (n. 25), kept over for separate examination. Dr. Barrow's objections are arranged into distinct classes, in reference to each text: I shall observe the same order in following him; and in citing the objections of other writers not proposed, or not so fully proposed by him, I shall *try* to observe it.

§ 1. *Objections against the arguments from
Matthew, xvi.*

I. THE ROCK.

OBJECTION I.

152. "Those words do not signify any thing to their [the Roman Catholics'] purpose; for they are metaphorical, and *thence* ambiguous, or capable of divers interpretations; whence they cannot suffice to ground so main a point of doctrine, or to warrant so

* The Edition I follow is that published at Oxford in 1836, as a portion of the *Enchiridion Theologicum Antiromanum*.

huge a pretence; these ought to stand upon downright, evident, and indubitable testimony" — BARROW, *p.* 86.

ANSWER.

153. I. Metaphorical language has a fixed and determined meaning, just as much as literal language, and its use is governed by the laws that regulate the use of language (which are derived from the customs of speech, *usus loquendi*, as Horace has long ago remarked), just as much as the use of literal language is governed by those laws. Take up any book—for every book not purely scientific contains metaphors in abundance—we are constantly writing and speaking metaphors—take up any book in prose or poetry, from specimens of the least ornamental, to specimens of the most ornamental style, from Swift to Burke or Macaulay; turn over a few pages and note down the metaphorical expressions, and you will find in every instance that the meaning of the metaphor is as distinct and determined as the meaning of the plainest words, that there is no ambiguity, no room for “divers interpretations”, no shadow of doubt as to what the writer is at. I have just done what I have asked my reader to do—taken up a volume of Burke, and opened his “Letter

to a Noble Lord" at random. From the first paragraph that met my eye I take the following extract.

"Nothing can be conceived more *hard* than the heart of a thoroughbred metaphysician. It comes nearer to the *cold* malignity of a wicked spirit, than to the frailty and passion of a man. It is like that of the principle of evil himself, *incorporeal, pure, unmixed, dephlegmated, defecated evil*. It is no easy operation to *eradicate* humanity from the human breast. What Shakespeare calls, 'the compunctious visitings of nature', will sometimes *knock* at their hearts, and *protest against* their murderous speculations. But they have a means of *compounding with* their nature. Their humanity is not *dissolved*. They only give it a long *prorogation*. They are ready to declare, that they do not think two thousand years too long a period for the good that they pursue. It is remarkable, that they never see any way to their projected good, but by the *road* of some evil. Their imagination is not *fatigued* with the contemplation of human suffering, through the *wild waste* of centuries, added to centuries of misery and desolation. Their humanity is at their horizon—and, like the horizon, it always *flies before them*", etc.

I have marked most, if not all, of the metaphorical

expressions in this passage; and though the comparison of humanity to a parliament which is not dissolved, but only prorogued, may be justly objected to on the score of taste, yet there is no mistaking the meaning and purport of every metaphor in the extract. It is as clear and definite as human language could make it. Of course a writer may use obscure, absurd, unintelligible metaphors, as he may use obscure, absurd, unintelligible literal language: but metaphorical language is not thereby proved to be a more obscure, ambiguous mode of expression, any more than a farmer who cultivates hemp coöperates to self-murder, because a man may hang himself with the rope which is made out of it.

153. II. Nay more, I assert that the meaning of metaphorical language properly used, is less ambiguous and more defined, than the meaning of literal language often is. We call a courageous man a *lion*, a cruel man a *tiger*, a rude man a *bear*, a cunning man a *fox*, a stupid man an *ass*, etc. Though a lion is cruel as well as a tiger, and a tiger courageous as well as a lion, yet I could not substitute one for the other in the metaphor; so, though a bear and an ass are both rude, and neither endowed with any notable degree of sagacity above the other, I could not substitute one for the other in the

metaphor; use having so fixed the metaphorical meaning of each word. It would be easy, but tedious, to illustrate this at greater length.

154. III. Farther still, not only is the meaning of metaphorical language more defined, and *therefore* clearer, but the idea is much more *forcibly* conveyed by metaphor—of course I suppose an appropriate metaphor—than by literal language. I need not enlarge on this proposition. The examples adduced in the two last paragraphs, and in *n.* 125 are sufficient to illustrate it.

155. IV. Our Lord often uses highly figurative language, not only in propounding speculative doctrines, but (where it would be less expected) in inculcating moral precepts. A glance at the Sermon on the mount alone, in *St. Matthew*, will be sufficient to show this.

156. V. I have already proved, that the meaning of the metaphor now under discussion is clear and determined (*chap.* i. § 3, 4).

OBJECTION II.

157. “This [the ambiguous meaning of the metaphor] is manifestly confirmed from that the Fathers and divines, both ancient and modern, have much differed in exposition of these words” (here

follow quotations and references)—BARROW, *p.* 86
PALMER, *Treatise on the Church*, II. *p.* 374.

[See *n.* 25, etc.]

OBJECTION III.

158. "It is very evident that the Apostles themselves did not understand those words of our Lord to signify any grant or promise to St. Peter, of supremacy over them. For would they have *contended* for the chief place, if they had understood whose it of right was by our Lord's own positive determination? (*Luke*, xxii. 14.) Would they have disputed about a question, which to their knowledge by their Master was already stated? (*Mark*, ix. 33.) Would they have troubled our Lord to inquire of him, who should be the greatest in his kingdom, when they knew that our Lord had declared his will to make St. Peter viceroy? (*Matth.*, xviii. 1.) Would the sons of Zebedee have been so foolish and presumptuous, as to beg the place which they knew by our Lord's words and promise fixed on Peter? (*Matth.*, xx.) Would St. Peter, among the rest, have fretted at that idle overture, whereas he knew the place by our Lord's immutable purpose and infallible declaration as-

sured to him? And if none of the Apostles did understand the words to imply the Roman sense, who can be obliged so to understand them? Yea, who can wisely, who can safely so understand them? For, surely they had common sense as well as any man living now; they had as much advantage as we can have, to know our Lord's meaning; their ignorance, therefore, of this sense being so apparent, is not only a just excuse for not admitting this interpretation, but a strong bar against it"—BARROW, *p.* 88, and others *passim*.

ANSWER.

159. I. We see from several passages in the Gospels, that the Apostles and other disciples of our Lord were exceedingly slow in understanding his words—to such a degree indeed that, at first sight, and before the causes of their dulness of apprehension are considered, we are rather astonished at finding that even the twelve, constantly following him, and listening to him, and truly believing in him, were so often at fault in taking up the meaning of language which to us presents no difficulty.

Among the causes of this were, first, that they were rude, uncultivated men, before their call, accustomed only to the ideas and language of what we

call humble life, of fishermen and the like; men too, who had arrived at that age when the untutored intellect becomes hard, stiff, not easy to turn into new habits of perception and reflection. Secondly, the supernatural enlightenment, which would have more than supplied the want of mental culture, was, up to the close of our Lord's earthly career, given to them gradually and in very small measure, compared with the fulness thereof which they afterwards received. This is manifest on the very surface of the Scriptures. Thirdly, the external revelation as regarded the nature and constitution of Christ's kingdom on earth, etc., was, at the period in question, but shadowed forth to them dimly. That the idea of a spiritual kingdom and a suffering Messiah was still far from their thoughts, is clear from the very texts referred to in the objection, and from the close of this very sixteenth chapter in *Matthew*, in which Peter appears to be quite shocked at the idea of Christ being subjected to torments and death, and this immediately after Christ had foretold his passion. Nay, we see that at the very end of his public mission, and on the eve of his death, the Apostles had "a strife amongst them, which of them should seem to be greater"—*Luke*, xxii. 24,—a proceeding which certainly in-

dedicated a degree of knowledge of their future calling, so low, that it may well be called dark ignorance, or rather error, compared with what they afterwards came to know and to teach. The truth is—perfectly plain from the inspired volume—that their conceptions of the future Church of Christ, as well as of other things, were vague, gross, and by consequence erroneous, and that it was not until after the Resurrection, or rather after the descent of the Holy Ghost, that their minds were fully informed. We now stand in a far higher position as to our knowledge, than the Apostles stood during the public mission of Christ. We see all, and therefore see the meaning, and end, and adaptation of all the parts: they saw but a little, and in a dark disjointed manner.

But whatever may have been the causes of the dulness of apprehension on the part of the Apostles, of the fact itself there can be no doubt: there are abundant evidences thereof in the Gospels themselves. Thus—

“Peter answering, said to him: ‘Expound to us this parable’. But he said: ‘Are you also yet without understanding? Do you not understand’,” etc.
—*Matth.*, xv. 15.

Jesus said to the disciples: “Take heed and be-

ware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees". But they thought within themselves, saying: "Because we have taken no bread". And Jesus knowing it, said: "Why do you think within yourselves, O ye of little faith, for that you have no bread?..... Why do you not understand that it was not concerning bread I said to you, Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees? *Then*, they understood that he said", etc.—*Matt.*, xvi. 5. See also 21; xix. 25; xx. 22. *John*, iv. 32, etc., etc.

The Apostles were particularly in the dark, or rather particularly erred as to the future constitution and organization of the Church. We should therefore expect that partial revelations on that subject would have been among the points misunderstood, or understood only in a gross general way. And accordingly we find this to be the fact. For—

160. II. That they expected one of themselves to be made head over the rest, is evident from the fact referred to in the objection, their quarrel about this headship, who should have it. If no intimation had been given of a primacy to be established, how did the idea not only come into their minds, but fix itself so strongly there? For they seem to have taken for certain that there was to be a headship; their whole contention on this and other occa-

sions being, as to *who would have it*. Why, while they remembered that the office was to be instituted, they had forgotten that it was also to be conferred on Peter, is not so easy to account for by a clear and decisive reason. Nor am I in any way called on to produce such reason. I take the word of God as I find it. There is a revelation distinct, striking, and, as I have proved, according to the plain usage of language, and of Scripture language too, promising thrice over a supremacy to Peter. Am I to throw up the fundamental and universal principles for interpreting speech, to renounce the clear revelation, because a strife afterwards occurs among the Apostles, which seems to imply that they had not well understood a portion of that revelation, or had forgotten it, for which misunderstanding or forgetfulness I am unable to account?—the mere fact of the strife being all that is recorded, and that in two or three words. Perhaps if the Evangelist had given the words in which the dispute was carried on, the whole affair would be to us perfectly plain. As it is, we are left to conjectures, more or less probable.

It may have been, as I have just intimated, that while the Apostles remembered that a primacy had been promised, they had forgotten that it was to be

conferred on Peter. Their mental condition at this period, described in the preceding *number*, renders this by no means unlikely. One of the ends expressly stated for which Christ promised to send the Holy Ghost, was to recall to their remembrance what he had himself previously taught them (*John*, xxiv. 26).

It may have been that the Apostles had not taken up the words of Christ accurately. We have an example of this even after the Resurrection, where his words were interpreted to mean that the beloved disciple would not die (*John*, xxi. 23).

It may have been that, though they understood Christ to have promised the primacy to Peter, yet they fancied that the promise might be reversed, or modified in some way, or that some other might be raised to a still higher dignity. Thus, after he had expressly foretold his sufferings and death and resurrection, we find Peter taking him aside, and expostulating: "Lord, be it far from thee, this shall *not* be unto thee!"—*Matt.*, xvi. 22.

To say nothing of the prophecies of the Old Testament, our Lord himself had often, and to us clearly enough, foretold his passion, and the spiritual nature of his future kingdom on earth: yet we see the Apostles to the last clinging to the fond ex-

pectations that prevailed among their countrymen, of a Messiah and a kingdom altogether different. "Then Jesus took unto him the twelve, and said to them: 'Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and all things shall be accomplished which were written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man. For he shall be delivered to the gentiles, and shall be mocked, and scourged, and spit upon; and after they have scourged him they will put him to death, and the third day he shall rise again'. And *they understood none of these things, and this word was hid from them, and they understood not the things that were said*"—*Luke*, xviii. 31. Words more simple, more obvious in meaning, could not possibly be uttered, than those here used by our Lord in describing his approaching passion. They were addressed to the same twelve Apostles who heard the address to Peter in *Matt.*, xvi. Yet it is written, that *they understood NONE of these things!* This text of itself is decisive, and quashes the objection at once.*

Nothing can be more perilous, in judging of the meaning of the words, even the plainest words of Christ, than to take as a guide the impressions and conduct of the Apostles before the descent of the

* See JAHN, *Enchirid. Hermen.* § 11.

Holy Ghost. Few things would strike a candid student of the New Testament more forcibly, than the complete, absolute change which takes place in their whole character after that event. From good and holy men, but still far from the Apostolic perfection, in knowledge especially, they became at once endowed with the fulness of wisdom, of zeal, of knowledge, of all heavenly gifts.

161. III. The first great point at issue between us and Protestants is, whether any individual supremacy, such as we maintain, was established: the second is, whether that supremacy was to be perpetual in the Church. If the first point—which is that now under immediate examination — were proved, I suppose there would be no controversy as to the individual Apostle really invested with the primacy. Indeed, most learned Protestant writers that have fallen into my hands, admit some pre-eminence, at least of honour, in St. Peter.* But

*“There seems good reason to believe—though it would be most unwarrantable to make it an article of faith—that Peter really was the chief of the Apostles; not, certainly, in the sense of exercising any supremacy and actual control over them,—as dictating to their consciences,—as finally deciding all cases of doubt,—or as claiming any right to interfere in the Churches other Apostles had founded (see *Galat.*, ii. 7, 9, and 11, 14), but as the chief in dignity; taking precedence of the rest, and acting as President, Chairman, or Speaker

the first great point is, was *any* supreme ruler established.

Now the very words which our Saviour used in stopping the strife for mastery among his Apostles, after the last supper, would appear to be a strong confirmation of this first point, would appear to imply very clearly that there was to be a supreme individual headship. Thus the text runs: "There was a strife amongst them, which of them should seem to be greater. And he said to them: The kings of the gentiles lord it over them, and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so; but he that is the *greater* among you, let him become as the younger, and he that is the *leader* (ὁ ἡγούμενος) as he that serveth"—*Luke*, xxii. 24, etc.

Therefore some one was to be *greater** among

in their meetings"—WHATELY, *Kingdom of Christ*; Essay II. § 7, *note*. So also BARROW, LAUD, *Conference with Fisher*, p. 153, 193 (*Ed.* Oxford, 1839); STILLINGFLEET, *Rational Account*, Part II. chap. 7; PALMER, vol. II. p. 370; BRAMHALL, vol. II. (*Ed.* Oxford, 1842), etc., etc., etc.

* "From the antithetical word *νεωτερος*, this has has been by some supposed to denote 'one who is elder', like the Latin *major*. But from the parallel passage of Matthew, it is plain that *νεωτερος* is rather to be accommodated to *μειζων* than *vice versa*; and Kype has adduced several Classical authorities for *νεωτερος* in the sense

them; *leader* among them; otherwise Christ would not have laid down a specific rule of conduct for such a personage, namely, that he was to bear himself not as a worldly ruler, lording it over others, but with the humility of an inferior—"Neither as lording it over the clergy, but being made a pattern of the flock from the heart"—I. *Peter*, v. 3. Let the leader act so and so: therefore there was to be a leader to act so and so. They contended for the leadership; they expected, then, that there would be a leadership. Christ does not correct their expectation, but so far confirms it, and corrects what was erroneous in their idea of what the leader ought to be. I do not see how this inference can be got over: it is as obvious and necessary as inference can well be.

So the text adduced to invalidate our plea, furnishes an additional argument in its favour.

162. IV. But this is not all. The Apostles had on former occasions contended for the leadership, and our Lord on those occasions contented himself with repressing their ambitious tendencies, by exhortations to humility, and by telling them

of an *inferior*. He shows that the expressions employed throughout have reference to *office*, or station in the Kingdom of Christ"—BLOOMFIELD *in loc.* The italics are his.

that the headship they contended for should be a headship of meekness as well as authority. He does a great deal more on this occasion. He takes away all ground and pretext for such contentions in future. *He appoints the leader* on the spot. Peter is singled out by name and, in being authorized and commanded to confirm his brethren, is then and there invested with the primatial office (*n.* 130, etc.). This settles definitively all disputes about who should be greater, and accordingly we never have a word more about them.

OBJECTION IV.

163. "This interpretation also doth not well consist with our Lord's answers to the contests, inquiries, and petitions of his disciples, concerning the point of superiority: for doth he not (if the Roman exposition be good) seem upon those occasions, not only to dissemble his own word and promise, but to disavow or thwart them? Can we conceive that he would in such case of doubt forbear to resolve them, clearly to instruct them, and admonish them of their duty?"—BARROW, *p.* 89.

ANSWER.

164. The solution of this objection is contained in that of the preceding.

I. There is no disavowing or thwarting of his own word and promise. The Apostles, as we have seen, expected a headship to be established; and as they were right in this expectation, it was not to be "disavowed" or "thwarted".

II. It was not a reasonable doubt to be resolved, or a legitimate inquiry to be answered, but an unseemly strife and inordinate desire of mastery that were to be dealt with; and Christ dealt with them exactly in the way that was most becoming his character, and salutary to the Apostles. For

III. He *did* "clearly instruct them, and admonish them of their duty", which was to be humble, submissive, and simple of heart, like little children, and not thirst after high places; and he refrained from gratifying their ambitious curiosity. When, in his own infinite wisdom, he saw that the time was come, he gave the final answer to their inquiries, and the final blow to their contentions, by appointing Peter to the headship.

OBJECTION V.

165. "Taking the rock, as they [Roman Catholics] would have it, to be the person of St. Peter, and that on him the Church should be built; yet do not the words *being a rock* probably denote government? For what resemblance is there between being a rock and a governor? At least what assurance can there be, that this metaphor precisely doth import that sense; seeing in other respects, upon as fair similitudes, he might be called so?" [Here follow some short extracts from the Fathers, which are entirely beside the question, but which, for the reasons already assigned, I reserve for future examination.]—BARROW, *p.* 89.

ANSWER.

166. I. We do not say that being a rock denotes government, or that to be a rock denotes to be a governor. But what we say is, that not only *to be*, but *to be appointed to be*, not a rock, but *the rock* on which *the whole Church is built* as an edifice, so that *in consequence* of its being built on the rock, it will *never fail*, though incessantly attacked by the most powerful and malignant enemies—what we say is, that to be thus appointed to be the Rock

of the Church, with these relations to the Church and these influences upon her destiny, is to receive supreme power over the Church. This has been proved at length (*chap. I. § 3, § 4, § 5, from n. 41 to n. 70*), and cannot be repeated here.

II. In the sections just referred to, unanswerable "assurance" has been given "that this metaphor *precisely doth* import that sense". With regard to the "other respects" in which Peter might be called and has been called a Rock, such as that he stood firmly against the blows of temptation (*Basil*)—that he first merited to found the Church by firmness of faith (*Chrysologus*), etc.; all this is perfectly true. These "respects" or relations are adjuncts of what the metaphor denotes, or follow from what the metaphor denotes, or are included in what the metaphor denotes, as parts are included in the whole; but they *are not*, or are not *the whole* of what the metaphor denotes. On what ground do I assert this? On this firm ground precisely, because I have already *proved* (in the place referred to) that the metaphor in the text denotes supreme authority over the whole Church.

OBJECTION VI.

167. "But, however, also admitting this, that

being such a rock doth imply government and pastoral charge; yet do they (notwithstanding these grants and suppositions) effect nothing; for they cannot prove the words spoken exclusively in regard to other Apostles, or to import any thing singular to him above or beside them; he might be a governing rock, so might others be; the Church might be built on him, so it might be on other Apostles; he might be designed a governor, a great governor, a principal governor, so might they also be; this might be without any violence done to those words. And this indeed was; for all the other Apostles in holy Scripture are called foundations, and the Church is said to be built on them"—BARROW, *p.* 89.

The texts referred to in the concluding sentence are, I suppose, *Ephes.*, ii. 20: "Built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone"; and *Apocal.*, xxi. 14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb".

ANSWER.

168. This objection will come to be examined hereafter (*n.* 244) under another and more general form. I reply to it briefly as it lies here.

I. The words *are* on this occasion spoken to Peter *exclusively* (n. 30).

II. The same words or any words like them, are no where else addressed to the other Apostles, or to any one among them. They are nowhere appointed by Christ to be, nor is it any where said of them that they were, the rock on which the Church was, or was to be built, in consequence of which the powers of hell should not prevail against it; nor is it said, in the way of appointment or narratively of any one of them; nor is the term Rock anywhere in Scripture applied to them, or to any one of them. The words addressed to Peter do therefore import something "singular to him above and beside them".

III. The *other* Apostles are nowhere called the foundation of the Church, nor is the Church anywhere said to be built on *them*. The *twelve* Apostles are called twelve foundations (*Apoc.*, xxi.), and they, *Peter included*, are called the foundation (*Ephes.*, ii.). In what sense the word "foundation" is used in these texts, and whether it be identical in meaning with "rock", we shall see hereafter (n. 248). But, supposing for the present that there is no substantial difference of meaning between the two metaphors, thus much follows, which we our-

selves not only admit, but maintain and profess as a dogma of faith, that the twelve Apostles were the chief rulers, "great governors, principal governors", of the Church. But it does *not* follow, that one of the twelve might not have been appointed chief of the chief rulers, principal governor of the principal governors of the whole Church—any more than it would follow from my speaking of twelve heads of an institution, that one of them was not chief head or principal. The contrary of this has been proved as a fact, for it has been proved that Peter was appointed head of the Apostles and of the whole Church.

OBJECTION VII.

169. "It is not said that the Apostles, or the Apostolical office, should be built on him; for that could not be, seeing the Apostles were constituted, and the Apostolical office was founded, before that promise; the words only therefore can import, that according to some meaning he was a rock, upon which the Church, afterward to be collected, should be built; he was 'a rock of the Church to be built', as Tertullian speaketh: the words therefore cannot signify anything available to their purpose, in relation to the Apostles"—BARROW, *p.* 91.

ANSWER.

170. I. Christ promised to build the Church; the whole Church on Peter; "On this rock I will build my Church"—*n.* 37 and 76. The Apostles were included in that Church, were a part of it, the more noble and eminent part of it. Therefore, they as well as the rest were built on Peter.

II. Christ was the essential, the primary Rock of the Church, Peter the dependent, secondary, vicarious Rock (*n.* 21, 49). All was built on Christ, the rock visible in the days of his sojourn on earth, the invisible afterwards. Christ appointed Peter to take his own place as ruler of the Church, after his departure. No matter when the Apostles were, instituted and the Apostolical office founded, Christ could at any time have placed them on a new foundation derived from himself, resting on himself, representing himself, remaining the visible Rock of the visible Church, after he had become invisible. The words not only *can* import, but *do* import that, not only the Church to be collected after Peter's actual appointment, but the Church existing at the time, should be built on him. I see not a shadow of difficulty, much less of impossibility, in all this—The sovereign Lord who has hitherto exercised the

supreme power immediately, appoints a regent to take his place after his departure, and that is all! Even a material edifice might be placed on a new foundation resting on the old one, if there existed any able to effect this—as of course God is able.

III. Dr. Barrow's interpretation would lead to certain conclusions enormously absurd and directly opposed to Scripture, but it is not worth while to pursue this objection further. I suspect that the ambiguity, already partially noticed (*n.* 43, *note*), of the word *foundation* had somewhat ensnared him. A man is said to *found* a society who originates it, though he possesses no authority over it. A society is said to be *founded* on certain principles—laws—usages, etc.; which may mean either that it derives its peculiar form and constitution from these, or that it is sustained and kept together by them, *i. e.* by their being acted upon. So a *foundation* may convey the idea of a mere commencement, or it may convey the idea of supporting—(but enough of this for the present, see hereafter *n.* 248). Undoubtedly the Apostolic office was founded, *i. e.* commenced, before the promise made to Peter, and so was the Christian Church in its rudimental form: undoubtedly also both were founded, *i. e.* based, upon Christ from the beginning. But neither was

at that time developed, completed, organized, adjusted in all its internal and external relations, perfected in all its gifts and powers, built up completely and finished off.

OBJECTION VIII.

171. "If we take St. Peter himself for the rock, then (as I take it) the best meaning of the words doth import, that our Lord designed St. Peter for a prime instrument (the first mover, the most diligent and active at the beginning, the most constant, stiff, and firm) in the support of his truth, and propagation of his doctrine, or conversion of men to the belief of the gospel; the which is called building of the Church;.....in which regard, as the other Apostles are called foundations of the Church (the Church being founded on their labours), so might St. Peter signally be so called.....Both he and they might also be so termed, for that upon their testimonies concerning the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, the faith of Christians was grounded; as also it stands upon their convincing discourses, their holy practice, their miraculous performances; in all which St. Peter was most excellent.....But this sense doth not imply any superiority of power or dignity granted to St. Peter above his brethren;

however it may signify an advantage belonging to him, and deserving especial respect"—BARROW, *p.* 91.

ANSWER.

172. I. The radical fallacy of this objection is, that it overlooks the distinction, already alluded to (*n.* 166) and explained and proved (*n.* 64), between *being* the rock, and *being appointed* the rock. Let it be granted that a man who excelled others in zeal might *be* and "*be termed*" a rock in a special and eminent manner, though he possessed no higher authority than they. So far as zealous labour goes, he actually does more than any one of them to consolidate and sustain, and therefore simply *is* (while this active zeal continues) a rock more than any one of them. Peter, however, not only *was*, and *deserved to be termed* a rock, specially, on account of his special zeal; but before the Apostolic mission began, before the plenitude of the Apostolic power was communicated, before the Apostles had yet received any thing like a clear notion of what their mission was to be (*n.* 159, etc.), before the Church had yet been established, before it had advanced beyond its inchoate, unformed condition—before all this, Jesus in the most solemn manner, and in the

presence of all the Apostles, promised to constitute Peter—neither then nor on any other occasion promising to constitute, or constituting any other than Peter—to be not *a* rock, but *the* Rock on which he would so firmly build and establish his whole Church, that the powers of hell could never prevail against it. I have already shown that, so to be appointed, is by the very fact to receive unbounded and sovereign authority in the whole Church. If Peter was præminent above the rest of the Apostles in the first founding and general administration of the Church, it was because his official authority, and therefore duties, were præminent above the rest. I *suppose* nothing in this inference, for I have already *proved* that such authority was conferred on him (nay from this præminence in founding the Church, præminence of authority might be reasonably inferred—but this is beside the present question).

II. If twelve men are appointed, by competent authority, to construct and govern a society, and if one of their number is appointed with sovereign jurisdiction over the whole, and if in carrying on the work that one is eminent in zeal and activity above the rest, takes the leading part in the fundamental operations, will you thence infer that he is

eminent and a leader in no other sense? Will you infer, because he is superior in zeal, that this is his *whole* superiority, or the whole ground of his superiority—forgetting that he was appointed with supreme power? Would you not rather account for his greater zeal by his greater office and weightier responsibility? This is not an imaginary case, it is exactly the case before us. You take the great works of Peter from the Acts of the Apostles, and you admit that Peter was above the rest of his brethren, but only as a zealous labourer—just so far above them as his greater works placed him and no farther, and that this is enough to fulfil the meaning of our Lord's promise. But you forget that that promise is a promise of appointment to supreme authority; and that this has been proved, and that the present objection does not even touch one fibre of that proof. Show that to be appointed the Rock of the whole Church, etc., does not imply an appointment to sovereign authority, and then you may withhold (so far as this part of *Matthew's* text goes) all preëminence from Peter beyond that which his zeal merited and purchased. This objection does not attack our proof, but ignores it.

III. I maintain that the words of Christ imply more than a *designing* of St. Peter to be a prime

instrument in the support of his truth, and propagation of his doctrine", etc., etc. They imply, moreover, an *official appointment* to do all these things, and to do them *as having specific authority* to do them. They imply also a great deal more than appointment and authority to support the truth of Christ, propagate his doctrine, etc.: for they imply appointment and authority to do all things conducive to the security, welfare, and propagation of the Church, they imply sovereign jurisdiction over the whole Church. I maintain this because I have already proved it (n. 64, etc.).

173. Observe that, though undoubtedly Peter was appointed, as were the other Apostles, to build up the Church, and though the building up of the Church, *i. e.* the preaching of the gospel and converting of men thereto, etc., was the prominent trait in the idea of the Apostolic office as such, yet so it is, that in the text before us, Peter is represented not as a builder of the Church, but as the sustainer, the rock-support of the Church built by Christ on him. "On this rock *I will* build my Church".

The comparison between Peter's functions and those of the Apostles has been slightly touched

upon, and will be fully examined hereafter (*n.* 224, 244, etc.).

As to the objection thrown in incidentally, that the primacy promised to Peter, was but to be the first in founding the Church, see below OBJECT. XII., *n.* 179.

OBJECTION IX.

174. "St. Peter, before the speaking of those words by our Lord, may seem to have had a primacy intimated by the evangelists, when they report his call to the Apostolical office; and by his behaviour, when in this confession, and before in the like, he undertook to be their mouth and spokesman; when *not being unmindful of his place*, saith St. Ambrose, *he did act a primacy; a primacy, addeth that Father, of confession, not of honour; of faith, not of order*: his primacy therefore (such as he had) cannot well be founded on this place, he being afore possessed of it, and, as St. Ambrose conceived, exercising it at that time"—BARROW, *p.* 92.

ANSWER.

175. This is strange reasoning. Peter had already possessed a certain primacy or precedence;

this primacy “of confession, not of honour—of faith, not of order”, he exercised in confessing the divinity of our Lord on the present occasion; *therefore*, in the words immediately addressed to him he received, or was promised no higher primacy, no primacy of jurisdiction! As if I said of a priest appointed to a bishopric, that he appears as a priest on the morning of his consecration; therefore, he does not become a bishop by the consecration! Of course if it can be proved that our Lord promised to him nothing but what he had before, then—so far as this promise goes—he got nothing more. But this is the question, what did Christ promise? a question, the answer to which has been already given and proved.

I say nothing of the “primacy intimated by the Evangelists, when they report his call to the Apostolical office”; as this belongs to the second branch of the Scripture argument (*n.* 1).

OBJECTION X.

175. “Wherever St. Peter is spoken of as a pillar or foundation of the Church, it is never by himself, but always in conjunction with others (*1 Cor. lat.*, ii. 9; *Ephes.*, ii. 19, 20, 21)”. BARWICK, *Treatise on the Church*, p. 170 (2nd Edit.).

ANSWER.

176. I. There is a wide difference between being called *a foundation* of the Church and being called *the Rock* on which the whole Church is built, so that the gates of hell should not prevail against it (170. III.). The text from the *Ephesians* will be fully discussed hereafter (n. 244, etc.). There is an infinitely wider difference between *a pillar* of the Church and *the Rock*, etc. There may be a thousand pillars in the edifice, there is but one rock-foundation on which it all rests.

II. In the text of the *Galatians* referred to, the Apostles there named are not called pillars of *the Church*, or even pillars *in* the Church, but simply *pillars*. "James and Cephas and John, who seemed to be pillars, gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship". I believe that the phrase "pillar of the Church", does not occur anywhere in the New Testament, nor even the phrase "pillar *in* the Church".

III. The promise in *Matth.*, xvi., was made to Peter *alone*, and *not* "in conjunction with others".

OBJECTION XI.

177. "What resemblance is there between a Rock and a governor? Can our adversaries pro-

duce any instance, in which a supremacy of power was ever conferred by comparing any person to a rock?"—BARWICK, *p.* 171.

ANSWER.

178. I. The first interrogatory has been answered already (*n.* 41, etc., *n.* 64, etc.).

II. To the second interrogatory, I answer, 1^o. I have produced an instance in the text before us from *Matth.*, xvi.; and I have proved that supremacy was there conferred in promise. 2^o. The supremacy was conferred not by *comparing* Peter to a Rock, but by appointing him to be the Rock, etc. (*as above*, *n.* 172). 3^o. There is no other instance in the New Testament, Peter's case excepted, in which supremacy of this kind was conferred on an individual, or promised to one: which is, I suppose, some reason why the metaphor was not used on other occasions. Why it had not been used elsewhere in the New or Old Testaments, I cannot account for by any clear and decisive explanation. There are a thousand other things in both, which I am at a great loss to account for—a very poor reason, I humbly submit, for evading the force of a text, the meaning of which I can clearly understand, and explain, and establish.

Christ came to establish a new kingdom on earth, a new society as the great means of perpetuating and communicating the fruits of his atonement. Though the word *Church* (ἐκκλησία) is so peculiarly fitted to designate that society, that it is used upwards of one hundred times between the commencement of the Acts of the Apostles and the end of the Apocalypse, yet in the whole of the Gospels it occurs but twice, and this in the Gospel of *St. Matthew*, once in the text under discussion, and once in chap. xviii. 17. The word *pillar* (στυλος) as applied to the Apostles, or other eminent pastors of the Church, is a very happy, intelligible, and expressive metaphor: yet it is used but once in reference to them, or any one of them, through the whole of the New Testament (*Galat.*, ii. 9)—its application in *Apocal.*, iii. 12, being altogether different. This same metaphor of a *pillar*, where applied to the Church in *I. Tim.*, iii. 15, is sufficiently clear and striking: yet, this is the *only* text in the New Testament in which it is applied to the Church.*

* Besides the three places above referred to, the word occurs but once more in the N. T., viz. *Apoc.*, x. 1—"And his feet are as pillars of fire".

OBJECTION XII.

179. St. Peter received a special power and appointment in this place, in being commissioned to found, *i. e.* commence, lay the foundation of, the Church; a commission which he fulfilled in being the first after Pentecost, who founded the Church among the Jews, by converting about three thousand of them (*Acts*, xi.), and subsequently among the gentiles, by converting Cornelius and others (*Acts*, x.). Such was the primacy and the whole primacy promised to him in the words, "upon this rock", etc.

This is an interpretation of the text very commonly, I might almost say universally, adopted by modern Protestant divines. See MANNING on the Unity of the Church, *page* 152, *note* (part 1, chap. 4). WHATELY, *Essays on the Kingdom of Christ*; Essay 2, § 7, *note*. PALMER, vol. 2, *p.* 376. BARROW, *ut supra*, n. 171. BLOOMFIELD, *in loc.*, etc., etc.

ANSWER.

180. The principles of the answer to this objection, have been more than once so fully laid down in the preceding pages, that I should have thought it superfluous to propose the objection

formally, but for the fact just stated—that it is so popular among Protestant writers. Let it here suffice to observe briefly, that Peter was appointed to become the *Rock* of the Church, its principle of power and indefectibility, and therefore its supreme ruler. Whether to found, *i. e.* commence, the Church was included in his office of supreme ruler or not, formed a part of the rights and duties of that office in detail or not; certain it is, that it did not constitute the whole, or nearly the whole, or even the principal and essential part of his special primatial powers and duties. All this follows from what we have already proved (chap. 1, § 3, 4, 5). Peter was appointed to become not the *foundation*, in the common sense of the word—or at least in the sense adopted in the objection—but the *Rock-basis* of the whole Church, from which rock-basis that whole Church was not merely to spring up as from a commencement, but from which it was to derive strength, unity, permanence, security, unconquerable power against all the assaults of hell. But this is only beginning to say over again what has been said already, as clearly as I could say it, and *proved*, I think, unanswerably.

Bloomfield thus paraphrases our Lord's words: "Thou art by *name*, *Rock* (*i. e.* thy name means

Rock); and suitably to that will be thy work and office; for upon *thee* (*i. e.* upon thy preaching as upon a rock) shall the foundation of the Church be laid”.

This is not a paraphrase but an interpolation. For, 1^o. Christ does not say or imply that his name meant Rock, or ‘thou art *by name* Rock’, but, ‘thou art Rock’—the Apostles knew very well that his name meant Rock, for that was the meaning of the word in the language spoken by themselves. 2^o. Why is *upon thee* made to signify *upon thy preaching*? 3^o. Christ does not say that the *foundation* of the Church shall be laid on Peter, but that the *whole Church* shall be built upon him, and built too by Christ himself.

OBJECTION XIII.

181. “To speak of a *succession* of men, as being each a *foundation* on which the Church is built, is not only extravagant, but unmeaning”. WHATELY, *loc. citat.*, and *Errors of Romanism*, p. 184. BARROW, p. 112.

ANSWER.

182. To speak of a succession of men, as being each a foundation in the sense of founding anew, commencing what had been once for all commenced

and established in perpetuity, would certainly sound extravagant and unmeaning. But it is not in this sense, as I have so often repeated and proved, that Peter was made the foundation of the Church, but in the sense of a sustaining, consolidating power. Now there is nothing either extravagant or unmeaning, in speaking of a succession of men, who are—not all so many distinct independent rocks, nor each *a* rock, but—each *the* rock, the same rock continuing in their persons to sustain the Church—as the monarchy is perpetuated through a succession of kings; each the visible embodiment, the depositary of that vital principle of supernatural strength and authority, whereby the Church is ever invigorated, combined, and secured to the end of time. Peter and his successors are not a material rock, but they are *like* a rock: this is the true and exact meaning of the metaphor:* as the rock is to the

* “The Metaphor [is] a word substituted for another, on account of the Resemblance or Analogy between their significations. The Simile or Comparison, may be considered as differing in form only from a Metaphor; the resemblance being in that case stated, which in a Metaphor is implied. Each may be founded either on Resemblance, strictly so called, *i. e.* *direct* resemblance between the objects themselves in question (as when we speak of ‘*table-land*’, or compare great waves to *mountains*), or on Analogy, which is the resemblance of Ratios—a similarity of the relations they bear to certain other objects; as when we speak of the ‘*light of reason*’ or of ‘*revelation*’

edifice built thereon, so they are to the Church. It is not the flesh and blood of Peter that are the rock, but the primatial authority, the supernatural endowments, not in the abstract, but as vested and centred in the living man for the time being, that are the Rock. Christ, the eternal but now invisible rock, vivifies through them, sustains through them, unites through them, conquers through them. Extraordinary this is indeed and without parallel, but not extravagant, not unmeaning, but full of meaning, deep and weighty meaning.

II. THE KEYS.

183. Several of the objections urged by Barrow and others against our argument from the preceding member of the text are repeated against our argument from the present member—such as, that the words are metaphorical, and therefore obscure; that the Apostles did not understand them to signify a supremacy given to Peter, otherwise they would not have afterwards contended for that supremacy, etc. Such objections I will not again notice, unless some new idea should be introduced into any

or compare a wounded and captive warrior to a stranded ship"—
 WHATELY, *Rhetoric* (part 3, chap. 3, § 3)—so far as it goes, by far the best book on the subject, I know of, in our language.

of them. Moreover, I reserve for separate examination, in the section of *General Objections*, the assumption, and the argument drawn from the assumption, that whatever was here given to Peter was given as fully to the other Apostles (see *ante*, n. 31, and *post*, n. 244, etc.).

OBJECTION XIV.

184. "If we should grant (that which nowise can be proved), that something peculiarly belonging to St. Peter is implied in those words, it can only be this, that he should be a prime man in the work of preaching and propagating the gospel, and conveying the heavenly benefits of it to believers; which is an opening of the kingdom of heaven"—BARROW, p. 95, WHATELY, WORDSWORTH, *Theophilus Anglicanus*, part 1, chap. 13, *loc. cit.*, and others *passim*.

ANSWER.

185. Material keys are used only for the purpose of opening and shutting. But it does not follow that, when taken figuratively, they signify only authority to open and shut. On the contrary, he who has the keys of any place possesses general authority in that place; possesses supreme authority

under him by whom the keys were given. That the keys are simply a symbol of authority; that the authority here given to Peter was a sovereign authority over the whole Church, and therefore not merely a power to found or commence the Church, has been already *proved* (n. 84, etc., 97, 98). Peter exercised, but did not exhaust his primacy in opening the kingdom of heaven: this was but one function, a temporary function, in every way far from the most important of the many functions of his sublime office. For the rest see above, n. 172. II.

OBJECTION XV.

186. "It seemeth absurd that St. Peter should exercise the power of the keys in respect to the Apostles; for did he open the kingdom of heaven to them who were by our Lord long before admitted into it?"—BARROW, *p.* 96.

ANSWER.

187. The answer just given to the preceding objection is an answer to the present also. Peter could not exercise *this particular function* of the power of the keys in respect to the Apostles, not from want of power, but from want of an object

to exercise it upon, so far as they were concerned: just as that part of the royal jurisdiction which consists in the power of appointing the judges of the land, cannot be exercised by the Queen in respect of those who had been already judges at the time of her accession. But it does not follow that Peter could not have exercised the power of the keys, in its other departments, over the Apostles. Observe, however, that it was only after our Lord's departure that the Primatial authority was to come into full operation.

OBJECTION XVI.

188. "Our Lord, as Luke relateth it (*Luke*, v. 10; *Matth.*, iv. 19), did say to St. Peter, and probably to him first, *Fear not, from henceforth thou shalt catch men*: might it thence be inferred, that St. Peter had a peculiar or sole faculty of catching men? Why might it not be as good a consequence as this, whereby they would appropriate to him this opening faculty? Many such instances might in like manner be used"—BARROW, *p.* 96.

ANSWER.

189. The text of Matthew runs thus: "Jesus

walking by the sea of Galilee, saw two brethren, Simon who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother, casting a net into the sea (for they were fishers). And he saith to them, come ye after me, and I will make you to be fishers of men. And they immediately leaving their nets, followed him". The text of Luke runs thus: "Which [the miraculous draught of fishes] when Simon Peter saw, he fell down at the knees of Jesus, saying, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord. For he was wholly astonished, and all that were with him, at the draught of the fishes which they had taken. And so were also James and John the sons of Zebedee, who were Simon's partners. And Jesus saith to Simon, Fear not, from henceforth thou shalt catch men. And having brought their ships to land, leaving all things they followed him".

The first call of Peter was that narrated in *John*, i. 42. "And Jesus looking upon him, said, Thou art Simon the son of Jona; thou shalt be called Cephas (which is interpreted Peter)". Some commentators think that the call mentioned by *St. Matthew*, is the same as that in *Luke*, the narrative of one Evangelist being, as in many other instances, fuller than that of the other. Others are of opinion that the call in *Matthew* was the second, that in

Luke a third and distinct call. My business is with the theology of the text and not to determine between conflicting critical opinions. I say then—

If Peter received no distinct call from the other Apostles to become a fisher of men, or to catch men, as is implied in the first of the aforesaid opinions, then the objection falls at once to the ground. If, as the second opinion and Dr. Barrow's objection suppose, Peter did receive a distinct call, then I would not only admit, but maintain—altering a word or two—the very conclusion which he seems to consider as too absurd for us to hold. I would maintain that Peter received a peculiar call to the catching of men—not a sole call, as if none other was called to this work but he. I would maintain that, keeping the three texts from *Matthew*, *Luke*, and *John* before our eyes, this peculiar call was a foreshadowing—dim of course and perhaps not at all noticed at the time, but by no means so dim afterwards when the whole design of God was revealed—a foreshadowing of the great event that afterwards came to pass, when Peter was invested with sovereign authority over the whole Church. In our doctrine all the passages of Scripture wherein Peter's name is introduced, harmonize perfectly.

As to the other "many such instances", when adduced they can be examined.

OBJECTION XVII.

190. The main force of the argument rests upon the accuracy of the statement that keys, when used as a symbol, signified authority (*chap.* i. § 3). Now there is one text of Scripture, where the word taken figuratively is not used in this sense. "Wo to you lawyers, for you have taken away the key of knowledge: you yourselves have not entered in, and those that were entering in you have hindered" —*Luke*, xi. 52 (see *n.* 94).

ANSWER.

191. I. Even though it were granted that authority is not in any way implied here in the possession of the key, still the full force of the argument would remain perfectly untouched. For, 1^o it is the possession of the keys of any place as a house, castle, city, etc., which is a symbol of the possession of authority over that place: keys in each of the five texts quoted (*n.* 87, etc.) to show the usage of Scripture, are keys of some place. Hence we say that, according to that usage, the promise of the keys of the whole Church to Peter, was a promise

of authority over the whole Church. In the text from *St. Luke*, the key spoken of is not the key of a *place*, but the key of knowledge. 2^o. It might be added that, though the bestowing by competent authority or the legitimate possession of the keys symbolized jurisdiction, yet it does not follow, that the unjust seizure and possession of keys was also looked upon as a symbol of authority. But I more than doubt if this be a sound and fair answer. Nor do we stand in need of it; for, independent of the previous answer, which at once settles the objection, I assert that—

II. Authority is here denoted by the key. For whatever be the specific crime for which the lawyers are denounced (see *Matth.*, xxiii. 13), this at least is evident, that they exercised authority over others—"those that were entering in you have hindered"—and that the usurpation of this control is signified by the usurpation of the key. It was an usurped authority, but still authority, and they exercised it.

III. THE POWER OF BINDING AND LOOSING.

OBJECTION XVIII.

192. The power of binding and loosing is nothing more than the power of remitting and retaining sins, afterwards given to all the Apostles (*John*, xx. 21, etc.).* BARWICK, *p.* 172, and others. This interpretation is adopted by many even of our more modern Protestant divines. DR. ARNOLD seems to approve of it ("Fragment on the Church", *p.* 35).

ANSWER.

193. I. See above, *n.* 118, 124, where it has been proved that the words cannot be thus limited.

II. The identity of the subject of the two texts can be known only from an express mention of the same subject, or such a similarity in the language used on both occasions as would imply the same subject. But not only is neither of these assumptions true, but the direct contrary is very clear from an inspec-

* English Protestant divines, with the exception of a few of the Tractarians—if even they are to be excepted—do not hold that Christ gave to the Apostles the power of directly and really remitting sins. They say that sins are remitted by preaching the Gospel or by other means whereby men are led to repentance.

tion of the texts. In one, the subject is expressly specified, and sin, the specific subject, is named: in the other, not only is there no mention of sin, but the word used to indicate the subject is of the most universal extent, *whatsoever*. In one, the words are *forgive*, or *remit*, and *retain* (αφιημι—κρατεω): in the other, the words are *bind* and *loose* (δεω—λυω). In one, *forgive* (which, if the subject were the same, would correspond with *loose*) is put first—the destruction of sin being the great, special, immediate end for which the power of forgiving and retaining sins was given: in the other, *bind* (which would correspond with *retain*) is put first—the idea of high and unbounded authority more immediately and forcibly presenting itself to the mind, rather under the image of pressure and restraint than of loosing.

III. I find that wherever, in the Old or New Testament, there is mention of forgiving sins, 1^o either the word *sin*, or *fault*, or some such word is used, or the sinful act itself is named, or described, or plainly referred to. The passages I have examined are as follow:

GENESIS, L. 17.

LEVITIC., iv. 26, 27—31, 35; v. 10, 16, 18; vi. 7; xix. 22.

NUMBERS, xiv. 19; xv. 25.

JOB, xlii. 9.

PSALMS, xxiv. 18; xxxi. 1; lxxxiv. 3.

ISAIAH, xxii. 14; xxvii. 9; xl. 2.

I. MACHAB., xiii. 39.

MATTH., vi. 12, 14, 15; ix. 2, 5, 6; xii. 31, 32; xviii. 21, 27, 32, 35.

MARK, ii. 5, 7, 9, 10; iii. 28; iv. 12; xi. 25, 26.

LUKE, v. 20, 21, 23, 24; vii. 47, 48, 49; xi. 4; xii. 10; xvii. 3, 4; xxiii. 34.

ACTS, viii. 28.

JAMES, v. 15.

I. JOHN, i. 9; ii. 12.

In almost all these passages the word *sin* (ἁμαρτία or some equivalent) is expressed along with *forgive*; and in the few passages in which the word does not occur, the *thing* is clearly denoted.

2°. In each of these passages the word used to signify *forgive*, is ἀφίημι, which is the very word used by our Lord, *John*, xxi. 23.

The only exceptions are *Isaias*, xxvii. 9, where ἀφαιρέω (lit. *to take away*) is used for ἀφίημι (lit. *to send away*); and *Isaias*, xl. 2, and *Job*, xlii. 9, in both of which places λυω is used, but in both of which also the word ἁμαρτία (*sin*) occurs: λελυται αὐτης ἡ ἁμαρτία—καὶ ἐλυσε τὴν ἁμαρτιαν αὐτοῖς.

In *Luke*, vi. 37, the following words occur,

απολυετε και απολυθησεσθε, translated, "Forgive and you shall be forgiven". But the word *απολυω* cannot here signify to forgive *sins*, for it is said "and *you*—not your *sins*—shall be forgiven". The meaning is "*release* or set free, and you shall be *released*", without specifying any particular species of releasing. In this sense the word is used in *Matth.*, xxvii. 15, 17, 21, 26; *Mark*, xv. 6, and in several other passages of the New Testament.

From all this, I think that I am fairly entitled to infer that, according to Scripture usage even the word *remit* (αφιημι), though the term commonly used when there is question of forgiveness, could not be used to signify *to remit sin*, unless the word *sin* were expressed, or the context clearly indicated that the question was of sin. Still less could the word *loose* (λυω) which is so rarely used in reference to sin—it being found but twice in all the texts quoted above.

OBJECTION XIX.

194. The words *bind* and *loose* merely signify authority to command and permit, or the like. But such power in St. Peter would not imply a supremacy. WHATELY, *Errors of Rom.*, p. 185. PARKHURST, *in voc.* BLOOMFIELD, *in loc.*, who

quotes "Lighfoot, Selden, Hammond, Whitby, Kuinoel, Wahl, Fritzche, and most recent commentators", as of opinion that *to bind* signifies *to forbid*, and *to loose* signifies *to pronounce lawful, concede, permit, direct, constitute, etc.*

ANSWER.

I have already refuted the first proposition in this objection (n. 118, etc.), and the second proposition (n. 117).

§ 2. *Objections against the argument from Luke, xxii.*

195. Dr. Barrow passes over this text altogether. I agree with the author of *The Claims of the Church of Rome*, etc., that the doctor "usually meets objections in a very straightforward way", but I do not admit the reason assigned for the present omission—namely that "he did not think this passage much to the purpose". I would rather suppose that as the text is not introduced among the leading arguments for the Primacy by Bellarmine and some others of our Theologians, Barrow did not think it incumbent on him to answer it in answering the leading objections. The only special objections worth notice which I find in other writers are:

OBJECTION XX.

The words of our Lord convey a warning, an admonition, a command to Peter; but do not convey supreme authority.

ANSWER.

196. The command to confirm, conveys authority to confirm, and that this implies supremacy I have already proved at length (*n.* 138; see also *n.* 208).

OBJECTION XXI.

197. "Our Lord seems to intimate, that after his fall Peter would become more cautious and circumspect than ever; and that, notwithstanding the baseness of his past conduct, he should be a proper instrument for strengthening the feeble-minded and supporting the weak: his two epistles to the persecuted Christians show how well he was qualified for this important work"—ADAM CLARKE, *Commentary, in loc.*

Which is to say that the preëminence of Peter was to consist in the superior strength of his faith, and the superior energy and efficiency thence

arising in the discharge of his Apostolic duties—very much, I suppose, as a brave, strong man is a security to his timid and weak companion, though possessing no authority over him.

ANSWER.

198. All I have said (*n.* 64) about the difference between *being* a sustainer of others, and *being appointed to the office* of sustaining others, applies here with full force.

Christ not only intimated and prayed that Peter would “become uncommonly strong in the faith”, but appointed him to strengthen not merely the feeble-minded, the weak, and the persecuted, but all his brethren, against all the assaults of the devil: that is, he invested him with supreme authority over all his brethren (*chap.* ii. § 2).

§ 3. *Objections against the argument from*
John, xxi.

OBJECTION XXII.

199. “From words which truly and properly might have been said to any other Apostle, yea, to any other Christian pastor whatever, nothing can be concluded to their purpose, importing a peculiar

duty or singular privilege of St. Peter"—BARROW, *p.* 96, *n.* 1, *p.* 97, *n.* 5, *p.* 98, *n.* 7. PALMER, and the Protestant divines *passim*.

ANSWER.

200. But Christ did not address these words to any other Apostle or pastor. He commissioned Peter alone to feed, that is (as I have proved, *chap.* iii. § 3) to rule his lambs and sheep, that is (as I have proved, *chap.* iii. § 2) all his lambs and sheep, that is (as I have proved, *ibid.*) all the members of his Church, the Apostles included.

If Dr. B. means—what I suspect was in some confused way before his mind,* though his language does not mean—that the words would be true, could be said of, any other Apostle; then I deny the assertion. It would not be true to say of any other Apostle that he was the supreme Pastor: it would be true to say this of no one save him whom Christ made supreme pastor, that is Peter. All Christian pastors can of course be called pastors, but not pastors of the whole Church of God.

* I say this, because it is in the above form that other Protestant writers generally present this objection.

OBJECTION XXIII.

201. "From indefinite words a definite conclusion (especially in matters of this kind) may not be inferred. It is said, *Do thou feed my sheep*; it is not said, *do thou alone feed all my sheep*: this is their arbitrary gloss, or presumptuous improvement of the text; without succour whereof the words signify nothing to their purpose, so far are they from sufficiently assuring so vast a pretence. For instance, when St. Paul doth exhort the bishops at Ephesus *to feed the Church of God* (*Acts*, xx. 28), may it thence be collected, that each of them was an universal governor of the whole Church, *which Christ had purchased with his own blood*?"—BARROW, *p.* 96, and the Protestant divines *passim*.

ANSWER.

202. I. Words may be indefinite or indeterminate as to their *meaning* or as to their *extension*. Words are indefinite as to their meaning, when out of several meanings which they may bear, that which they have in the particular proposition is undetermined: *e. g.* when I use a term which has a literal and metaphorical meaning, and it cannot be ascertained which I intend. Words are indefinite

as to extension, when the individual persons or things denoted by them are left undetermined: *e. g.* when I say *some men, many men, most men.*

The words in the text are not indefinite in either way; there is not a single indefinite word among them. The only words of which there could be a shadow of doubt as to their definite meaning, are *feed*, and *lambs*, and *sheep*. As to the meaning of the two latter, that they denote the members of the Church, all are agreed. As to the meaning of the first word, I have proved it to be clear and definite (*n.* 145, etc.). In like manner each word is definite as to extension. The person speaking is definite—our Lord: the person spoken to is definite—Peter, and Peter *alone*: the lambs and sheep are definite—*all* the members of the Church, not some, as already proved (*n.* 141, 144).

203. II. Christ does not use the *words* “alone—all, do thou *alone* feed *all* my sheep”: but what these words signify is necessarily conveyed by the words actually used. I have proved that the words “my sheep”, denote “*all* my sheep” (*n.* 141, etc.). Peter *alone* is addressed, Peter *alone* on the present occasion received the power of feeding all the sheep; on no other occasion did any other individual receive this power. These are two propo-

sitions, *Peter received the power*—*No other received the power*; the first is proved by the text before us, the second is proved from all the rest of Scripture, in which there is no intimation of such power having been conferred on any other. But these two propositions are identical with this one, *Peter alone received the power*. We do not presumptuously improve the text, we do not alter a word of the text, but we evolve its meaning according to the sound and admitted rules for interpreting Scripture, without the aid of the authoritative teaching of the Church: we explain it rightly and argue from it reasonably. All this might be illustrated from every chapter in the Bible; but the thing is too plain to require further confirmation.

204. III. When St. Paul^{*} exhorts the bishops at Ephesus “to feed the Church of God”, it cannot be collected “that *each* of them was an universal governor of the *whole* Church”, and this for the very obvious reason that, 1^o the Church spoken of there, is not the whole Church but a part of it, that part, namely, of which they were bishops (see *n.* 37).^{*} That part of the Church was, like every

* “Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, *in which* (ἐν ᾧ) the Holy Ghost hath placed you Bishops”. So “Feed the flock of God *which is among you*” (το ἐν ὑμῖν ποιμνιον) I. *Peter*, v. 2.

other part, purchased with the blood of Christ. 2°. St. Paul does not exhort *each* of them to feed the *whole* even of that part of the Church: he addressed the body of bishops there present, and tells *them* (*ὑμας*) to feed the Church. Each was to feed his own division of that part and was ruler therein: just as, if the bishops of any kingdom were exhorted at the present day by any one having authority to exhort them, to govern the Church of that kingdom, the meaning would be, not that each was to govern the whole, but that all were to govern the whole, each governing his own diocese.

OBJECTION XXIV.

205. "By these words no new power is (assuredly at least) granted or instituted by our Lord; for the Apostles, before this, had their warrant and authority consigned to them, when our Lord did inspire them, and solemnly commissionate them, saying: *As the Father did send me, so I send you* (*John*, xx. 21): to which commission, these words (spoken occasionally, before a few of the disciples) did not add or derogate. At most the words do only, as St. Cyril saith, *renew the former grant of Apostleship*, after his great offence of denying our Lord"—BARROW, *p.* 96.

. ANSWER.

206. I. I have proved that a new and distinct power was here granted, a new and distinct office here instituted. For *one* is appointed to govern *all*; and such power had not been promised or given to any save Peter alone.

II. To the general commission given to all the Apostles—Peter included, always included—these words do add a special commission given to Peter. What Dr. Barrow would infer from the words having been “spoken occasionally, before a few of the disciples”, I am utterly at a loss to conjecture. Surely the word of God, on whatsoever occasion uttered and before how few soever, even before Peter alone, is still the word of God, and being recorded by the Holy Ghost in the inspired volume, lies there a divine revelation for all the world. Dr. B. asserts, but does not prove: we have proved. His assertion stands but as an assertion against our proof.

OBJECTION XXV.

207. “These words do not seem institutive or collative of power, but rather only admonitive or exhortative to duty; implying no more, but the pressing a common duty, before incumbent on St. Peter, upon a special occasion, in an advantageous season,

that he should effectually discharge the office which our Lord had committed to him", etc. (The paragraph which follows is a mere repetition of this in other words)—BARROW, *p.* 97.

ANSWER.

208. I. Even though the words were in the form of mere admonition, still they necessarily imply the "collation" of authority, or suppose it already conferred—for if Peter were admonished by God to feed the whole flock, then he of course had *full authority* to do that whereof he was so admonished. Christ did not admonish him to do anything without giving him the power and right to do it. This is very plain (see *n.* 138, 145).

II. But the words are more than admonitive or exhortative. They denote an express appointment and delegation to a specific function,—that of feeding the whole flock; a delegation as express as that conveyed in the words addressed to the whole body of the Apostles, "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations"—*Matth.*, xxviii.

III. The duty of pastor is a common duty among pastors: but the duty imposed on Peter, that of *Supreme Pastor*, was not a common duty, but one peculiarly and exclusively his.

OBJECTION XXVI.

209. "Take feeding for what you please; for teaching, for guiding; the Apostles were not fit objects of it, who were immediately taught and guided by God himself"—BARROW, *p.* 100.

ANSWER.

210. I. The Apostles were taught and guided by God, but there is no evidence whatever that they were *immediately* taught and guided, or received any promise whatever of being immediately taught and guided on *all* occasions, on those occasions on which the means established by God for their teaching and guidance were available. God immediately assisted them whenever this assistance was necessary in the work of their ministry: it does not follow that he immediately assisted them when the means established by him for their assistance could be brought into action. Were any such means established? Was the primacy of St. Peter one of the means, or itself *the* means? This is the real question, the answer to which in the affirmative we have tried to prove in the first three chapters of this Essay.

II. If the immediate divine superintendence

rendered the Apostles unfit objects for the authoritative guidance of Peter, *a pari*, or rather *a fortiori*, it rendered them unfit objects for the guidance, authoritative or not authoritative, of each other. But we see (*Acts*, xv.) that when the dissension about circumcision was brought before the Apostles at Jerusalem, they not only thought fit to meet together for the purpose of considering about the matter, but had the ancients also in their council. We are told moreover that there was *much disputing* (*πολλης συζητησεως*) in the council. This certainly looks most unlike the proceedings men would adopt who believed themselves so immediately assisted by God, especially in important matters like this, that the necessity of all other guidance was superseded. Other instances to the same purpose might be quoted.

III. Even though we granted that the Apostles did not stand in need of any guidance but that which they had from God, and that in fact Peter never exercised any control or primacy whatever over them; still nothing would follow in the least degree affecting our doctrine or our arguments. For this only would follow, that, as we say in the schools, *per accidens*, the exercise of the primacy was not needed for the Apostles, though it is

established for all. Just as a very holy religious never requires to be reprimanded by his superior, a good child by his father, an exact soldier by his officer, though superior, father, officer, still retain authority to correct. The primacy was established not for the Apostles so much as for the whole Church, and specially for the preservation of unity; not so much for the Church of the Apostolic age as for the Church in after times, when its exercise would be most needed. What then if an office which was for the whole Church and for all time, happened, from extrinsic causes, to be unnecessary for the twelve Apostles, and unnecessary for them alone?

Take the two propositions, The primacy was established by Christ, The primacy was not to be exercised over the Apostles, or in controlling their ministry. The first I have proved, the second is maintained by Dr. Barrow: from both together it would follow that the primacy was established for the post-apostolic times: *i. e.* the perpetuation of the primacy would follow!

IV. But I cannot admit Dr. Barrow's assertion, that "the Apostles were not fit objects of it". For our Lord expressly asserts the very contrary in *Luke*, xxii., "Behold, Satan hath desired to have

you — Do thou confirm thy brethren". The Apostles were to be violently assaulted by the devil —so Christ asserts: they needed a strengthener—so the case itself implies, so the words of Christ imply, for he appointed one to strengthen them: Peter is the one appointed—so the word of God tells us. The Apostles were fit objects of Peter's teaching, for they were actually taught by him at the Council of Jerusalem. After their *consideration* of the question, and their *much disputing*, Peter rose and delivered his judgment, and all were silent and adopted his judgment (*Acts*, xv. 7, 12, 14, 22).

I admit that the Apostles did not, in the discharge of their ordinary Apostolic duties, so much require the guidance of Peter, as other pastors who were under them or succeeded them would require it. The need of the Apostles for such guidance was as nothing compared with the need of others.

OBJECTION XXVII.

211. "But they, forsooth, must have St. Peter solely obliged to feed all Christ's sheep; so they did impose upon him a vast and crabbed province; a task very incommodious, or rather impossible for him to undergo. How could he in duty be obliged, how

could he in effect be able, to feed so many flocks of Christian people scattered about in distant regions, through all nations under heaven? He, poor man, that had so few helps, that had no officers or dependents, nor wealth to maintain them, would have been much put to it to feed the sheep in Britain and in Parthia; unto infinite distraction of thoughts such a charge must needs have engaged him.

“ But for this their great champion [Bellarmine] hath a fine expedient; *St. Peter*, saith he, *did feed Christ's whole flock, partly by himself, partly by others*; so that, it seemeth, the other Apostles were St. Peter's curates, or vicars and deputies. This indeed were an easy way of feeding; thus, although he had slept all his time, he might have fed all the sheep under heaven; thus any man as well might have fed them.....The Apostles, I dare say, did not take themselves to be St. Peter's surrogates, but challenged to themselves to be accounted *the ministers, the stewards, the ambassadors of Christ himself*; from whom immediately they received their orders, in whose name they acted, to whom they constantly refer their authority, without taking the least notice of St. Peter, or intimating any dependence on him. I. *Corinth.*, iv. 1. II. *Corinth.*,

v. 20; x. 8. *Galat.*, i. 1. *Titus*, i. 3; etc.”—
BARROW, *p.* 100.

ANSWER.

212. I. As to the impossibility—“with man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible”—*Matth.*, xix. 26. *How* could Peter be able to feed so many flocks? I answer, with the assistance of God. He was poor according to the world, had few helps from the world, had no worldly officers or dependents, or worldly wealth to maintain them: but he was rich in heavenly gifts and strong in heavenly aid, and had under him an array of pastors invincible against all the powers of earth and hell. “In the world you shall have distress: but have confidence; I have overcome the world”—*John*, xvi. 33. Is not this one of the leading evidences of the divine origin of the Christian religion, that without the help, against the resistance of worldly power and influence, from such small, obscure beginning, with such slender human support, it made its way so rapidly and so extensively, and sustained and still sustains itself so firmly against all opposition?

II. It is a *fact* that the Roman Pontiff governs the whole Catholic Church in every continent and

island where it exists over the face of the earth. Whether this supreme and universal sway be founded in right or not, it is a *fact* which no Protestant can deny to exist and to have existed for many centuries. But what is a fact cannot be impossible. We claim no more for Peter than we admit in him whom we believe to be Peter's successor.

III. Bellarmine's answer is direct to the point and perfectly sound. Christ appointed Peter to govern the whole Church: but that Peter was not thereby bound to govern each diocese and parish of the Church, as the particular pastor thereof is bound, follows evidently from the evident physical impossibility of the thing, and from the fact that Christ appointed other pastors, and authorized them to appoint others, and from the fact which we gather from the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, that numberless other pastors were appointed with local jurisdiction more or less. The Scriptures prove that Peter was pastor of the whole Church: and the same Scriptures prove that there were many other pastors in the Church over particular flocks: therefore Peter was not to rule as if he were sole pastor, *i. e.* to rule each part as a local

pastor should. Peter had immediate jurisdiction every where, as we hold his successors to have; but it does not follow from this doctrine, that he or they should exercise that jurisdiction directly and by themselves in every place and on all occasions. Is not the Sovereign Authority—whether vested in an absolute monarch, or in monarch and parliament, as with us—is not the Sovereign Authority in the state still a Sovereign Authority, and does it not act as such, though it acts through judges, magistrates, and other officers? Were even twelve Apostles, or twelve times twelve Apostles, able to feed, of themselves directly and permanently, “so many flocks of Christian people scattered about in distant regions, through all nations under heaven”? they could only do it in part through others as they actually did it. The answer of Bellarmine, which is the answer of all Catholic divines, is not only reasonable as a reply, but an obvious substantive conclusion from Scripture itself, a statement necessary for the full delineation of the Primatial authority, though no objection of the kind were to be met.

I am really ashamed to have to answer the observation about St. Peter sleeping all his time. If

St. Peter had slept all his time, it would follow that he neglected his duty, that he did not *exercise* any authority, not that he did not possess it. But St. Peter did not sleep. Why bring forward such impossible hypotheses, which, even granted, prove nothing?

The Apostles were not, according to our doctrine, "curates, or vicars and deputies" of St. Peter. But this will be explained hereafter, when we come to investigate the relations between the Primacy and the Apostleship (*n.* 224, etc., 244, etc.).

OBJECTION XXVIII.

213. "In fine, this, together with precedent testimonies [he of course means the texts from *Matth.*, xvi., and *Luke*, xxii.], must not be interpreted so as to thwart practice and history; according to which it appeareth, that St. Peter did not exercise such a power, and therefore our Lord did not intend to confer such an one on him"—BARROW, *p.* 101, and other Protestant divines *passim*.

ANSWER.

214. I. Even though there existed no traces of the exercise of the Primatial power in Scripture,

yet a solid argument could not be thence drawn against our doctrine or our proofs; and this for three reasons.

First. I have already proved that the Primacy was instituted in Peter. Protestants are therefore called upon to show that the point has not been proved, or if they cannot effect this, we are no more called upon than they to account for all omission of the exercise thereof in Scripture. If I have proved my proposition, you have no right to come in and say, there is no record of the exercise of the Primacy in Scripture, *therefore* it is not proved. There may have been reasons for this silence known only to God: I am not called on to account for what the Holy Ghost has not thought fit to tell us: he *has* told us, and I have proved that he has told us, thrice over, in the strongest manner, that Peter was appointed Head of the Church. This is enough for me. I believe the revealed truth of God in whatever form it is proposed to me, and will not reject it because it is not proposed to me in another form, under another aspect. I believe that the primacy was established because the Holy Ghost has revealed to me both the promise and the establishment thereof: and I will not reject this primacy instituted, because God

has not revealed to me the primacy exercised. But you will say, if it had been instituted, the exercise thereof would have been recorded. How do you know this? Can you bring me any solid argument from Scripture or reason to prove this? Are you sure that there was not some reason unrecorded in Scripture and unknown to you, or unconjectured by you, for the omission? But you will rejoin, the institution is not surely revealed. But I answer, here are my proofs of the certain revelation: your present objection leaves them untouched, and runs into a counter proof—founded on what? on a text asserting or implying that such institution was not made? No such thing, but on the silence of Scripture as to certain facts in the life of St. Peter. This is not fair reasoning. The fact of the silence of Scripture you can ascertain: but the cause of that silence is not revealed, nor can you by solid reasoning on revelation, prove the cause conjectured by you.

Secondly. It does by no means follow that, because Scripture records not the exercise of the primacy, therefore it was not exercised. I will not now go into the ground disputed between us and Protestants, as to Scripture being the sole rule of faith and containing the whole Christian revelation.

The exercise of the primacy was no revealed doctrine or fact; it was but an event among a thousand others in the history of the founding of the Church. It was witnessed and known just as any other fact would be witnessed and known: if recorded in the word of God, it would then of course become a revealed fact. It was, as I have said, but a fact, or number of facts in the life of St. Peter. Now there is but very little of the lives and labours of the Apostles recorded. The Acts are mainly occupied with the labours, first of St. Peter, then of St. Paul. Take away what is recorded of both, and how very little we are told of the rest? Nay of some of them we are told nothing, or next to nothing. Yet surely every one of the twelve, filled with the Holy Ghost, faithful to the vocation of an Apostle, must have done many great things for God and his holy Church. What must not Andrew, and Bartholomew, and Thaddeus, and others of the Apostles have said and done, of which not a trace remains! "Their sound hath gone forth into all the earth, and their words into the ends of the world"—*Psalms*, xviii. 5; *Rom.*, x. 18. The effects of this mighty movement exist and will exist to the end, but of itself, the record of a few lines is all we possess.

The Primacy, you will say, is an institution of so peculiar a nature and of such special importance, that the action of it at least, if it came into action, would be in some way recorded.

I admit the importance of the Primacy, but, as I shall presently show, not so much for the Apostolic age. Now for what purpose should the exercise thereof be noted? To testify to us its vital existence, that is, to give us a practical proof, notification, revelation thereof? But we have the clearest proof and revelation thereof, in the three Evangelists. No one who believed the word of Christ could doubt of the primacy having been instituted: to mention its exercise for the purpose of declaring its institution would have been quite unnecessary. It was established as a working power in the Church. It came into operation then in due time, as a matter of course: there was nothing new, nothing strange, nothing that should not have been expected. It was only a man commencing to do what all knew he had power to do: it would have been quite superfluous afterwards to tell what he did, in order to show that he had power to do it—and to tell to those to whom Christ's repeated assertion of the power had been already communicated

Thirdly. There are several very weighty reasons why the Primacy would not have been exercised so frequently and fully by St. Peter as by his successors. I shall briefly notice some of them.

The Apostles possessed individually extraordinary authority, extraordinary gifts, extraordinary guidance. They were sent by Christ himself immediately to preach every where, to found Churches and ordain pastors every where, to legislate every where: their commission was not restricted to a particular place, and though none save Peter had the headship of the universal Church, yet each was an apostle for every part of the Church, according to the distribution of labour, which order, the efficiency of their ministry and the propagation of the Gospel required, and according to their law of subordination to Peter. Now with men so gifted and commissioned, it was manifestly unnecessary for Peter to trouble himself much: there was no danger of their falling into any error, of their doing anything which would have called for the exercise of the Primatial authority to warn against or annul or punish. In times of peace the general lives retired without "plumed helm" on his head or baton in his hand: where the magistrates are active and successful in the discharge of their duties, the

Sovereign lets them alone. It would have been not only unnecessary but unbecoming, looking like a display of authority and a lording it over them—contrary to our Lord's admonition to the great among them (*Luke*, xxii.), if Peter had assumed the dictator over his brethren.

The Apostolic office, as such, was to cease with the Apostles: they were to commence, to found, to establish the Church, as it were to set it a going. As it became extended and fixed; took its place in human society; showed itself a living, wide-spread, enduring power; turned the eyes of all nations upon itself, its end, its nature, the evidences of its supernatural claims; came into contact with the world, its social institutions, and ideas, and prejudices, and philosophies, and creeds; began to war with some of these—to strike and to be stricken—to adapt itself to others, to purify and assimilate others unto itself, to make way at any rate—in one word, as the Church expanded into vigour and form, as the grain of mustard-seed grew into the tree, and put forth its branches on all sides, the Apostolic work was completed, the Church was fully established, and the Apostles dropped off one by one, and it was now left to pursue its course through the journey of ages, always invincible and always

one—left with that strengthening and unitive principle within, which would now of course give stronger signs of its existence, and develope itself more boldly, and shoot its fibres through the whole structure, and penetrate, and encircle, and clasp all in its binding and quickening embrace. The Primacy, as I have said (*n.* 212), was not intended to supersede, to take the place of local pastors. It was placed over all, that all might be one, and that the functions of each might be carried on for edification: it oversees, and where aught is going wrong which requires the intervention of the highest power, its office is to interfere and apply the remedy. Where the welfare of a part or of the whole requires its interference, its office is then to interfere, but only then (*n.* 63).

215. II. There are to me clear evidences of the exercise of the Primatial authority—not of its full exercise and in all its capacity, but so far as it could have been then exercised—in Scripture. Such I conceive to be St. Peter's first opening the Church to the Jews and the gentiles, his presiding at the Council of Jerusalem, and especially when we consider the manner and circumstances in which these things were done, etc., etc. But this belongs to the second part of the Scripture argument, which is yet

to be opened, and besides would be too long to enter on here even in epitome. I have said enough in the preceding *number* to answer the objection.

OBJECTION XXIX.

216. "The interpretation of 'sheep' and 'lambs' as '*pastors*' and '*people*', is quite uncertain. Theophylact understands them to mean perfect and imperfect Christians"—PALMER, *p.* 378. LAUD, Conference, *sect.* 25, *n.* 17, *p.* 158. STILLINGFLEET, *part* 2, *ch.* 7, § 4.

ANSWER.

217. I. That by the *sheep* are signified pastors, and by the *lambs* the simple faithful, I have shown to be a very natural and probable opinion, but one which we do not require to insist on for our argument (*n.* 141).

II. I have shown that both together designate the whole flock, and therefore pastors as well as people, even though neither should denote any particular portion of the flock exclusively (142, 144).

III. I have shown that, even though *lambs* and *sheep* directly signified but the simple faithful, still by the very fact of their being given in charge

to Peter, the pastors were also subjected to him (*n.* 143).

IV. I suppose that *perfect* and *imperfect* Christians would be as adequate a division of all the members of the Church, ruled and rulers, as good and bad, or old and young, or Christians with one eye and Christians with two eyes, or Christians under a certain height and Christians over that height, etc. It is manifest that perfect and imperfect comprises all Christians.

OBJECTION XXX.

218. "The question three times put, insinuates a distrust of him, and was occasioned by his thrice denying, and at last forswearing Christ; the charge three times given *savours strongly of the same*, and St. Peter's being grieved at the repetition shows undeniably that in this sense he understood it. And this also clears up the words of Christ immediately following (*ver.* 18). Here therefore, as I said, there is nothing of superiority of power nor of honour given to Peter, but of INFERIORITY and REPROACH!"
—BARWICK, *p.* 176.

Gentle reader! I give this objection not to be answered, but as a specimen of the kind of objections I pass over unnoticed, and of the kind of

reasoning into which a certain class of our opponents are not afraid to descend. Mr. B. thinks almost as lowly of the Blessed Apostle as our poetical friend Mr. Sheridan Knowles (*n.* 19, *note*), and gives him only a primacy of inferiority and reproach. This very ingenious interpretation I leave in the hands of Drs. Barrow (see next objection), Bramhall, Whately, and the others, High Church and Low Church, named or alluded to above (*n.* 161, *note*).

The preceding objections are all (with the exception of *object.* xiii., *n.* 181, and perhaps portions of others), directed against the Primacy of St. Peter himself. I shall now proceed to examine the

§ 4. *Objections against the Perpetuation of the Primacy, and the Scripture argument for it.*

OBJECTION XXXI.

219. "His primacy was grounded upon personal acts (such as his cheerful following of Christ, his faithful confessing of Christ, his resolute adherence to Christ, his embracing special revelations from God), or upon personal graces (his great faith, his special love to our Lord, his singular zeal for Christ's service), or upon personal gifts and endow-

ments (his courage, resolution, activity, forwardness in apprehension and in speech); the which advantages are not transient [*qu.* permanent?], and consequently a preëminency built on them is not in its nature such"—BARROW, *p.* 111, and Protestant writers *passim*.

ANSWER.

220. Dr. Barrow confounds the end for which the primacy was *instituted*—to preserve the unity of the Church, and to secure her against the powers of hell—with the motive from which it was *conferred* on *Peter*, rather than on any other Apostle. The above are excellent reasons to account for the latter, not so to account for the former. See the objection fully answered, and the principle turned into a positive argument for our doctrine (*n.* 77).

OBJECTION XXXII.

221. "All the pretence of primacy granted to St. Peter, is grounded upon words directed to St. Peter's person, characterized by most personal adjuncts, as name, parentage, and which exactly were accomplished in St. Peter's personal actings; which therefore it is unreasonable to extend farther.

“ Our Lord promised to *Simon, son of Jona*, to build his Church on him: accordingly in eminent manner the Church was founded upon his ministry, or by his first preaching, testimony, performances.

“ Our Lord promised to give him the keys of the heavenly kingdom: this power St. Peter signally did execute in converting Christians, etc.

“ Our Lord charged *Simon, son of Jona*, to feed his sheep: this he performed by preaching, visiting, guiding, and governing Christians, as he found opportunity: wherefore, if any thing was couched under these promises or orders singularly pertinent to St. Peter, for the same reason that they were singular, they were personal; for

“ These things being in a conspicuous manner accomplished in St. Peter’s person, the sense of those words is exhausted; there may not with any probability, there cannot with any assurance, be any more grounded on them”—BARROW, *p.* 111.

ANSWER.

222. Most of the main assertions on which this objection rests, have been already investigated.

I. The duties of the Primacy were all discharged by St. Peter for his own time, so far as the peculiar circumstances of the Apostolic age called

for, or allowed the discharge of them. It does not follow that they were not to be discharged by a succession of others in after times: any more than it follows that a Bishop who is appointed to a certain diocese, and who discharges faithfully the work of a Bishop, is therefore to have no successor. The personal adjuncts of name and parentage by which St. Peter is marked out in our Lord's address to him, no more prove that he was to have no successor, than similar individualizing terms addressed to a king at his coronation, or to a bishop at his consecration, would prove a similar inference in regard to them.

II. "These things" were not fully "accomplished in St. Peter's person", nor is "the sense of those words exhausted" in him. For I have shown that the words imply a perpetuation of what is by them promised or given to Peter (*n.* 71, etc.): their sense therefore could not be exhausted in Peter unless his life were prolonged to the end of the world. For his own part and so far as an individual could be, he was all that the words imply—for he was supreme ruler of the Church: but a perpetual supreme rulership was also implied.

OBJECTION XXXIII.

223. "The apostolical office, as such, was personal and temporary; and therefore, according to its nature and design, not successive or communicable to others in perpetual descendance from them.

"It was, as such, in all respects extraordinary, conferred in a special manner, designed for special purposes, discharged by special aids, endowed with special privileges, as was needful for the propagation of Christianity and founding of Churches.

"To that office it was requisite that the person should have an immediate designation and commission from God...should be able to attest concerning our Lord's resurrection or ascension, either immediately, as the twelve, or by evident consequence, as St. Paul...should be endowed with miraculous gifts and graces...It was also a privilege of an Apostle, by virtue of his commission from Christ, to instruct all nations...Apostles also did govern in an absolute manner, etc., etc.

"Now such an office, consisting of so many extraordinary privileges and miraculous powers, which were requisite for the foundation of the Church, and the diffusion of Christianity...was not designed to

continue by derivation; for it containeth in it divers things, which apparently were not communicated...Neither did the Apostles communicate it; they did indeed appoint standing pastors, etc..... but they did not constitute Apostles, equal to themselves in authority, privileges, or gifts.

“Wherefore St. Peter, who had no other office mentioned in Scripture, or known to antiquity, beside that of an apostle, could not have properly and adequately any successor to his office; but it naturally did expire with his person, as did that of the other Apostles”—BARROW, *p.* 112—114. To bring the objection within limits, I have put out some portions quite unnecessary to the force of the argument.

ANSWER.

224. We are to consider and accurately distinguish these two things, first, the kind and the amount of authority and gifts required for founding and establishing the Church; secondly, the kind and amount of authority and gifts required for governing—keeping together and in order—sustaining—perpetuating the Church thus once established. That some things would be necessary for the former which are not necessary for the lat-

ter, is evident from the nature of the case; and that the divine economy in reference to the Church was actually shaped according to this principle, we shall immediately endeavour to show.

The powers and privileges of the Apostles were threefold; some communicable and transmissible, others possessed by them solely as Apostles, and not communicable. These were, 1^o the priesthood or the power of orders in all its plenitude in the Episcopate; 2^o jurisdiction or authority over others or in reference to others, the power of teaching, legislating, etc.; 3^o certain extraordinary gifts, as that of infallibility, the power of working miracles, occasional inspiration, etc.

That the third species of endowments was specifically designed for the first forming and establishing of the ecumenical Church is undeniable. That it was necessary for this end—I do not say absolutely necessary to the full extent in which it was given, but necessary to some extent—and that it was no longer necessary after the Church had been firmly established, are equally undeniable: for, on one hand, *e. g.* miracles were required to prove the divine mission of the Apostles to the gentile world, and, on the other hand, what is once established by solid proof, the record of the proof still remaining,

does not require to be proved again. I need say no more on this point; for I suppose that none of those who stand opposed to us in the present inquiry would deny that the gift of miracles, inspiration, etc., as public and permanent evidences of the truth of Christianity, were to cease with the Apostles.

That the first species of power, that of orders, was designed to continue, in all its fulness, permanent in the Church, is admitted by all who admit the existence of such a power. The power of orders, if at all communicated, is evidently not for the founding of the Church, but for the Church already founded; not for any one period, but for all time, as long as the Church is to continue.

The whole dispute turns on the second species of power—jurisdiction. This is the question to be cleared up, whether the authority promised or given to Peter in the three texts already examined ceased with him, as the authority of the Apostolate ceased with the Apostles.

225. Now in speaking of the authority of the Apostles, two important distinctions are to be kept before the mind. The first is that already spoken of, namely, the distinction between the authority given for the purpose of the first propagation and

establishment of the Church, and that given for the government of the Church ever after. The second distinction is between the authority given to the Apostles as a body, and that given to them individually: that is to say, the authority to be exercised by them in their corporate capacity, and that to be exercised by each individual in his own actual circle of Apostolic labour. Thus, Bishops assembled in general council define doctrine and make laws in their corporate capacity, but each in his own diocese teaches and legislates for his own diocese in his individual capacity.

The office of the Apostolate as such was an office conferred immediately by Christ himself, empowering each individual vested with it to preach the gospel in any part of the world, to found churches and appoint Bishops any where, in one word to introduce and establish the Christian faith and the Christian Church in any part of the world, and therefore to do all that, according to the divine ordinance, is included in the idea of such an establishment or necessary therefor. Other powers, whether of order or jurisdiction, possessed by the Apostles, they had not, as Apostles, not as *founders* and establishers of the Church, but as ordinary chief *pastors* and governors of it. As an Apostle,

the jurisdiction of each of the twelve extended over the whole earth: but guided and controlled as they were so specially by the Spirit of God, there was no danger of collision or confusion of any kind.

This was the Apostolate, and this Apostolate was bestowed in all its fulness on each of the twelve.

Suppose that an Apostle, after having converted many nations to the faith, had fixed his residence in one particular territory which he had marked out as a diocese for himself to govern as Bishop for the rest of his life. He still retains his Apostolic office with which Christ invested him, and of which death alone can deprive him; but he no longer exercises it.

226. Among the several calls of the Apostles and the commissions given to them on different occasions, it is no easy matter to determine with clear certainty, in all cases and from the naked text of Scripture, when they are commissioned precisely as Apostles with power that was to cease with themselves; when as ordinary chief pastors with power that was to be perpetuated for ever in the Church; when as partly one and partly the other, with power that was partly to cease with themselves

and partly to continue after them. It would seem to me that in the various texts in which our Lord confers jurisdiction on the Apostles, that jurisdiction was conferred on them, not as Apostles, but as chief pastors of the future Church—the first chief pastors in the order of time, to have a succession in that office to the end of ages. Of course the authority which they received as ordinary pastors they could exercise, so far as it was needed, in their capacity of Apostles: but in the texts alluded to they were not directly addressed as Apostles.

Certainly the power of judging, punishing, binding and loosing, given to the Apostles (*Matth.*, xviii. 17, 18), is a power not so much for establishing, as for governing the Church once established, or rather it is entirely for the latter.

Certainly the power given in *Matthew*, xxviii. 19, 20, is not a power to be exercised merely in the first construction of the Church, and confined to the twelve Apostles, but a power that was to be exercised after them to the end. “Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the

world". The nations are to be taught and to be baptized to the end of the world. Therefore, the power here given, which is the power of doing these things, was not a power belonging exclusively to the Apostolic office as such.

Certainly the power given in *John*, xx. 21, 22, 23, was not a power to die with the Apostles. "As the Father hath sent me, I also send you... Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained". Whether the power here given of forgiving sins was to be exercised by a distinct and peculiar sacramental rite, as all Catholics hold, or in preaching the gospel, as some non-Catholics hold, or in conferring the sacrament of baptism, as others hold, one thing is clear, that it was not a power for the mere foundation and first settling of the Church, but a power to continue for ever in the Church.

Certainly the power given in *Acts*, i. 8, is, like that given in *Matth.*, xxviii., to remain for ever. "And you shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth".

All these powers the Apostles received in a body: but whether each power was received by

each Apostle fully, so that not only all had the power, *e. g.* of preaching the gospel over the whole earth, but each individual Apostle received the power of preaching it any where, and, if possible, everywhere, this the texts do not declare in any way. Though whether a conclusion may not be drawn on this point from the nature of the thing, we shall see hereafter (*n.* 234). Yet this is at least one of the peculiar properties of the Apostleship, to have authority to exercise the ministry in all places.

227. But, whatever may be said on this point, we see these two things clearly in Scripture: first, that the Apostolic office ceased with the Apostles, that they had no successors in the Apostleship; secondly, that in the office of ordinary pastors for teaching, legislating, judging, etc., they had successors in the Bishops of the Church. The first is admitted by all, and forms indeed the ground on which the present objection rests. The second is manifest from the Acts of the Apostles and from the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, which everywhere exhibit the plainest traces of an established and permanent system of rulers distributed over the Church, and having power to teach, watch, govern, etc. See the texts cited in *n.* 67, 69. All that the

Apostles possessed remained in the Church, save that which was but for the *founding* thereof.

228. I have premised thus much on the precise nature of the Apostleship, not so much for sake of the present objection as of one that shall come to be discussed by and by (*n.* 244, etc., 254, etc.). Having had to say something here on the subject, I thought it better to make a full deliverance at once, to which reference may be made as occasion requires it hereafter. We now close in upon Dr. Barrow's objection.

Dr. Barrow, if I read him aright, admits that it was only the extraordinary power given to the Apostles and designed for the special purpose of "the propagation of Christianity, and the founding of Churches", that ceased with them. Now I utterly deny that the office promised to Peter, or conferred on him in *Matth.*, xviii., *Luke*, xxii., *John*, xxi., was the Apostolic office: I utterly deny the assertion that St. Peter "had no other office mentioned in Scripture, besides that of an Apostle": I on the contrary assert that, over and above the Apostleship which he received in common with the rest, he received also a distinct office, distinct in its nature and end, from that received by any other Apostle.

I. The Apostleship was an office for founding the Church: the office specially conferred on Peter was an office for governing, uniting, sustaining, perpetuating the Church thus founded. All admit that Christ designed his Church to be governed by pastors to the end of time, that rulership of some sort is an essential and ordinary office in the Church; and all genuine Episcopalians (at least of the High Church School) hold that the Episcopal form of government was to be by divine institution permanent in the Church. Peter was appointed an ordinary pastor, an ordinary ruler, an ordinary Bishop, with just this difference between him and any other Bishop, that he was by divine right Bishop, or ordinary pastor of the whole Church, and that he received the plenitude of authority for the government of the whole Church. Let the reader bear in mind the important distinction between the metaphor of a foundation as conveying the idea of simple commencement, and the metaphor of a rock, as explained before. Peter was appointed in *Matth.*, xvi., to become, not the foundation in the sense just mentioned, but the rock of the Church. I have already proved that the words used by our Lord in promising this office to Peter, imply the idea of perpetuity (*n.* 71, etc.): the present objection leaves that

argument untouched, it is but an unsupported assertion against proof.

II. All the arguments which prove the primacy of Peter, prove, by the very fact, that he received something which no other Apostle received. All this will be more fully developed and established hereafter (n. 244, etc.).

OBJECTION XXXIV.

229. "Accordingly, whereas the other Apostles, as such, had no successors, the Apostolical office not being propagated, the primacy of St. Peter... did cease with him; for when there were no Apostles extant, there could be *no head* or *prince of the Apostles* in any sense"—BARROW, p. 114.

ANSWER.

230. Peter was not appointed head or prince of the Apostles in the sense that his jurisdiction extended exclusively to them: nor was he appointed head of the Apostles, under that designation. He was appointed head and prince of the whole Church, in which the Apostles were included. If the Apostles had all died before him, of course he would have ceased to be their head, as he ceased to be ruler over all other members of the Church who

died before him—his authority extending only over the Church militant. When there were no Apostles extant, there was no head over them—just because they were not extant; but of all the Church then extant, to which they had ceased to belong, there was a head.

OBJECTION XXXV.

231. “If some privileges of St. Peter were derived to Popes, why were not all? Why was not Pope Alexander VI. as holy as St. Peter? Why was not Pope Honorius as sound in his private judgment? Why is not every Pope inspired? etc., etc..... What ground is there for distinguishing the privileges, so that he shall have some, not others? Where is the ground so to be found?”—BARROW, *p.* 115.

ANSWER.

232. “If some privileges of St. Peter were derived to Popes, why were not all?” I answer, because such was the will of God, who in his infinite wisdom so ordained, so constituted the Church, the work of his hand. “What ground is there for distinguishing the privileges?” I answer,

the word of God as interpreted by Dr. Barrow himself.

If some privileges of the Apostles—the power to teach, to baptize, to superintend, etc.—were derived to Bishops, and even to the second order of the clergy, why were not all? why is not every Bishop and priest as holy as St. Peter? why not as sound in his private judgment? Why not inspired? etc.

To be inspired, to have the gift of miracles, etc., form the third class of Apostolic endowments named above (*n.* 224), which it is admitted did not descend to the successors of the Apostles, for the reason there stated and from the notorious fact. Peter possessed these gifts not as Pope but as Apostle.

The texts of Scripture from which we prove the succession speak only of the primatial authority of St. Peter. We gather from them by legitimate reasoning that this primatial authority was to continue in the Church. But in those texts there is nothing about St. Peter's inspiration, his gift of miracles, etc. Therefore we do not infer the continuance of these privileges. In other parts of Scripture where his inspiration is spoken of—if it

be spoken of in Scripture—or his gift of miracles, etc., there is nothing to indicate a perpetuation thereof, rather very much the contrary. Therefore we do not infer such perpetuation. In one word, we say that the primatial office is continued, because we have ground in Scripture for saying so—to pass over the proofs from the witness of the Church: we say that the other privileges were not continued, because we not only have no ground in Scripture for their continuance, but the clearest evidence against.

This is our “ground” for “distinguishing the privileges”; and rational and solid ground it appears to be.

OBJECTION XXXVI.

233. The ordinary authority of the Apostles was communicated from them not by succession properly so called, but by ordination. “The Fathers therefore so in a large sense called all Bishops successors of the Apostles; not meaning that any one of them did succeed into the whole Apostolic office, but that each did receive his power from some one (immediately or mediately) whom some Apostle did constitute Bishop, vesting him with authority to feed the particular flock committed

to him in way of ordinary charge..... Thus did the Bishops supply the room of the Apostles, each in guiding his particular charge, all of them together, by mutual aid, conspiring to govern the whole body of the Church. In which regard it may be said that not one single Bishop, but all Bishops together through the whole Church, do succeed St. Peter, or any other Apostle; for that all of them, in union together, have an universal sovereign authority, commensurate to an Apostle"—BARROW, *p.* 115.

ANSWER.

234. The Apostolic office as such, the extraordinary and universal jurisdiction possessed by each Apostle individually for the founding of the Church, was not perpetuated. This is admitted and has been already proved. The power which the Apostles received for the ordinary governing of the Church has been transmitted in all its fulness. But on this note two things—

I. This power for the ordinary governing of the Church was, in its fulness, communicated to all the Apostles together. There was one exception, and, abstracting from this exception, no one Apostle received the fulness of jurisdiction as an ordinary

pastor. To no one was it said, "He that heareth *thee* heareth me, he that despiseth *thee* despiseth me—whatever *thou* shalt bind on earth it shall be bound also in heaven, and whatever *thou* shalt loose, etc.—Going therefore teach *thou* all nations.....and behold I am with *thee*, etc.—Receive the Holy Ghost, whose sins *thou* shalt remit", etc. But to all together it was said, "He that heareth *you*—Whatever *you* shall bind—Going therefore teach *you* all nations.....and behold I am with *you* all days—Whose sins *you* shall remit".

II. *There was one exception:* Peter individually and by himself received the plenary jurisdiction which was elsewhere conferred on all together. This assertion is nothing else than a portion of the conclusion which we have drawn in the three first chapters of this Essay from the texts of Matthew, Luke, and John.

Now when a number of persons are appointed together chief rulers with plenary jurisdiction over any society, it follows from the nature of the thing and from the very terms of such appointment (unless something to the contrary be expressly stated), that each of those chief rulers is not thereby appointed with sovereign and independent authority, is not *the* or *a* chief ruler, over the whole society.

Each indeed receives authority, but authority subordinate to that of the whole body, in which alone the supreme uncontrollable power rests, as to it alone this power was given and not to any one individual of it. But if (as we hold, and have proved to be the case with the twelve Apostles), over and above this appointment of all together, there should be also a separate appointment of some one among them, investing him singly with the same plenary jurisdiction previously conferred on all together, constituting him the one chief ruler of the whole society, then each one of the other chief rulers is subject not only to the control of the body of chief rulers, including that one chief ruler, but subject to his control separately.

The best illustration of this is the actual system of the Roman Catholic Church, in which each Bishop is subject to the whole Episcopal body (the Sovereign Bishop being included therein), whether dispersed through the Church or represented in a general council, and subject also to the Sovereign Bishop individually.

The proof of the second part (*i. e.* the subjection of each to the one Sovereign Head) is in the proof of the Primacy already gone through. The proof of the first part (*i. e.* the subjection of each to the

whole body and, a head having been appointed, he included) is in the statement already made from the clear words of the Scripture, that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Apostles as ordinary pastors was conferred upon them in a body. That each individual received jurisdiction is clear, to what extent the texts do not tell us in any way: but, whatever may have been the extent thereof, that it was not independent of the control of the body, follows from the fact that to the body it was distinctly and formally given, and from the manner in which men would naturally and necessarily understand such appointment: for in all ruling bodies the body is above any one member, unless something to the contrary has been expressly ordained. Thus a body of officers in the army, of magistrates, of legislators, of town commissioners, of voluntary associates, of associates of any kind, is above any one officer, magistrate, legislator, etc. This is the universal custom of men growing out of the constitution of our nature and the exigencies of every form of society in which of choice or necessity we may combine together. This is the universal idea, that the whole morally taken is above each individual, unless the individual should be sovereign, in which case his relation to the body is regulated by

the constitution of his office. This is the universal idea, and men therefore, when they hear of a number of persons being commissioned by one and the same appointment to govern a certain society, at once, and as a matter of course, understand that the authority is shared by each, but is in each subject to that of the whole together.

If this body of rulers is to be perpetuated by regular succession through appointments made by themselves; if the same authority which constituted this ruling body, ordained also its perpetuation and its perpetuation in this way by appointment, the authority descends to individuals of the continued ruling body as it was in the individuals of the original body, subject to the authority of the body itself and to that of the one sovereign ruler, if there should be such in it. And the authority to appoint successors in perpetuity descends subject to the same control.

When I say that authority descends to individuals as it existed in the individuals of the original ruling body, it is needless, after all that has been said, to remind the reader that, in the application of this dictum to the Apostolic succession, it is not to be inferred that individual Bishops have received the authority of individual Apostles. I speak only

of the authority of individual Apostles which was actually communicated from them; their authority as Apostles was not communicated to their successors. If we suppose, *per impossibile*, that the Apostles could have resigned their Apostolic office, retaining merely what they had as simple Bishops, this would put the matter in a clearer light. Suppose that one of the Apostles had so actually resigned his whole Apostleship, and had only been retained or appointed to a particular see, then his successor in that see would succeed to all his authority.

The difference between the extraordinary authority of the Apostleship of the Apostles and their ordinary authority, may be put in a clearer light by this simple illustration. If the supreme Civil Power appointed a number of men to colonize some hitherto untenanted region, to establish and organize the new society there, extensive and absolute powers would be deemed necessary for successfully accomplishing such an object, which, the colony having been once permanently settled, it would be neither necessary nor expedient to continue in the hands of the ordinary magistrates ever after. The same is true of all great permanent institutions among men; to originate and establish them is a work altogether different from that of sustaining

and regulating them when once established, and requiring different instruments, a different procedure, greater enterprize, energy, and authority. Thus, laws are with us made by the highest powers in the state, the power which they call omnipotent, and if they be laws affecting the serious interests of the community or of large parties in it, they are passed only after lengthened commotion and debate and conflict of arguments and prejudices and eloquence. The laws once enacted, the storm rapidly subsides, and they pass quietly into the hands of the ordinary dispensers of justice, are enforced without observation, and soon assimilate with the olden usages which only a new generation in a new order of things will ever dream of disturbing.

235. From this exposition, together with what has been said in the Answers to previous Objections, the answer to the present objection is conclusive. The body of the Bishops are not, as Dr. Barrow asserts, successors to St. Peter, or to any other single Apostle, but to the body of the Apostles. The body of the Bishops is just the body of the Apostles—as Bishops, considered as vested with their ordinary authority—perpetuated. Among the twelve was one head, whose sovereign

authority was an ordinary authority: without that head the body of the Apostles, especially as ordinary pastors, is incomplete, is not the body as Christ formed it. It was a body of Bishops, with one among them supreme Bishop over the rest, and over all the Church. *This* we have proved is what Christ established, not what we fancy; it is his work, not our theory. In the perpetuation of such a body, but one succeeds the supreme Bishop, the rest succeed the rest. If many, or all, succeeded the one head, then many, or all, would have each sovereign authority over the whole Church—there would be many Heads. *This* would be our theory, not God's institution.

“All of them, in union together, have an universal sovereign authority, commensurate to an Apostle”.

All—but with Peter. There is no all but with him included: for Christ made him the Rock, on which all are built and consolidated and united. Without him they fall and are scattered and are no body. Christ made him the shepherd of the whole flock: without him the flock is dispersed and lost. All—but with Peter. The rest have not sovereign authority; but all have it, he being included; and he has it by himself.

Several objections follow the present, immediately in Dr. Barrow's book, based on the same principle, and therefore answered by the principles evolved in the reply to the present objection.

OBJECTION XXXVII.

236. "Whereas our adversaries (*Bellarmino*, iv. 25, etc.). do pretend, that indeed the other Apostles had an extraordinary charge as legates of Christ, which had no succession, but was extinct in their persons; but that St. Peter had a peculiar charge, as ordinary pastor of the whole Church, which surviveth. To this it is enough to rejoin, that it is a mere figment, devised for a shift, and affirmed precariously: having no ground in holy Scripture... there being no such distinction in the sacred writings; no mention occurring there of any office, which he did assume, or which was attributed to him, distinct from that extraordinary one of an Apostle"—BARROW, *p.* 118.

ANSWER.

237. The assertion of Bellarmine is not a figment, but has solid ground in Scripture. For what is meant by this ordinary authority, ordinary pastorate? It is authority not for a solitary and

passing occasion, not for a single emergency, not for a work like that of founding the Church, but for the permanent government of the Church now formed and settled: an authority like that exercised by a Bishop in his diocese, or a parish priest in his parish, or the Queen of England in her empire, or a magistrate in his district.* Now this is exactly the kind of authority which St. Peter received. He was constituted the Rock of the Church, to keep her strong and united for all time against all enemies. He received supreme power to teach, to exhort, to watch, to appoint to offices and to remove from them, to reprove, to punish, in a word, to do all that according to Scripture is implied in the idea of the duties of an ordinary pastor and Bishop of the whole Church (ch. i. ii. iii.). No other Apostle received this supreme and independent pastorship but himself. All this is nothing else than an epitome of the conclusions which have been proved at such length from Scripture: to say more would be but to repeat what has been already advanced.

As to St. Peter's having received nothing but what *each* of the *other* Apostles received, this has

* Ordinary jurisdiction is taken here not as opposed to *delegated* but *extraordinary*.

been already touched on (*n.* 168, 203), and will be noticed more formally hereafter (*n.* 244, etc.).

OBJECTION XXXVIII.

238. "If any such conveyance of power (of power so great, so momentous, so mightily concerning the perpetual state of the Church, and of each person therein) had been made, it had been (for general direction and satisfaction, for voiding all doubt and debate about it, for stifling these pretended heresies and schisms) very requisite that it should have been expressed in some authentic record, that a particular law should have been extant concerning it, that all posterity should be warned to yield the submission grounded thereon.

"Indeed a matter of so great consequence to the being and welfare of the Church, could scarcely have scaped from being clearly mentioned somewhere or other in Scripture, wherein so much is spoken touching ecclesiastical discipline"—BARROW, *p.* 118.

ANSWER.

239. I. Waving the question of the completeness of Scripture as a record of revelation and of the conditions required in order that a doctrine

should become strictly an article of faith, I say that if the doctrine is fairly proved from Scripture, though not formally expressed therein, this is enough to claim our assent to it. This is plainly implied in the sixth of the thirty-nine Articles. The reason is, that, though man is not always accountable for the inferences naturally deducible from his words, in as much as they may not have been foreseen by him, the Holy Ghost, however, whose word the Scripture is, cannot say anything from which a false conclusion may be drawn by the legitimate exercise of that reason which has been given us for the discovery of truth.

Nor is it "very requisite", or at all requisite, or in any way necessary, that the law, of which Dr. Barrow speaks, should have been enacted, or the warning given. It is enough if the doctrine be contained in, or proved from a single text or a single line of Scripture. As to voiding all doubt and stifling heresies and schisms, it is manifest on the very face of the Scriptures, that this was not designed by the Holy Ghost in dictating them. There is hardly a doctrine of pure revelation, even among those professed by us and Protestants in common, on which doubts and debates and heresies and schisms without end have not existed. "For

there must be also heresies"—I. *Cor.*, xi. We are tried in our faith as in all other virtues. But it is needless to say more on a matter so very obvious to every diligent reader of the Bible, whether Catholic or Protestant. Indeed I cannot account for such a statement proceeding from so able and acute a writer.

II. Either our reasoning (*n.* 71—78, 101) is solid or it is not. If it be solid, then the doctrine which it proves from Scripture should be admitted; if not, let the fallacy be shown. At the same time I fully admit, as I have already admitted (*n.* 2), that the perpetuation of the Primacy is not so expressly contained in Scripture as the Primacy itself.

OBJECTION XXXIX.

240. According to Roman Catholic divines, "the Primacy of St. Peter was to be a permanent office in the Church, because the reason for which it was instituted was to *preserve unity*; and this being a permanent object, the office which was instituted for it must have been so likewise. But no Scriptural proof has ever been adduced in support of this theory of the *reason* of the existence of St. Peter's preëminence. There is no *evidence from Scripture* that the *preservation of unity* was the reason"—PALMER, II., 382.

ANSWER.

241. I. The preservation of unity was not the only end for the purpose of accomplishing which the Primacy was established. See *n.* 71, etc.

II. I have produced *evidence from Scripture* that the *preservation of unity* was among the reasons for which the Primacy was established. See *n.* 44, 76, 99.

The remaining objections of Mr. Palmer against the perpetuation of the Primacy are either answered elsewhere in the present chapter, or are directed against caricatured arguments of our divines, or arguments not advanced by them as decisive. Thus he represents us as inferring the *fact* of the perpetuation of the Primacy from the admitted *expediency* of such an office in the Church. There is something in this reasoning as a reply to certain objections, or even as a proof in conjunction with other proofs. But I can assure Mr. Palmer that we have much stronger things to say for St. Peter and his successors, as he may discover even from this poor little fragment of an Essay.

§ 5. *General objections against the doctrine of the Primacy and the Scripture proof thereof.*

242. As nearly all the following objections are directed, not against our *arguments*, which they leave untouched, but directly against our *doctrine*, against the proposition which our arguments are adduced to establish, aiming to demonstrate the contradiction between that doctrine and reason, or other parts of revelation, I here once for all beg the reader to attend to the following very simple and trite but very important observation, and to keep it before his mind throughout.

When the proof of a proposition is stated, and an opponent directs his objection not against the proof, but against the proposition itself, *e. g.* this proposition is inconsistent with such and such texts of Scripture, with such and such admitted principles, with such and such doctrines held by the defendant himself; in this case,

I. It is evident that the objector does not overthrow my proposition unless he proves, strictly *proves* and demonstrates, the alleged contradiction—I of course mean by such sort of demonstration as theological subjects admit of. It is not enough for him that I am unable to give a satisfactory account

of the thing, that I am unable to show, by positive proof, that my proposition perfectly harmonizes with the text or reason from which his objection is drawn: he must himself *prove* that his meaning of the text is certain, or that his principle of reason is certain in the sense in which he uses it; and he must moreover *prove* that his text or his principle thus understood clashes with my proposition, that the truth of one is inconsistent with the truth of the other. It is not enough that I cannot show that his text rightly interpreted is not opposed to my proposition, he must show that it *is* opposed. Until he does this, he only proves that I am an ignorant man, or a dull man, or that the harmony between my proposition and some other proposition in Scripture or out of it, cannot be shown; but he must prove not merely that no one can reconcile the two, but that they *are* irreconcilable, not only that their agreement cannot be shown, but that they actually *disagree*. The reason of this is that my doctrine is supposed to be already solidly proved, and the proof is, by the supposition of the case, left untouched and in its full force. Consequently my doctrine is not overturned until its contradiction to some other truth is positively proved. Thus, for example, suppose that I have proved the Liberty

and Immutability of God, and that an infidel brings an argument to show that these two attributes are irreconcilable in the same being. I may not be able to show how they are reconcilable, but I have given my proof of the fact that they do exist together in God; and while that proof remains unanswered, it is not enough for the infidel that I am unable to explain the mode in which they exist together, for this may arise from my imperfect knowledge of the divine nature; he must prove that they are irreconcilable, otherwise he cannot establish the falsity of my proposition.*

To take an example from the matter immediately before us, several eminent Protestant divines draw what appears to them a conclusive argument against the Primacy of St. Peter from the following passage in the Acts of the Apostles: "When the Apostles who were in Jerusalem, had heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and John"—*Acts*, viii. 14. To send a man on any mission is, they say, an exercise of authority in the sender over the sent, at least the superior cannot be sent by the inferior: therefore, as Peter was sent by the Apostles, he was not above them.

* See Vol. III. Essay on Faith and Reason, *n.* 87, and *n.* 103, etc.

To this I say that sending may be an act of authority, as when a master despatches his servant on an errand, or it may be done by entreaty. An inferior may in this way send his superior, and send him, too, as a special mark of confidence and honour, as when a son sends his father to transact some difficult and important business for which he feels himself not so competent. So a clerk would send his employer, a meeting depute its chairman, a community its head, or some member in whose superior capacity it confided. Suppose that I say this, and that I have nothing more to say to this specific objection, I am not called upon to say more, I am not called upon to show from the text that Peter was actually sent in this second way. I am proving nothing from the text, my business is merely to show that my opponent cannot prove any thing from it against my proposition or my proofs. It is his business to prove that Peter was sent by the Apostles as having authority to send him, which they on this occasion exercised — a point which he cannot establish. Then there are my proofs of the primacy of St. Peter from *Matthew*, xvi., etc. This objection does not assail them, and I therefore from them infer, and am clearly justified in inferring, that the sending of

Peter was not an exercise of authority over him, but rather a proof that the Apostles believed him and John to be the fittest of their number for this mission, or that there was some other motive of convenience for the selection which has not been revealed to us.

II. The objector is called upon not only to make good his ground of objection, but moreover to give some fair and at least probable interpretation of the texts on which my proof is founded, which interpretation will overturn that proof, or at least render it uncertain, not strictly conclusive. Peter was sent by the Apostles, and there are other things said of him and omitted too, which look very unlike what would have been stated or passed over in silence, if the sacred writers believed him to be what we affirm he was. Well, but what say you to my proofs? Either my reasoning on the aforesaid texts is solid or it is not: if not, there it is, examine it fairly, examine it all through, bring the lamp of reason close to every member and joint, and if you find unsoundness in any essential part—in any part at all necessary to the completeness of the argument—point it out, put your finger on the spot. If you cannot do so, then give up all further controversy, unless you find a text equally clear and decisive on the opposite side—a discovery

which I am quite sure no man has ever yet made, or ever will make.

OBJECTION XL.*

243. Nothing was given to Peter that was not also given to the other Apostles. He was an Apostle, so were they. He was a foundation of the Church, so were they (*Apoc.*, xxi. 14; *Ephes.*, ii. 20). He received the power of binding and loosing, so did they (*Matth.*, xviii. 18). He received power to feed the sheep of Christ, so did they; for St. Paul tells the Bishops at Ephesus that the Holy Ghost had appointed them "to feed the Church of God"—*Acts*, xx. 28. See also *I. Peter*, v. 2. His commission was universal, extended to all the earth, so did theirs (*Matth.*, xxviii. 19; *Mark*, xvi. 15; *Luke*, xxiv. 47)—BARROW, *p.* 59, etc., and all Protestant divines.

ANSWER.

244. The rest of the Apostles received nothing *which Peter did not receive with them at the same time and in equal measure with any of them.*

* In the portion of Dr. Barrow's work occupied with the general objections, there is endless repetition and prolixity: besides, that several of the objections, or large portions of them, have been answered in the preceding sections. I have therefore condensed in

He was among them when Christ "called unto him his disciples, and chose twelve of them, whom also he named Apostles"—*Luke*, iii. 13; *Matth.*, x.; *Mark*, iii.

He was among them when it was said to them, "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, shall be loosed also in heaven"—*Matth.*, xviii. 18.

He was among them when it was said to them, "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations", etc.—*Matth.*, xxviii.

He was among them on all occasions on which our Lord conferred any power of order or jurisdiction on them.

But beside those occasions on which Peter received power in common with the other Apostles, there are four things to be noted in our Lord's addresses to him specially and exclusively, on other occasions, and which show that he received a supreme power, given to no other Apostle, over all the Church.

my own words the substance of all that yet remains to be answered, omitting nothing that appears to me of real weight, and adding whatever I think deserving of consideration, from the works of other Protestant divines.

245. *First*: He was (a) constituted the *Rock on which Christ was to build his whole Church*, and so constituted as to be thereby (b) *the principle of the Church's unity and indefectibility* (chap. i.).

He was appointed specially and in express terms (c) *to confirm his brethren, that is, the Apostles*.

Now these are momentous offices, or rather functions of the same office, which were in no way, neither in *kind* or *degree*, conferred on any other. The other Apostles were, indeed, individually pastors as well as Peter, had the power of binding and loosing as well as he; they had so far the same kind of office as he had, though (as we shall see, and indeed have already seen) in a different degree and subordinate to him. But these particular functions of being the Rock of the Church, its principle of unity and indefectibility, of confirming the other Apostles, not one of them was invested with in any way. That is to say, as we have already proved (n. 64, etc., n. 132, etc.), Peter received supreme authority over the whole Church, and no other Apostle but he received it.

246. Nor do the two texts referred to in the objection affect our position in the least. The first, from the *Apocalypse*, runs thus: "The wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the

twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb" (*Apoc.*, xxi. 14). The second text is from *Ephes.*, ii. 20: "Now therefore you are no more strangers and foreigners; but you are fellow-citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone: in whom all the building being framed together, groweth up into an holy temple in the Lord: in whom you also are built together into an habitation of God and the Spirit".

As to the text from the *Apocalypse*, it is plain from a mere reading of the chapter, that the city spoken of there is not the Church militant on earth, but triumphant in heaven. Granting, however, what I at once admit, that the words, though as they lie in the inspired book, applied only to the heavenly Jerusalem, are nevertheless applicable and may with strict propriety be accommodated to the Church on earth; what I have to say on the second text will suffice to remove all difficulties grounded on this.

On the text from the *Ephesians*, then, I note
247. I. All the Apostles together are called the twelve foundations of the Church (as in *Apocal.*), or the foundation (as in *Ephes.*). Peter

therefore was one of the twelve foundations, or a part of the one general foundation. But it is not said of *any one* of the twelve, in these two texts or (Peter alone excepted) in any other part of Scripture, that he was *the foundation of the whole Church*. Now, over and above what Peter was in common with the rest of the twelve, he was, as has been proved, what none of them was, the foundation, or rather rock, of the whole Church. As an Apostle he was what they were, but he received another office distinct from that of the Apostleship, and he alone received it. Thus, for illustration's sake, he whom we believe to be Peter's successor, is at once Bishop of Rome, and Bishop of the whole Church. Thus, according to the theory of our constitution, the Queen is one branch of the legislature, one constituent of the whole made up of three — the Queen, Lords, and Commons: but she has also an executive authority which she does not share with them, but holds herself alone supreme. Thus the House of Lords is a branch of the legislature, as the House of Commons is, and no more. But it has also a judicial capacity proper to itself, in which it is supreme, being the final court of appeal.

248. II. I have already touched on the dif-

ference between the meaning and force of the metaphor of a *foundation* and of a *rock* (n. 43, note, 170). *Foundation* may be used to convey the simple idea of *commencement*—*first beginning*—*cause*. Thus we say that a legacy bequeathed, in his early days of trial, to one who is now a rich merchant, was the foundation of his present wealth: such a heroic deed was the foundation of the soldier's present rank in the army: such a popular production was the foundation of the author's fame: such a service rendered by James to John, was the foundation of a lasting friendship between them, etc., etc. So we say, from the foundation of the world to the present time, from the foundation of the Roman Empire, of the English monarchy, etc., etc. *Foundation* may be also used to convey the idea of strength, as when I say the house rests on its foundation, society rests on law as on a foundation, etc., etc. But *rock*, of its own nature, and without waiting for its import to be determined by the context, signifies strength, and, in reference to any thing built on it, rising up from it, strength communicated thereto (n. 43). Whereas, when foundation implies strength existing or communicated, or does not imply either, it is to be determined by the context.

It seems to me that in the text from the *Ephesians*, simple commencement — origination — source of first formation, or the like, is implied, and nothing more: I mean implied by the mere word *foundation*; that more is implied by the context I admit. For, 1^o. St. Paul speaks of the “foundation of the Apostles and Prophets”. Now we cannot well understand how the Prophets were a part of the foundation of the Church in any other sense than that of introducing and commencing it among men—afar off, indeed, and as an institution yet to be. I am aware that the word *Prophets* is here understood by some of the class of teachers or interpreters, so called in the time of the Apostles.* But even in this interpretation of the word our reasoning retains its weight. 2^o. The strengthening and sustaining power is referred to the “chief corner-stone”, Jesus Christ. Undoubtedly the Apostles were also foundations of the Church, in the sense of sustaining and consolidating it; but this is not the idea conveyed in the present text. 3^o. The unconquerable power and strength of the Church is not the doctrine which the Apostle is here conveying, but the union of all its

* The argument of ESRIV against this opinion appears to me conclusive. See his commentary *in loc.*

members together with Christ and the Apostles, and the growth and expansion of the Church from them.

249. III. Granting that the *foundation* in *Apoc.* and *Ephes.*, has the full meaning of *rock* in *Matth.*; still the Apostles are only called, said to be, foundations. There is no text of Scripture in which they were *appointed*, or appointed to become foundations of the Church: whereas Peter was solemnly appointed and constituted by Jesus Christ as the rock-foundation of the whole Church. On the difference between these two things, see *n.* 64.

250. *Secondly*: The power of binding and loos-
ing which was given to all the Apostles together, was, on a different occasion, given specially and individually to Peter, and specially and individually to him alone. He therefore received what no other Apostle received, nor all the rest together without him (*n.* 234). For as the power of binding and loos-
ing, in the way in which it was conferred upon the twelve, made them the supreme ruling *body* over the whole Church, so, being conferred on Peter individually in exactly the same manner, in words of exactly the same import, it made him the supreme ruling *individual* over the whole. If twelve men are appointed in a body as officers over a newly formed regiment, and one of their number,

and he alone, receives a distinct appointment as officer over the regiment, is it not plain that he has received not merely an honorary title, but a real power which no other officer has received? Is it not plain that while the twelve in a body are the *heads* of the regiment, he and he alone is the *head* of it? This is not the way in which appointments are actually made among men, whether in Church or State—the form of the institution of the Episcopate being in this respect peculiar—and therefore our minds, accustomed to take what we see as the type of our conceptions, do not at once take in the new idea in all its completeness and reality. It is necessary for us to abstract from those aspects in the every-day realities about us, which make the difference between them and the reality under consideration. Undoubtedly *if* a number of officers or magistrates or rulers of any kind, were appointed by competent authority over any body of subjects, as the Apostles were appointed over the whole Church, and *if* one of their number received the same specific appointment, distinct from his fellow-rulers, which St. Peter received distinct from the other Apostles—*if* such a thing occurred, undoubtedly men would at once interpret the relative jurisdictions of the one specially constituted ruler

and of the rest, as I have interpreted the relative jurisdiction of St. Peter and of the Apostles, nor would it enter any one's mind to understand the matter otherwise.

The power of binding and loosing is the only power conferred on the Apostles together, and conferred, *in the same form of words or under the same image*, separately on Peter alone. But the same principle applies to all that was given separately to Peter, and given to the Apostles collectively, whether given on both occasions in the same form or not.

251. *Thirdly*: The third very marked distinction which Christ made between Peter and the rest of the Apostles, is the frequency of the distinct promises or appointments to rulership and jurisdiction over the Church, as compared with similar promises to, or appointments of, the body of the Apostles. On the force of the argument hence derived see *n.* 125 and *n.* 150. Let us here inquire into the fact.

“And he made that twelve (whom also he named Apostles—*Luke*) should be with him, and that he might send them to preach. And he gave them power to heal sickness and to cast out devils.....And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words...it

shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment than for that city..... He that receiveth you, receiveth me"—*Mark*, iii. 14; *Matth.*, x. 1, 14, 40; *Luke*, vi. 13, 40.

At the last supper, "Amen, amen I say to you, he that receiveth whomsoever I send, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me"—*John*, xx. 20.

"Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven"—*Matth.*, xviii. 18.

"Going therefore teach ye all nations", etc.—*Matth.*, xxviii. 19; *Mark*, xvi. 15.

"You shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth"—*Acts*, i. 8.

These texts* represent the several occasions on which authority over others was given to the body of the Apostles: and of these there is but *one*—that of *Matthew*, xviii.—in which the plenitude of

* I have taken the references from ZACHARIAS, *Antifehonius*, c. i. (vol. i. pag. 30. *Edit. Bruxell. et Lovan.*, 1839). As this is an exceedingly careful and laborious collector (his chief merit), I have trusted to the completeness of his references, without searching the Gospels myself for more texts.

jurisdiction is directly conveyed: for authority to preach and teach, is but a part of the rulership conferred on the Apostles.

“And Jesus looking upon him, said, Thou art Simon, the son of Jona, thou shalt be called Cephas [Rock]”—*John*, i. 42.

“Thou art Peter, and upon this rock.....To thee I will give the keys.....whatsoever thou shalt bind”, etc.—*Matth.*, xvi.

“Thou being once converted, confirm thy brethren”—*Luke*, xxii.

“Feed my lambs...Feed my lambs...Feed my sheep”—*John*, xxi.

Here we have the supremacy *promised* to Peter on two occasions—on the first, the promise being so obscure as to be intelligible only through the second, or through the appointment itself—and on the second, the promise is thrice repeated under three different forms.

We have the supremacy *conferred* on Peter on two different occasions; and on the second, the appointment made thrice over.

Certainly the distinction is very striking, in the matter of repetition, between the manner in which the supreme power was conferred on the body of the Apostles and on Peter simply.

252. *Fourthly*: The fourth distinction is in the language and imagery adopted by our Lord in addressing the Apostles, and addressing Peter alone.

“He that receiveth whomsoever I send”.

“Whatsoever you shall *bind*—and *loose*”.

“Teach all nations”.

“You shall be witnesses”.

The metaphor of binding and loosing is the only one used. See how different is the language addressed to Peter.

“Thou shalt be called *Rock*”.

“Upon this *Rock* I will *build*”,

“To thee I will give the *Keys*”.

“Whatsoever thou shalt *bind*—*loose*”.

“Confirm thy brethren”.

“*Feed* my *lambs*—my *sheep*”.

The metaphor of the Rock—of the keys—of binding and loosing—of feeding the flock, are all used in reference to Peter, and *but one of them* in reference to the Apostles (see *n.* 125).

From all these considerations it follows that the rest of the Apostles, or any one of them, did not receive the power promised to Peter in *Matth.*, xvi., and conferred on him in *Luke*, xxii., and *John*, xxi.

OBJECTION XLI.

253. The Apostles were all equally Apostles, Apostles in the same degree: no one was, as to authority, more an Apostle, a higher Apostle than another. But the Apostolic office was the highest instituted by Christ: it was *supreme*. "There is no office above that of an Apostle known to the Apostles", says Dr. Barrow. "Nothing", says Mr. Palmer, "conceivable by human imagination, can surpass the grandness and the magnitude of this mission and these powers [of the Apostolic office]; and therefore St. Peter could not have exceeded the other Apostles in power or official dignity; but could only have excelled them in personal respects".

This the supreme authority of the Apostolic office, they prove by citing the usual texts in which powers and gifts are conferred upon the twelve, most of which (all those relating to authority) have been already quoted, *Matth.*, x. 14; xxviii. 18, 20. *John*, xiv. 16; xvi. 13; xx. 21—23. They also quote, *Ephes.*, iv. 11, and I. *Corinth.*, xii. 28, which we reserve for separate examination under the next objection — BARROW, *p.* 52. PALMER, II. *p.* 370.

ANSWER.

254. I. I admit the first proposition in what some schoolmen call the *reduplicate sense*: that is, I admit that the Apostles, *as* Apostles, were all equal: there was no higher or lower *in the Apostolic office itself*.

II. I deny the second proposition. I have already proved, in the answer to the last objection and also previously (*n.* 228, *compare n.* 226), that St. Peter received a distinct office from that of the Apostolate, that is the office of ordinary pastor for governing the Church founded, established, and formed—an office to remain for ever in the Church: whereas the Apostolate was an office for founding the Church, and, as such, to cease with the Apostles. It follows from what I have said, in the same reply to the last objection, that this office of Peter, was above that of the Apostolate as it was in any one Apostle, or in all the rest together. It is unnecessary to repeat the arguments over again. I have said *in any one Apostle*, etc.: for to say that Peter by himself had more authority than the whole body of Apostles, *himself included*, would be absurd. From what has been proved of Peter's primatial office it follows that

1°. The whole authority of Peter was to descend fully to successors: this is true of no other Apostle.

2°. Peter could command and send with authority any of the other Apostles, mark out the sphere of labour for each, in a word, exercise the authority of Chief Pastor over them: whereas, no other individual Apostle could do so with regard to Peter or any other of his brethren. That this authority of Peter was not exercised commonly or in any marked way, has been already stated, and the reasons given (*n.* 210).

3°. Peter had supreme authority to govern the whole Church together, to enact laws for it, etc. This no other Apostle could do by divine right: though with the consent of Peter, tacit or express, he could do it.*

255. As to the argument from the texts referred to in the objection, it falls to the ground from what has been said (*n.* 226), that *the authority of which there is question in those texts was not the Apostolic authority, as such*; and from what has been said (in the same *n.* and in *n.* 234, and the answer

* See SUAREZ, de Fide, Disp. 10, sec. i. SCHELSTRATE, Dissertat. de Auctoritate Apostolorum, *cap.* i.—iii. PAULUTIUS, Jurisprudentia Sacra, *Lib.* 2. *Tract.* 2. *Cap.* 1. TOURNELLY, de Ecclesia, *vol.* ii. *p.* 32. PERRONE, de Locis, *P.* i. *n.* 457-8.

to the last objection) that the authority conferred in those texts *was possessed in all its plenitude, supremely and independently, by Peter, and by no other individual Apostle except Peter.*

OBJECTION XLII.

256. St. Paul, when “purposely enumerating the chief officers instituted by God in his Church, doth place Apostles in the highest rank”; *Our Lord*, saith St. Paul, *gave some Apostles, some Prophets, some Evangelists, some Pastors and Teachers (Ephes., iv. 11);* and God hath sent some *in his Church, first Apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers; πρωτον αποστολους (I. Corinth., xii. 28);* why not first a pope, an universal pastor, an ecumenical judge, a vicar of Christ, a head of the Catholic Church? Could St. Paul be so ignorant, could he be so negligent or so envious, as to pass by without any distinction, the supreme officer, if such a one then had been? As put case, that one should undertake to recite the officers in any state or republic, would he not do strangely, if he should pretermitt the king, the duke, the major, the consul thereof? Would not any one confiding in the skill, diligence, and integrity of such a relator, be induced from such an omission to

believe there was no such officer there?"—BARROW, *p.* 52. PALMER, *p.* 371. STILLINGFLEET, *p.* 2, *c.* 7 (*page* 282), and Protestant theologians *passim*.

ANSWER.

257. The objection from the texts quoted embraces two points, 1^o that St. Paul in the enumeration of offices would not have omitted that of Primate of the Universal Church, if such office had been instituted: 2^o that he would not have placed the Apostles in the first rank, and expressly named them first, saying, "first Apostles", if there had been a Primate who was above them all.

First: As to the omission of the Primatial office.

I. The objection can have no weight, unless it should appear that St. Paul intended to give a complete enumeration of the offices divinely established in the Church; or that the drift of his reasoning, or some other circumstance in the object, the occasion, or the manner of his writing, called for a specific mention of the Primacy. It is evident that if the mention of it was not required on any of these grounds, no inference whatever can be drawn from the silence of the Apostle. For then only *can* the omission of any such fact in a statement be alleged as evidence of any kind, as a

presumption even in the lowest degree, against the truth of the fact, when—knowledge, honesty of purpose, etc., being of course supposed—the mention of the fact would have been demanded from the writer, on some of the aforesaid grounds. Otherwise I might argue against the doctrine of the Trinity from every text of Scripture in which Christ is named without any mention of the Father and the Holy Ghost: I might argue against there having been twelve Apostles from every text in which only a portion of the twelve are named: I might argue against the institution of the Blessed Eucharist, because it is not spoken of in the Gospel of St. John: I might argue against the heavenly doctrine contained in the discourse of our Lord to his disciples after his last supper, as given in *John*, xiv., xv., xvi., xvii.; and I might argue against the sublime and weighty conclusions drawn therefrom regarding his divinity, several attributes of the Church, etc., because this discourse is entirely, or almost entirely omitted by the other Evangelists: in short, I might argue from any one text against the truth of what is contained in all other texts but not included in it—just as they argue from the texts cited in the present objection against the Primacy of St. Peter, which (as has been proved)

is revealed in three of the Evangelists, but not alluded to in those two texts.

I deny that the Apostle was on any ground called upon to number the Primacy among the offices named by him.

1°. Does he, as Dr. Barrow insinuates, “undertake to recite the officers”, *i. e.* *all* the officers, or rather offices, in the Church? There is no evidence whatever that he proposed any such thing to himself: he does not tell us so directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication. When the Evangelists “undertake to recite” the names of the Apostles in full, to give a list of them, they indicate this pretty plainly. “And the names of the twelve Apostles are these”, etc.—*Matth.*, x. 2. Then follow the twelve names. “And he made that twelve should be with him”, etc.—*Mark*, iii. 14. Then follow the names. “And he chose twelve of them, whom he also named Apostles”, etc.—*Luke*, vi. 13. Then follow the names as before. There is nothing of this kind in the texts from *I. Corinth.*, xiii., or *Ephes.*, iv. “And God, indeed, hath set some in the Church, first Apostles”, etc. “And he gave some Apostles, and some prophets”, etc.

St. Matthew undertook to write a life of Jesus Christ. How much has he not omitted which is

given in St. John's Gospel? St. John undertook to write the same life. How much has he not omitted of what is given by St. Matthew? The four Evangelists give each a history of the passion: St. John alone makes mention of the mysterious flowing of blood and water, when the soldier opened the side of Jesus with a spear. This was a deep and important circumstance: for he adds, that, "he that saw it hath given testimony, and his testimony is true: and he knoweth that he saith true, that you also may believe"—*John*, xix. 35: yet none of the other Evangelists alludes to it.

You will say, and say quite truly, that it was not the design of any one Evangelist to relate all the incidents in our Lord's life, or to record all that fell from his lips: nor have the four Evangelists together told all or nearly all. And you will say, with equal truth, that of what God willed to be communicated, one supplies the part omitted by another. Just so: and in like manner it was not the design of St. Paul to enumerate all the offices in the Church, and the one great office which he omitted to name, is set forth in the strongest terms elsewhere, by no less than three out of the four Evangelists.

2°. Did the subject on which St. Paul was

writing, or the view in which he wished to place it, or the principles which he was inculcating, etc., require a complete enumeration of the offices in the Church, or at least a special mention of the Primacy? Not at all. He is on both occasions urging the necessity of the union of charity among all the members of the Church. In the Epistle to the Corinthians, he compares the Church, the mystic body of Christ, to the human body, in which there are various members, each having its own distinct function, and all for the welfare of the whole. So in the Church there are different gradations and offices and gifts, not shared in common, but distributed among different persons, for the common good. In the Epistle to the Ephesians, he says that this variety of functions in the Church, so far from being an obstacle to the union of charity, should rather promote it, inasmuch as they were instituted gratuitously, "according to the measure of the giving of Christ...for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ"—*vv.* 7, 11 (The latter verse is connected in sense with the former, the matter intervening between them being parenthetical). The *fact* of diversity of offices, etc., existing in the Church, whatever they were, was all

that appertained to the reasoning of the Apostle. He mentions some of them by way of illustration: but it is perfectly plain that to undertake a formal and complete enumeration of them, would have been altogether foreign to his purpose—just as foreign as a person illustrating variety in unity from many branches in one tree, to count all the branches of the tree; or from many members in one body, to enumerate all the members; or from many mansions in one house, to tell the number and names of the several mansions. It is enough that there *are* many branches, many members, many mansions; but that there are just so many, and that they rank in such and such order, have such and such uses, are details altogether irrelevant.

II. It is evident that St. Paul did not intend to make a complete enumeration of offices in *both* of these texts. For there are *more* enumerated in the text from I. *Corinthians*, than in that from *Ephesians*, and even as far as the latter enumeration goes, it is not throughout the same with the former, but *different* in as much as it comprises “Evangelists”, which are not in the former. In I. *Corinth.*, the words are, “And God indeed hath set some in the Church, first (*a*) apostles, secondly (*b*) prophets, thirdly (*c*) doctors, after that (*d*) miracles, then (*e*)

the graces of healings, (*f*) helps, (*g*) governments, (*h*) kinds of tongues, (*i*) interpretations of speeches". In the text of *Ephes.*, the words are: "And he gave some (*a*) apostles, and some (*b*) prophets, and other some (*c*) evangelists, and other some (*d*) pastors, and (*e*) doctors".

III. Certainly he does not enumerate all the offices in the Church, for he makes no mention of Bishops, unless we suppose them to be included under the general—too general—name of pastors. But he enumerates some powers which were not ordinary offices in the Church, but extraordinary gifts, as the power of miracles, the gift of tongues, the graces of healings.

IV. Most of the offices and faculties which he enumerated were for the founding of the Church, and were all of them then existing in full operation, well known and familiar to the people. And observe, that as the enumeration which St. Paul did make, was *but for illustration*, he would of course enumerate the things most *familiar to those whom he was addressing*. Now the Primacy, as has been already shown, was not only an ordinary office, not for founding the Church, but for governing the Church when founded; but it was moreover an office which would come less before the Church of

that time, would indeed not come at all into *full* and *constant* operation until afterwards. This assertion we make, not to get out of a difficulty—for we do not want it for such purpose—but because it is, as we have proved (n. 214, *Thirdly*), a natural consequence of the nature and end of the Primacy viewed in connexion with the Apostolate.

258. *Secondly*, as to the Apostles having been named first, which would not have been done had a higher office existed, I answer: •

I. If, as we have just seen, there existed reasons for not introducing any allusion whatever to the primacy in either of the two texts, then of course the Apostolic office would be named first in any enumeration constructed according to the order of rank.

II. He does not put the *Apostolate* first, but the *Apostles*. Now the Apostles really were the first, and that one of them held an office distinct from the Apostolate and above it, did not prevent the body from being first, and was moreover, from what we have seen in the reply to the previous member of this objection, a circumstance which St. Paul was by no means called upon to mention. Thus we say that kings are first in the civil order, though some kings are far above others in rank. and may

even possess and often have possessed certain control over them, as in the feudal times. Thus, in the graduation according to rank of the offices of the state, we would give a distinguished place to the judges of the land, second, third, fourth, fifth, whatever it might be; though some among them hold a much higher rank and even a much more extensive jurisdiction than others. Thus in enumerating the legislative bodies, we would say, first, the House of Lords, second, the House of Commons, though there is one in the House of Lords, the Chancellor, who is above the rest, and one in the House of Commons, the Speaker, who is above the rest. We would speak thus even when our object was to make a formal enumeration, which was not St. Paul's object. So we constantly say that in the Church Bishops are first, then Priests, then Deacons; though we believe that there is one Bishop above all the rest, and even Bishop of Bishops, and some Priests are far above others in rank, and exercise the highest jurisdiction over others.

III. There is a very remarkable discrepancy between the order of enumeration in *I. Corinthians* and that in *Ephesians*. Apostles and Prophets are the two first in both: in the former, Doctors,

Miracles, Graces of healing, are in the third, fourth, fifth places; in the latter, Evangelists, Pastors, and Doctors. From this it would seem to follow that by the words *first, secondly, thirdly, after that, then*, the Apostle did not imply order of rank or authority, but order in reference to something else: or, if the order of rank be observed in one text, it certainly is not observed in the other.

To this it may be replied that in the four lists of the Apostles (*Matth.*, x.; *Mark*, iii.; *Luke*, vi.; *Acts*, i.) St. Peter is always first, while no exact order is observed with regard to the rest, except that Judas Iscariot, wherever named, is always last. So the Apostles are put first in those two texts. As first rank is claimed for Peter on the ground of his uniform position as first, while there is no uniformity in the numbering of the rest: so first rank should be claimed for the Apostles as being uniformly first, *though* the subsequent arrangement of names is not uniform.

To this I rejoin, that, independent altogether of any arrangement in the two texts, I of course maintain the first place in the Church for the Apostles, which the Scripture clearly gives them: and in like manner, you should admit a similar first place, among the Apostles, to Peter, which the Scripture

clearly gives him—a first place not only in rank, but in authority. But all I infer from the observation above, is, that St. Paul did not propose to himself to draw up an exact list of the several offices of the Church in their regular gradations of rank and authority.

Note. In the course of the Proofs and the preceding Answers to objections, I have entered at sufficient length into the broad fundamental principles, by the application of which every thing of weight in any of the remaining objections may be easily and satisfactorily refuted. In truth, every thing of real moment urged by Protestant divines, has been already subjected to examination. I shall therefore contract the rest of this section within the smallest possible limits.

OBJECTION XLIII.

259. The Primatial office of St. Peter was as distinct from that of the Apostolate as the office of king from that of any subject. Such an office should have been marked by some distinct and characteristic name, as that of Arch-apostle, Arch-pastor, etc. But no such name was given to it in Scripture—BARROW, *p.* 51.

ANSWER.

260. I. I deny the first proposition. The office of the Apostles as ordinary Bishops was certainly very far below that of Peter, as Apostles below it, but not nearly so far below it.

II. I deny the second proposition. It is enough if the *thing* be revealed, without a distinct name: the Church could then, and of course would, affix an appropriate title; as men invent names for every new object. The doctrine signified by the word *Trinity* is revealed in Scripture: there is no *name* in Scripture for it, neither the name *Trinity* nor any other.

III. I deny the third proposition. Jesus Christ himself did give a name to the office, or rather to Peter as invested with that office, as he gave the name of *Apostles* to those called to that dignity. He gave a name to Peter at once *distinct*—shared by no other, and *characteristic*—expressive of the office with which he was invested. “Thou art Simon, the Son of Jona: thou *shalt be called* Cephas”—*John*, i.; a name distinct, given to none else: a name characteristic, Cephas, Peter, ROCK. “Thou art Rock, and upon this Rock”, etc.

OBJECTION XLIV.

261. St. Peter wrote two Catholic Epistles, in which there is no intimation of the Primatial power. Now it is natural for persons endowed with such high authority to discover indications thereof in their style of writing on important occasions—BARROW, *p.* 52.

ANSWER.

261. I. To the first proposition—waiving the question of fact whether any such intimation is given—I answer, 1^o. To write as an Apostle, and with the proper authority of an Apostle, and as the other Apostles wrote, was quite enough for St. Peter's purpose: as it would be for the Pope, in preaching a sermon in one of the Churches in Rome, to preach just as Bishop of Rome. 2^o. St. Peter *did* write simply as an Apostle. “Peter an Apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers dispersed through Pontus”, etc.—I. *Pet.*, i. 1. “Simon Peter, servant and Apostle of Jesus Christ, to them that have obtained equal faith”, etc.—II. *Pet.*, i. 1.

II. It is natural for ordinary mortals to show their authority on all occasions. In the great saints

of God it is becoming and even a duty to put forth their authority when necessary for a good end, to enforce obedience, to claim belief, etc. It was necessary for the Apostles in teaching, especially in their public teaching, to teach with authority—but the Apostolic authority was sufficient.

The objections which occur in Dr. Barrow's work between *p.* 62 and *p.* 71, are all answered by the principles laid down in answering object. xxvi. and xxviii. (*n.* 210, 214). The other objections occurring in this part of Dr. Barrow's Treatise not noticed hereafter, have been all answered before—excepting those from the Fathers.

OBJECTION XLV.

263. St. Paul “doth more than once affirm himself *to be inferior in nothing to the very chief apostles* (II. *Corinth.*, xi. 5; xii. 11): in nothing; that is, in nothing pertinent to the authority or substantial dignity of his place; for as to personal merit, he professeth himself *much less than the least of the apostles*—I. *Corinth.*, xv. 9; *Ephes.*, iii. 8”.
BARROW, *p.* 74.

ANSWER.

264. St. Paul is speaking of himself merely as

an Apostle, vindicating his authority and dignity—so far as he does vindicate them—as an Apostle. If the reader will take the trouble of looking carefully over, or even lightly through, the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth chapters of the Epistle, he will find that there existed at Corinth a clique of evil-disposed, lying teachers, who thrust themselves upon the people as superior to St. Paul, and represented him as not a genuine Apostle, like the rest, but a pretender, a carnal person, swaggering and high-sounding when absent, in his letters, but mean and timid in address, when present. It is strange that such characters should have existed at that time in the Church, and have been able moreover to draw parties after them: but the Scriptures, both here and elsewhere, are clear upon the fact. St. Paul, reluctantly and protesting that he is impelled only by zeal for their salvation, sets forth his own gifts, his own claims, and declares himself to be not only an Apostle, but an Apostle fully as much as any of the rest. And he really was so. This is the sum of the matter: nor is there any thing in the language of St. Paul in any way inconsistent with the fact that one of the Apostles had received an office of supreme authority distinct from the Apostleship.

OBJECTION XLVI.

265. “But when Cephas [Peter *Gr.*] was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. For before that some came from James, he did eat with the gentiles: but when they were come, he withdrew and separated himself, fearing them who were of the circumcision. And to this dissimulation the rest of the Jews consented, so that Barnabas also was led by them into that dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas before them all: If thou, being a Jew, liest after the manner of the gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to lie as do the Jews?”—*Galat.*, ii. 11, 14.

Here we find St. Paul lecturing and reprimanding St. Peter in a point of duty: a proceeding which would not have been adopted by an inferior to a superior: a proceeding which no one in the Church would venture to take with regard to the Sovereign Pontiff—BARROW, *p.* 77, and Protestant divines *passim*.

ANSWER.

266. I. Correction is of two kinds, that which

proceeds from a person having authority over another for his correction, and that which is a simple act of paternal charity, from an equal to an equal, or from an inferior to a superior. The correction of St. Peter by St. Paul assuredly was not of the former kind, for this much at least is certain, that if St. Peter did not receive jurisdiction over the other Apostles, no one else received it: St. Paul certainly had no authority over him or any other of his brethren in the Apostolate.

I cannot understand why Protestant divines lean so much as they commonly do on this text of the *Galatians*. There is not only no objection from it—so far as St. Peter's *supremacy* is concerned—but not even a shadow of objection. For the objection *must* proceed on the assumption that an inferior cannot correct—rather admonish—his superior; that correction implies equality if not superior authority in him who gives it. Surely the law of nature, the light of mere reason, abstracting from all revelation, tells us that any man may, on sufficient ground and observing certain conditions, admonish any other man inferior, equal, or superior; nay, that admonition to whomsoever directed is sometimes an act of strict duty, especially if the fault of which the corrected person is guilty should

affect the public good, still more especially if, as was the case with St. Peter's mistake, it should affect the spiritual welfare of others. Thus, a child may admonish his parent, a servant his master, a subject his ruler, a parishioner his parish priest, a priest his Bishop, a cardinal the Pope.

There are clear and certain laws laid down by all approved Catholic theologians for fraternal correction, laws drawn from reason as well as revelation, regulating the duty, the cause, the time, the mode, etc., of proceeding in this correction, for superiors with regard to inferiors, for equals with regard to equals, for inferiors with regard to superiors. As St. Paul was a prince of theological science, we may rest satisfied that he knew those laws, that he knew how to admonish: as he was a vessel of election speaking to a vessel of election, a most holy and humble man of God speaking to a brother Apostle, we may be sure that his admonition was uttered in a spirit of reverence and love.

But no man could take such liberty with the Pope, the successor of St. Peter? Not every man certainly, but I imagine St. Paul, if he were living, might take such liberty.

But why did St. Paul publish this fact, and as if boasting of it?

I do not believe that the blessed and inspired Apostle wrote, on the present or any other occasion, in a spirit of boasting. Still less do I believe, that he would have triumphed in the fault of his elder brother in the faith and the Apostolate, and paraded his own correction of him. St Paul published the fact, as he published every thing else, for some holy purpose. It is plain from the Epistle itself, that among the Galatians, as among the Corinthians, there were some false teachers who denounced St. Paul as not being a true Apostle, and as teaching doctrines different from those taught by the other Apostles. Through the greater part of the first and second chapters, he is occupied in refuting these pernicious calumnies, and shows that he is truly an Apostle called and taught by God himself, that he was in communion with the other Apostles, and that his doctrine was the same as theirs. To enhance his authority as a teacher, he tells them that on one occasion he set *even* St. Peter right on an important matter of discipline, and that his correction was acquiesced in. To have corrected an ordinary Apostle would have been

something, but to have corrected the Prince of the Apostles was an extraordinary thing, and he who did it must have been a man of no common authority.

A great deal more might be said on the present objection, but this is enough.

267. II. I have spoken only of the *supremacy* of St. Peter. As to his *Infallibility*, it does not enter into the present inquiry: but I shall make two brief observations on the present text in reference thereto.

1°. St. Peter's mistake* was in a mere question of *expediency*, whether such or such a line of conduct would be more conducive to the interests of religion. The whole case will be found pretty clearly in the Epistle itself, and more fully explained in the ordinary commentators. There was no question of doctrine at all.

2°. St. Peter was infallible in his public teaching; and this is all the infallibility which the ultramontane divines have ever claimed for St. Peter's successors.†

* Some theologians hold that Peter did not sin, that his fault was purely *material*; others hold that he sinned venially.

† I have answered on the supposition that the Kephas or Peter mentioned in the text from which the present objection is drawn, was the

OBJECTION XLVII.

268. "When they had seen that to me was committed the gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision: For he who wrought in Peter to the Apostleship of the circumcision, wrought in me also among the gentiles"—*Galat.*, ii. 7.

On this text Dr. Barrow says (*p.* 80): "The which words do clearly enough signify that he took himself, and that the other Apostles took him to have, under Christ, an absolute charge, subordinate to no man, over the gentiles: whence he claimeth to himself, as his burden, *the care of all the churches*—II. *Corinth.*, xi. 28".

ANSWER.

269. I. In the division of the Apostolic labours, St. Paul received a special charge of the gentiles, as St. Peter had of the Jews. But where did Dr. Barrow find that St. Paul's charge was absolute and subordinate to no man? This is no

Apostle Peter. This however has been denied by many able writers. See dissertations on the subject in COLLET, *Theolog. Moral. de Legibus*, c. 4, Sect. 9, Punct. 4; NEUBAUER, *Theolog. Wirceburgensis. de Legib.*, c. 2. Art. 4 (vol. iii. *pag.* 258, etc. *Edit.* 1852).

where asserted or insinuated: the contrary we have proved in proving the Primacy of St. Peter.

A number of men may be appointed to rule over different districts, each over some particular district. It does not follow that they are thereby sovereign rulers therein.

II. If St. Paul had the absolute, independent, sovereign care—charge of authority over—all the gentile churches, then St. Peter, by a similar appointment, had the absolute, independent charge of all the Jewish churches: and therefore St. Paul could not have had the same charge over *all* churches.

In truth what St. Paul says of himself, might be said of every other Apostle, though in different degrees, that he had the care, solicitude of (*μεριμνα*) all churches; that his zeal and anxiety for the conversion and salvation of men, embraced the whole earth. There is nothing in this inconsistent with the supremacy of St. Peter (see *n.* 214, *Thirdly*).

Many commentators, Protestant as well as Catholic, take “all churches”, to mean all the churches of the gentiles, at least all churches founded by St. Paul. It is quite immaterial to the objection what meaning be adopted.

OBJECTION XLVIII.

270. "Upon the same grounds, on which a supremacy of power is claimed to St. Peter, other Apostles might also challenge a superiority therein over their brethren: but to suppose such a difference of power among the rest is absonous: and therefore the grounds are not valid upon which St. Peter's supremacy is built.

"I instance in St. James and St. John, who upon the same probabilities had (after St. Peter) a preference to the other Apostles. For to them our Saviour declared a special regard; to them the Apostles afterwards may seem to have yielded a particular deference; they, in merit and performances, seem to have surpassed; they (after St. Peter and his brother) were first called to the Apostolical office; they, as St. Peter, were by our Lord new christened, as it were, and nominated *Boanerges*, by a name signifying the efficacy of their endeavour in their Master's service", etc., etc.
—BARROW, p. 81.

ANSWER.

271. I. *Not upon the same grounds.* For Peter alone (as we have proved) was made the sovereign

ruler and pastor of the whole Church. Whatever difference there may have been between the other Apostles, as to their personal merits, the places they occupied in our Lord's affection, the special favours he may have conferred on them, etc., there is no evidence of a difference of authority, at least no one among them received the sovereign authority conferred on Peter.

II. As to the title *Boanerges*, it was a *title*, not a *proper name*, by which they were afterwards to be called; for they were never afterwards so designated in Scripture; besides that it was a title given to *both* James and John. Whereas Simon received the name of Peter: his name was changed into Peter or Simon Peter: and so he was afterwards called as by his proper name.

OBJECTION XLIX.*

272. The text from *John*, xxi., no more proves the supremacy of St. Peter, than it proves that "heretics, though princes, are to be put to death by authority derived from Peter, because *feeding the flock* implies a power of killing wolves"—DODDRIDGE.

* The following objections should have been inserted earlier.

ANSWER.

273. I. The authority conferred on Peter was a *spiritual*, not a temporal or *civil* authority. Our Lord answered to Pilate, "My kingdom is not of *this world*. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would certainly strive that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now my kingdom is not *from hence*. Pilate therefore said to him. Art thou a king then? Jesus answered: Thou sayest that I am a king. For this was I born, and for this came I into this world, *that I should give testimony to the truth*. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice"—*John*, xviii. 36, etc. See also *II. Corinth.*, x. 4; etc., etc. The divine authority of the Church is to be exercised, not by inflicting temporal punishments, but by inflicting spiritual punishments, where these are necessary for the correction of individuals or the protection of the body. Christ appointed Peter ruler over his kingdom on earth, a spiritual, not a civil, ruler over a kingdom purely spiritual. That Peter was appointed chief ruler over the Church, by the words in the text of *John*, xxi., we have already proved. That all authority, supreme or subordinate, communicated by Christ in his Church, was of a spiritual, not of a

temporal kind, is admitted by our opponents, and proved from the whole tenor and spirit of the New Testament.

II. The text sufficiently explains itself. Peter was to be to the Church, not a shepherd, in the common and most literal sense of the word, but *as* a shepherd (see *n.* 182, *note*). Peter was to feed, not with carnal food, not with food for the body, but with spiritual food. Peter's office was that of a spiritual pastor.

III. It is hardly worth while to add in further reply to this objection, that it would prove a great deal too much. It cannot be denied that the pastoral office was established in the Church. It cannot be denied, that this office implied authority in each pastor over the faithful committed to his charge, like that which a shepherd exercises over his flock. Therefore each Bishop is empowered to put to death every one who attempts to seduce the faithful of his diocese from the right path!

OBJECTION L.

274. "Nor does the Apostle Peter—though writing his second Epistle in the near prospect of death (*II. Pet.*, i. 14, 15), and anxious to provide a record of his teaching that might last after his

decease—say a word to the disciples of the duty of submitting to his successors; but refers them back for guidance to the words of the holy prophets, and to his own letters (*ibid.*, i.), and to those of Paul (15, 16)"—*Cautions for the Times*, No. 2.

ANSWER.

275. I. The principle of this argument is exactly the same as that advanced by Dr. Whately against the Infallibility of the Church; and the principle of our reply to that argument in the preceding volume applies directly to the present objection.*

II. Supposing that no Primatial office had been established, the Episcopal office, or at least some form of permanent pastorship, was established, as our opponents on the present question would all, I suppose, maintain, and as has been sufficiently

* I have been informed that Dr. Whately, though not the sole author of the little pamphlets which have been issued under the above title, is a large contributor to them. Several of the papers (among which are those from which the present objections are taken) bear, in parts or throughout, unmistakable marks of his peculiar style and system and turn of thought. But there is a great deal in them, especially as the numbers advance, worthy only of the low canting creatures who haunt the environs of the "Priests' Protection Society".

proved (*n.* 67—69). The present objection, however, would tell as strongly against the institution of such office as against that of the Primacy. For St. Peter does not “say a word to the disciples of the duty of submitting” to the successors of the Apostles, Bishops, Elders, Superintendents, or whatever else they may be called; “but refers them back for guidance to the words of the holy prophets”, etc.

If it be said that there was no necessity for referring them to any such pastoral “guidance”, then there was as little necessity for referring them to the guidance of Peter’s successors. And this is just what I would say. See the Reply to Dr. Whately’s Argument, *vol.* III., *p.* 34, etc. But

III. All this kind of purely negative reasoning is merely cutting figures in the air: it is like flourishing some shadowy weapon, at a far-off distance, against a man who is reposing beyond its reach in an impregnable fortress. Make up to the fortress, try *that*; try the arguments from the text of the three Evangelists. Destroy these, if you can: until you have done so, all other attacks on the field of Scripture are mere waste of strength. See *n.* 242, 257.

OBJECTION LI.

276 “In the beginning of the Revelation of John, too, you will find the Lord addressing *each* of the seven Churches of Asia [*sic*] as severally independent of any earthly central power, and responsible to Him alone for their conduct as Christian Churches”. *Cautions, etc., ibid.*

ANSWER.

277. I. I distinctly and flatly deny that the seven churches are addressed, either together or severally, “*as* independent of any earthly central power”. There is not one word from beginning to end about their independence, or dependence on such power: there is no allusion, however obscure or remote, thereto: the idea of independence on any power, central or other, is not even glanced at.

It may be said, that I fasten too much on the phrase “*as* independent”; and that it was only intended to state, in the objection, that the *dependence* of the seven Churches on a central power was not mentioned or alluded to, was, as we might say, silently ignored in our Lord’s address.

To this I rejoin, 1^o. that I take the objector to be a writer of plain English, and to have used his words in the plain and proper sense of them. Now when we say that a man is addressed *as* such or such, we are at once understood to signify that the quality, or character, or relation, under which the individual is addressed, is in some way intimated by the speaker; that it appears from the express terms of the address, or from its form, or from some known circumstances, or from the declaration of the speaker himself, or of some one else who knows his mind. If there be no intimation of any kind that the person is addressed *as* such or such, how do I know, how can I assert, that he is so addressed? Thus if a man tells me that a certain speaker addressed his audience as Christians, or as mere rational men, as learned or unlearned, as men easy to move, or men hard to move, as Protestants or Catholics, as men “independent of any earthly central power” in religion, or as men acknowledging dependence on such power; I at once conclude, that my informant, supposing him to speak the truth, has learned this from the assertion of the speaker, from the drift of the discourse, or from some other source whence such information might be gleaned. If, *e. g.* he tells me that they

were addressed as unlearned men, it would never come into my head to understand him as merely meaning that their learning was not spoken of or alluded to; that there was no allusion at all to their being learned or unlearned. So if he tells me that they were addressed as Protestants, I would not understand him as merely meaning to say that the speaker said or intimated nothing about purgatory, or the Real Presence, or the seven Sacraments. So when I am told, that the Churches of Asia were addressed, "as independent of any earthly central power", I would never understand this as barely meaning that there was no allusion to their dependence—or independence either!

2^o. If then the objection only means that there is no mention or allusion to their dependence on a central power, what follows? *Therefore* they were not dependent; there was no such central power! There was no mention of Baptism, of the Eucharist, of many other divine doctrines and institutions: *therefore* such doctrines were not revealed, such institutions were not established! See *n.* 242, 257.

But, you will urge, the institution of Baptism and the Eucharist is already revealed in other parts of the word of God.

Exactly so. In like manner, I say that the Primacy of St. Peter was already revealed in Scripture, and that of his successors at least proved therefrom.

II. But it may be added, and, in order that the objection might have even the least semblance of weight, *should* be added, that if the seven Churches had been dependent on a central authority, this would have been intimated in our Lord's address.

I answer, as I have answered to similar statements in previous objections, that the assertion is unproved, and cannot be proved. No reason is given, and I am sure no reason can be given, why our Lord would have alluded to the central power on the supposition that such existed.

I go farther and say, that all the *positive* probabilities, all the positive evidence we can now have from the bare text of our Lord's address, are decidedly against such a conclusion. Our Blessed Saviour, in his infinite mercy, condescends to address from his own lips, through his beloved disciple, certain commendations, reproofs, commands, and exhortations to the Bishops of the seven Churches, according to their respective merits and wants. He says what is sufficient for the object in view: one word from him should be sufficient to rekindle

zeal where wanting, to augment it where existing. It is the All-wise God, who, from his own mouth instructs his Bishops for their own sanctification and that of the people. Only think of the idea of referring from God's own direct and immediate guidance and instruction, to those of Pope or Apostle! What could the Pope or the whole college of Apostles have done for them more than what Jesus Christ did? They had the whole revelation, the whole law of God already, as communicated to the twelve: he came specially to admonish and console them in reference to the discharge of their personal and Episcopal duties. What more could man, what more could God, in his ordinary providence, have done for them?

III. I suppose it would be held, at least particularly by those who deny the primacy of Peter, that the Apostle John himself was a competent authority to refer to. If any reference were needed, he—especially in the hypothesis of our opponents, that no primacy was instituted—would have been the person pointed out, and above all at the time of the writing of the Apocalypse, when all the other Apostles had gone to their eternal rest. Surely no one could have been more fit than he to guide, to instruct, to settle controversies, to do any

thing for which reference to authority would be supposed necessary or useful. Yet no reference is made to him.

OBJECTION LII.

278. "Peter, indeed, is so far from being described, in the Acts of the Apostles, as *sending* the other Apostles where he would, that we read of their *sending him*, along with John, to confirm the Church in Samaria"—*Cautions*, etc., N. 3, p. 31.

ANSWER.

279. This objection has been already answered incidentally (n. 242). All the other objections crowded into the same page (31) of the *Cautions*, have been fully examined and answered in the preceding pages of this essay.

I would not have thought of noticing this little series but that, besides its having been highly praised by most respectable Protestant judges, a Catholic gentleman recently directed my attention to it as a smart and rather dangerous publication. I do not think that the stability of the Chair of Peter is much perilled by arguments like the foregoing. After a string of objections (chiefly

directed against our doctrine on the Unity of the Church), ending with the two given above (*n.* 274, 276), the writer concludes with the following sentence.

“On the whole, then, there is not only no evidence in the New Testament *for* any such central authority, but very strong evidence *against* its being, in any sense, *essential* to the Church”—*Cautions*, *N.* 2, *p.* 21.

The writer, in the previous part of the Number not only does not attempt to refute our arguments, but does not even allude to them. In the next Number (*p.* 31), he resumes the subject, and gives a string of old, oft-refuted objections against the Supremacy of St. Peter (every one of which I have fully stated and answered in the preceding pages), but takes not the slightest notice of our direct proofs, except by adding, at the conclusion, and *in a note*, the following off-hand remark—

“As for our Lord’s promise to Peter, ‘upon this *Rock* I will build my Church’, it is plain [PLAIN!] that the same privilege was afterwards conferred on *all* the Apostles; who are spoken of as, together with Christ, ‘the corner stone’, the *foundation* of the Church. *Ephes.*, ii. 20, compare *Rev.*, xxi. 14. And the promise, ‘Whatsoever thou shalt

bind on earth', etc.—*Matth.*, xvi. 19, is afterwards made to *all* the Apostles—*Matth.*, xviii. 18".

To the reader of the preceding pages it is unnecessary to make any comment on this.

Here we, for the present close this part of our argument.

Equivocation and Mental Reservation:

THEIR LAWFULNESS CONSIDERED.

Equivocation

AND MENTAL RESERVATION.

AMONG the many odious charges brought against the moral character of the theological system of the Jesuits, and more recently against the theological teaching of Maynooth, and as commonly against the approved teaching of the Church in general, few have been urged with more triumph and pertinacity than that of sanctioning the practice of unreserved equivocation and mental reservation.* Indeed, so far as the Jesuits are concerned, the very name of the order itself has been, in our language, identified with fraud of speech and action. You have it in the Dictionary†—"JESUITISM: cunning, deceit, hypocrisy, prevarication,

* "The offences of their [the Jesuits'] casuistry, as charged by their adversaries, are very multifarious. One of the most celebrated is the doctrine of equivocation; the innocence of saying that which is true in the sense meant by the speaker, though he is aware that it will be otherwise understood"—HALLAM, *Literature of Europe*, part 3, chap. 4, n. 13 (vol. 2, page 501, 3d edition).

† Webster's Dictionary, London edit. 1848.

deceptive practices to effect a purpose".* The casuistical aspect, if I may so call it, of the subject is one which it is, perhaps, more difficult to put in a clear and satisfactory light before the mind of a Protestant, especially a fanatical Protestant, reader than any other of the numerous horrors that haunt the unquiet pillows of Spooner and Newdegate, or dance in rapid and distorted whirl through the Apocalyptic brain of Dr. Cumming, or swell the chorus of religious frenzy in Exeter Hall. If an impartial and philosophic examination of this topic leads to the conclusion that, after all, the common doctrine of Catholic theologians is nothing else than common sense and plain reason, it is not too much to claim a presumption in respect of the

* In the number of the *Quarterly Review* for last June (page 67), it is stated not only that the late Archbishop Murray "avowedly introduced Jesuit influence into Maynooth", but that "Roche Arnaud professes to have seen (him) received as a Jesuit at Monte-Rouge"—the reviewer apparently accepting the testimony. It is astonishing how things come to light. The celebrated Count Blabber, in his *Memoirs of Distinguished Proserers* (vol. 10, page 666), states that he was present with others, several years ago, when Wilson Croker took the solemn vows at the Jesuit College of Stonehurst, and has since frequently seen him perform the annual exercises of Ignatius, in the Jesuit costume, within the same mysterious precincts. Of course, what a man of Blabber's established historical fame states so circumstantially, must be true.

other topics, that they too, investigated in a similar manner, would lead to a similar conclusion.

All those absurd, and too often pernicious, reports of Catholic teaching; those monstrous—to the eye of a Catholic theologian *such* monstrous—caricatures of our moral system, where they are not the offspring of malice prepense and conscious fraud, originate in ignorance of the principles, the system, the very language, the commonest technical terms of our theology, frequently, I believe, in gross and, if the matter were not in its practical bearings so serious, ludicrously gross incapacity of understanding those things.

It is by no means an easy task always to comprehend accurately the doctrines of a religious creed different from our own, their meaning and their connexion. This difficulty arises from many causes. Religious convictions, when they possess a firm hold on the mind, sway it permanently and most strongly in one direction: they imbue it with feelings, in that direction, of the most decided and exclusive character. The man who believes, without any doubt, that his own faith is true, that all forms of religion opposed to it are false, and that to desert it for any of them would be in him highly criminal—such a man wants the impulse of curiosity

that prompts us to inquiries which we expect to end in the discovery of truth. He is sure that he can find nothing but error, unprofitable error, knowledge not only false, but forbidden and unholy. Some special reason is necessary to excite, perhaps to justify him, in entering on such inquiry at all. If he be a professor of polemical theology, or if he be engaged in religious controversy and have a due regard for the interests of his cause as well as for his own character, it is his duty to understand accurately the meaning of the doctrines he undertakes to refute. But even with such persons, the great essential point is to establish their own creed by direct and positive proof, and to show it unsailable, by answering the objections of opposite religionists, not caring to inquire farther into their positive system of belief. With most men the feeling is one of simple repose in their own religion, without a thought regarding any other, beyond that of indifference, or contempt, or aversion, or—if they be men in whose breasts pure charity predominates—of commiseration for the sad condition of those whom they believe to be sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.

Again, there is the *intellectual* difficulty, like that which one experiences in studying a new

language, whose structure is entirely different from that of any already known to the learner; or of mastering some new and intricate theory entirely opposed to our previous convictions, in political, moral, metaphysical, or any other science. This difficulty is, from obvious causes, much greater in the matter of religion.

But it is unnecessary to speculate farther on the reason of the thing: the fact itself being clear enough to all who have turned their attention to the consideration of the subject.

Now it might be, at first sight, supposed that Catholics would have a greater difficulty in understanding the Protestant theology than Protestants in understanding ours. For the faith of Catholics is more fixed, exclusive, theologically intolerant,*

* The distinction between *theological* and *political* intolerance is laid down by our most approved theologians. Theological intolerance regards the doctrine, political intolerance regards the person. A man is theologically tolerant who holds that all religions, or any number of religions are or may be equally true; that a man is equally safe in one Church as in another; that he may, without sin, conform to the Catholic religion in Italy, to that of the Established Church in England, to the Presbyterian in Scotland: theological toleration consists in holding these or similar latitudinarian opinions. A man is politically tolerant who does not resort to, or approve of resorting to, temporal penalties for the purpose of

shrinking with infinite horror from the very idea of departing one hair's breadth from the defined teaching of the Church. The faith of Protestants—I all along contemplate educated and thinking men—is more accommodating, admits the possibility of error even in the whole Church, and consequently the possible necessity of a universal doctrinal reformation, maintains the right of individuals to examine and test the public teaching of the Church by the standard of Scripture, that is, by their own view of the meaning of Scripture. This principle of Protestantism, I need hardly add, is not professed in the same extent by all the different schools of that religion. The High Church theories, however, which held so proud and apparently so strong a position in England some years ago, seem at present to have very much “fallen from their high estate”. Of the two systems it might be supposed that the Catholic would of its own nature tend to shut up and stiffen the mind, to weaken its powers of adaptation not only in accepting (which confessedly is the case), but in understanding

punishing those who hold erroneous doctrine. A man may be at once theologically intolerant and politically tolerant, both in the very extreme. The most odious species of intolerance is the political in those who are at the same time theologically tolerant.

another creed, to render it less fit for the accurate conception of ideas foreign and opposed to its own consecrated and only true faith. The Protestant system would seem to encourage the opposite tendency, to exercise the mind in the investigation, and consequently in the clearer understanding, of the most varied and conflicting theories, to accustom individual reason to cast its light with equal scrutiny and fulness on every subject. Such are the conclusions which a superficial consideration of the distinctive characters of Catholicism and Protestantism respectively might not unnaturally lead to. Nothing however can be farther from the truth.

In the course of my study of Catholic and Protestant controversialists, I have, from the beginning, noticed two facts, which the gradual extension of my reading only served to establish, day after day, more clearly.

First, I have observed that Protestant controversialists rarely bring against any of our respectable theologians the charge of misrepresenting Protestant *doctrines*. That historical facts are misrepresented by our writers, theologians and others, *e. g.* by Baronius, Lingard, etc., is a charge that has been constantly preferred. That the arguments of Protestant divines have been unfairly

stated; that we reason unfairly against them from their own principles; that we draw conclusions from their doctrine, which are not held by them, and are not justly deducible from the doctrine, all this is, from time to time, asserted. But we are not generally accused of so treating the doctrine itself. Upon the whole, Bellarmine has fairly represented the doctrine of Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, and the other early reformers whose names are introduced into his writings. The same is true of Bossuet, a century afterwards.* In our own day the theories of the Oxford divines—to say nothing of the able series of articles on the High Church claims, which appeared some years ago, from the pen of Cardinal Wiseman, in the pages of the *Dublin Review*—are as correctly stated by Perrone,† as was possible for a foreigner not well acquainted

* See SIR W. HAMILTON's *Essays*, p. 492, etc.

† He has been charged with not understanding the systems of the modern German rationalists. That the accusation is not altogether unfounded is by no means improbable. Of the system of one of the leading names among those Teutonic sages, the eminent scholar quoted in the preceding note thus speaks—A true genuine scholar Sir William is, no doubt of it, but perhaps, now and then, a little too smashing and *Boythorn*-ish for a transeendental philosopher, an Aristotle revived in the cold regions of the North.

“ I have never, in fact, met with a Hegelian (and I have known

with our language, and writing amid the very ferment of the controversy, while the new ideas were undergoing continual change in the hands of their chief propounders, and while any thing in the shape of an authentic confession of faith, resting on the *consensus* of the leaders, was so very difficult to be got at by persons living on the scene of the controversy.

Of course when I speak of Catholic theologians, I mean *theologians* properly so called, and these too men of character with us; not of the rabble of polemics who infest the lower regions of theological literature, buzzing and fretting and teasing for their little noisy hour, and then rotting into the general mass of dead reputations.

The second fact I have observed is, that Protestant divines are constantly accused, by our writers, of misrepresenting our doctrines — and

several of distinguished talents, both German and British), who could answer three questions, without being driven to the confession, that they did not, as yet, fully *comprehend* the doctrine of their master, though *believing* it to be all true.... Hegel himself, not long before his death, made the following declaration: 'I am downcast about my philosophy. For of all my disciples one only understands it; and he does not'. The one disciple, I presume, was Gabler; but did Hegel understand himself?" — SIR W. HAMILTON, *ibid.*, p. 696.

often justly accused. The agitation which has been convulsing all England for the last two years, furnishes several striking examples of this. I do not now allude to the vulgar and insane declamations of fanatical orators and pamphleteers, but to the productions of some of the most distinguished Protestant theological writers of the present day. For example, I have seen it stated, in one of these, that we are not agreed among ourselves as to whether the Infallibility which we claim for the Church, resides in the Pope alone, or in the Bishops, dispersed or in general council assembled, or in both Pope and Bishops. The statement, it is true, has not been recently advanced for the first time: it used to be a standard objection in old times; but I had thought it long since silently dropped from all decent controversy, like the forgotten (are they altogether forgotten?) charges that we hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, that it is lawful to assassinate an heretical prince, etc., etc. Any one who looks into one of our common treatises on the Church will see, what is notorious to the merest tyro in theology, that, while the Ultramontanes hold the Infallibility of the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*, and the old Gallican school denied this; both agreed that neither opinion was

defined as of faith by the Church, and both agreed, and *all* Catholics agree, in holding, not as a debateable or free opinion, but as an article of faith, in the strictest sense of the word, that the Pope *and* the Bishops, whether represented in General Council or dispersed, are infallible in defining any doctrine for the Church, are *the* infallible body with whom Christ promised to abide all days to the end of the world. I could multiply examples with specific references to distinguished Protestant divines; but the topic is an unpleasant one, and enough has been said upon it.

I do not believe that writers of the class referred to, misrepresent our doctrines knowingly. Men even of a low moral sense, however mistaken and however culpable in their error, would hardly descend to such a depth of guilt, and so lie on so momentous a subject. I do not hold *all* those writers as entirely blameless, free from the imputation of rashness in not having instituted previous inquiries: but I hold them guiltless of formal conscious mendacity. Without recurring to a supposition so hateful and so improbable, I see sufficient evidences of the true causes of their misconceptions and misrepresentations. Passing over the influences of early education, of sentiments

imbibed with the mother's milk, and the nurse's prattle, of companions, of books in prose and verse, of prejudices whencesoever derived, that have once taken root in the mind; passing over the influences for good or for evil, common to the whole human race, to all times, and places, and persons; there are in the matter before us, certain peculiar sources of error, and among those too which more immediately influence the understanding itself: of these the following, adverted to above in passing, are some and the principal too.

The first cause of the liability of Protestants to misstate our doctrine, is their want of acquaintance with our theologians. I have been often surprised that able Protestant divines, men who are or have been professors of theology, or who devote their lives to the study of it, who write extensively and thoughtfully on the great questions disputed between the Churches, show so little knowledge of our great theological writers. A few of the old English Protestant divines certainly looked into some of them, Bellarmine especially; but of these few only a small proportion seem to have been familiar with his principal work. They did not study our writers, did not enter fully into their views and arguments; rather contented themselves with hunt-

ing out passages to suit a present purpose; appear not to have put before their minds the importance of investigating and grasping the whole of our theological system. This might be perhaps too much to expect, considering the amount of labour and time required for such a business, and the peculiar difficulties, to which we will immediately advert, encountered at the very commencement. But for the last hundred years and upwards, even slight incursions, such as used to be formerly made into the domains of our theology, seem to be entirely given up. The Oxford divines themselves, of whom it might be expected that their onward course would have led them in that direction, are very much like the rest. Mr. Palmer would, at first sight, appear to be an exception, and, to some small extent, he really is so. He has taken nearly all the form and a great deal of the matter of his volumes on the Church from our Treatises on that subject, moulding what he borrowed into the shape best suited to his purpose: but beyond this he has ventured very little. Among the Low Church writers—if it be not, as I fear it is, very presumptuous in me to offer an opinion on such a matter.—Dr. Whately and the late Dr. Arnold would seem to be the ablest; clear, consistent, argumentative,

fully understanding and maturing their own fixed theories. There is not a trace in the writings of either, especially of the former, that would indicate any acquaintance with our standard theologians. The same is substantially true of other distinguished writers of that party, Dr. Hinds, the amiable Protestant Bishop of Norwich,* Dr. Hawkins, Provost of Oriel College,† Dr. Shuttleworth, Warden of New College,‡ Mr. Powel, Savilian Professor of Geometry, Oxford,§ etc., etc. What surprises me is that men of their kind, acute, inquisitive, “with wealth to spend and power to range”, never thought of reading through, as a regular study, some at least of the treatises of such writers as Suarez, those namely that bear more or less on the controversies which engage their own minds and pens, for example, his treatise *de Fide*, his work *Contra Regem Angliæ*, or still more, perhaps, our larger commentaries on the Scripture, such as those

* An Inquiry into the Proofs, Nature, and Extent of Inspiration. and into the Authority of Scripture, *Oxford*, 1831. Scripture and the Authorized Version of Scripture, *London*, 1845, etc., etc.

† Sermons on the Church, *London*, 1847, etc.

‡ Not Tradition, but Scripture, 3rd Edit., *London*, 1839.

§ Tradition Unveiled, *London*, 1839. Supplement to Tradition Unveiled, *ibid.*, 1840.

of Cornelius à Lapide and Estius. It is true, they would meet a great deal of what, in their eyes, would be but mere rubbish, and much of what, in the eyes of all, would be now antiquated or irrelevant: but mixed with this they would find huge masses of deep thought and solid reasoning, such as writers of this class get little credit for possessing from those unacquainted with their works.

The second cause is the difficulty of understanding our more voluminous and recondite theologians. Even to a Catholic student, unacquainted or but slightly acquainted with theology, the difficulty is often very great; and, if he be not a person of considerable acuteness and under the guidance of a master, sometimes insuperable. The constant recurrence of the technical phraseology of the schools; the mixing up of endless speculations with the defined dogma—which, though all confusion to the untutored, is by the practised theologian disentangled, put in order with the greatest ease—the exhaustive process to which the writer subjects his topics, pursuing every principle and doctrine through all its consequences, from the light of clearer evidence to the remotest glimmer of probability and verisimilitude; the subtle distinc-

tions; the shadowy conceptions—shadowy as a spirit's form, but as real, and to the spiritualized eye clear; the discourse of things that lie so far away beyond the ordinary range of human thought, these and other characteristics of the works of our greater divines render the study of them extremely difficult, perhaps repulsive and disheartening, to a mind not well prepared for the task. In our Ecclesiastical Colleges, with their system of daily professorial instruction and severe application, a young man of fair talents, after passing with suitable diligence through the ordinary theological course of three or four years, only feels himself, at the end, in a position to commence the study of the voluminous theologians with hope of profit. Very competent professors have declared that it is only after some years of practice in teaching (by far the best way of learning), they find themselves quite at ease in prosecuting this kind of work.* There are peculiar difficulties in the way of Protestants. There is no such thing as a *Theological science* among them in these countries. Their College divinity curriculum is of the most meagre description:† odds and ends of ecclesiastical history;

* See note at the end of this article.

† "The absence of any efficient course of theological training at

isolated points of controversy, *dicta* of old English divines, unconnected notices of particular opinions or theories—what is the doctrine of Hooker, or Bramhal on such a point? How is such an argument of Bellarmine, or Bossuet, or Delahogue refuted? etc., etc. It is all throwing up new ramparts, or mending breaches in the old—the treasure they are constructed for the purpose of protecting (if treasure they contain) left to rust and moulder in neglect. There is no sustained and searching investigation of God's revelation consi-

the Universities, which profess to feed the ministry of our Church, is a crying evil, which nothing but the acquiescence in anomalies, characteristic of the people of this country, could have suffered to remain. It is not too much to say, that there is no country of Europe, Protestant or Romanist, in which so anomalous a state of things exists; every Church, Lutheran, Reformed, or Romish, but our own, provides that her ministers shall undergo two or three years of theological study and preparation before they enter upon their office"—*Oxford University Commission*, 1852, Evidence of the Rev. E. A. Litton, M.A., *page 177*.

This gentleman is the author of a work published in 1851, under the title of "The Church of Christ, in its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry: with a particular reference to the controversy on the subject between Romanists and Protestants". I should have named him as among those who show some acquaintance with some of our theologians. His views I will have occasion to notice in a future work, at some future day.

dered in itself and its bearings; no digging into the golden mine of God's word; no continuous application of philosophy to religion, showing the evolution of truth from truth, their connexion and harmony.*

The third cause is in certain influences of the Protestant idea of faith, as distinguished from those of the Catholic, on the respective believers. It would be too long to explain this fully here: it may be touched on briefly and indirectly in the opposite picture which I am now going to draw.

I all along speak only of the difficulty of understanding our *theology*, not of understanding the plain general articles of faith as given in our common catechisms. Some of these too have been often enough misrepresented, but not from the difficulty of understanding them.

The condition of the Catholic theological student, in reference to Protestant theology, is widely different from that of the Protestant student in reference to our theology.

In the first place, the Protestant divinity is quite

* Dr. Hampden and all of his school would perhaps consider this as the highest praise of the Protestant theology. I beg to say that I am not now criticising any system, praising or blaming, but only stating a fact to account for another fact.

easy reading to us. There is in it infinitely less of technical phraseology, of subtle disquisitions, and of the other characteristics of Catholic theology, noticed above. The matter, in itself more level to the comprehension of ordinary readers, is clothed in a plainer and more popular form.

In the second place, the peculiar training of the Catholic theological student contributes most powerfully to fit him for profound and careful investigations into every doctrinal theory, whether Catholic or not, and of forming clear and distinct ideas about it. To take as an example, the system of theological study and instruction pursued in our own College of Maynooth. Every student, before entering on his theological course, is obliged to spend one year in the study of Logic and Metaphysics: during which period he is taught the principles of reasoning and the art of disputation, and thoroughly exercised therein. The mysteries of syllogism and every thing connected with it are evolved with a degree of fulness and precision, that would astonish an Oxford professor, and satisfy Sir William Hamilton himself. The ordinary theological course, Dogmatic and Moral, extends over four years. The treatises used, whether as mere text books, or as books of constant reference, are

composed on the strictest philosophical principles of which the subject is capable, both as to the arrangement of the several divisions of the treatise and the way in which the matter is put before the reader's mind. The doctrine is stated in distinct propositions, and, where necessary, explained and illustrated in preliminary remarks. The opposite errors of ancient and modern sectaries are also stated and explained, and, in the larger treatises, generally with references to the works of the author of the error, or of some other trustworthy witness. Great importance is always attached to the full and accurate "Statement of the Question". Next follows the proof, which commonly consists of a number of arguments, independent or mutually sustaining each other, as the case may be, arranged under the two great heads of Scripture and Tradition. Lastly come the objections with answers appended to each; the former consisting of the arguments of opponents in favour of their own doctrine, and their arguments against our doctrine, or against the proofs brought by us in support of it. I say nothing now of what are called scholastic questions, which occupy so large a space in the more extensive theological courses. These are questions not settled by the Church, not belonging to

the deposite of defined doctrine, left to the schools (whence they are called *scholastic*), to be discussed and ventilated there. Some of these questions help to throw great light on the defined doctrine, others of them are interesting in other respects, some indeed idle enough. In some of them conclusions are arrived at with more or less probability: in others inquiry ends in mere conjecture and doubt—reason is unable to explore so far, and revelation is silent even to suggest. From discussions of this sort we learn at least the limits of our knowledge; and the humble and devout mind will be warmed into a holy desire for a fuller knowledge of heavenly truth, and for the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision wherein it will be seen.

“What hope for answer or redress?
Behind the veil, beyond the veil”.

There happens to be a very good illustration of what we understand by scholastic questions, in the portions of the Treatise on the Incarnation of our Blessed Lord, on which I happen to be just now lecturing—that portion, namely, which treats of the Satisfaction or, as it is more commonly called in our language, the Atonement of the Cross. We have the broad and fundamental doctrine of the real and

full atonement of Jesus Christ explained, and proved at great length from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and from the testimony of the Fathers, and defended against the objections of Socinians (its principal impugnors) and others. Around this central question are grouped a number of others, some highly interesting in themselves, some important, and some in a manner necessary for the full exposition of the Catholic doctrine. One of the questions of the first class, that is, of those that are simply interesting, is, whether the Incarnation would have taken place if Adam had not sinned? a question which the Church has left entirely free, and on which accordingly theologians are divided. As to the utility of such discussions for any other purpose beside the one now immediately under consideration—that of forming the mind to close and accurate theological investigations—this is a point which I cannot be expected to discuss here.

The constant professorial lectures and expositions, and the constant examination of the students in the matter of their immediate study, form another portion of our system, which contributes most powerfully to instruct and sharpen and train the mind. The theological students, numbering between two

hundred and fifty and three hundred, are divided into four classes, with a professor over each. The class which commences its theological course this year passes into new matter and under a new professor next year, and so on to the end. Each professor goes through a new portion of the course each year until the end of the four years' curriculum, when he recommences as four years before. Thus the students have, in the variety of their instructors, the advantage of the different methods and views of different minds.

The mode of instruction is a mixture of lecture and examination. In the earlier stage of the course, the professor generally explains beforehand and at length, the more difficult questions, or those which are not treated with sufficient fulness in the text book or other accessible works—almost always however confining himself to the exposition of preliminaries and of the proof, and leaving the objections, for the present, to exercise the sagacity of the student. He then interrogates the students, one or two at each succeeding class, until the whole body is gone through—no order being observed among them, and therefore no student knowing who may be thus questioned. The student thus interrogated is required to explain, if necessary, the state

of the question, then to deliver his proof of the given proposition, and finally to reply to the objections proposed by the professor, which are often put in difficult form, and urged at great length. In the answers to objections the professor generally throws in some observations of his own; and if the objection be one of moment or difficulty or not well answered by the person interrogated, he goes through the whole answer himself, and evolves, enforces, and illustrates at such length as he thinks the importance of the subject or the capacity of some of his hearers may require. As the course advances the previous formal lecture becomes rarer, the students growing more and more able, from increasing knowledge, as well as increasing familiarity with theological study, to work for themselves: but the running remarks and explanations concurrent with the daily examinations are kept up to the end.

In the three last years of the course, there are eight hours devoted each week to these exercises; namely, two on Monday, on Tuesday, and on Thursday; one on Friday and on Saturday—the students of this period attending the lectures and interrogations of the Professor of Scripture for one

hour on Wednesday and one on Saturday. In the first year of the course there is an additional hour for theology on Friday, and the students of this year attend the class of Ecclesiastical History on Wednesday and Saturday.

This system continues from the opening of business in the second week of September, until within a few days of Christmas. A public oral examination of all the theological students commences in the first week of January, when each student is required to answer in any part of the business of the preceding academical half-year which the examining professor may think fit to propose. Beside the professor of the class, there are always some others assisting at these public examinations. Classes are reopened at the end of January, and, with the exception of a few vacant days, about one vacant week at Easter, and the same at Pentecost (during which latter the public ordinations are held), the work is carried on to the second half-yearly examination, which is conducted like the previous one, and terminates some time in June. There is then an examination in writing of the more distinguished students of each class. The professor, on a review of these written composi-

tions, of the two half-yearly examinations, and of the daily routine examinations, adjudges the several prizes, which are distributed at the end of June.

In this way the course of Dogmatic Theology is gone through. The same method is pursued in reference to Moral Theology (which generally occupies the second half, or a great portion of the second half, of each academical year)—the only diversity being what the different nature of the subject requires.

There is another feature in our theological system, which, joined with the conditions required for Catholic faith, subjective and objective, creates additional facilities for apprehending forms of doctrine differing from our own. The Catholic doctrine is distinct and fixed. No shade of error can melt into it: whatever is at variance with it, however remotely or indirectly, is carefully distinguished from it, disjoined from it, set in the true attitude of opposition to it. The theological student is thus habituated to view the doctrine in the most precise light, to contemplate it in every phase which it presents to every phase of antagonist error. Thus, to take an example from the Treatise above referred to, our ideas of the union of the divine and human in Christ are made much more distinct

by the examination of the various heresies, Nestorian, Eutychian, etc., which, in the early ages of the Church, assailed the orthodox doctrine on this subject. To understand that doctrine fully and accurately as it is opposed to those heresies, we must understand accurately in what they consist, wherein exactly lies their opposition to the truth. A more familiar subject—the Real Presence—furnishes a more familiar example. Among the early reformers who rejected the received doctrine on the reality of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, but still wished to retain some kind of divine presence therein, there were three leading theories or explanations. The first was, that Christ is present in the consecrated elements merely as in a figure — representation — symbol: this is, I think, the common doctrine of Protestants in these countries. The second was, that Christ is present as an object of faith to the worthy communicant: the soul making the object of its faith as it were present to itself, by the apprehension and contemplation thereof which the act of faith involves. The third was, that Christ is present by some supernatural influence communicated from him to the receiver through the sacred elements.* The

* The exactness with which our theologians discuss these subjects

Council of Trent* defined, that Christ is *really, truly, and substantially* present in the Holy Sacrament; and Bellarmine† and other theologians oppose these words directly and specifically to the three Protestant opinions just stated. Examples might be produced from every leading question in dogmatic theology. Every particular heresy, at least every notable heresy that sprang up in successive ages, from the Apostolic times to the present, is, through the whole course, viewed side by side with the dogma which it assailed. We are thus accustomed to form the most precise concep-

will appear from the following short extract taken from Becanus, a writer better known to Protestants by his learned work, “*Analogia Veteris Novique Testamenti*”.

“Potest aliquis quatuor modis esse præsens alicubi. Primo, per *signum figuram vel imaginem* sui; quo pacto imperator est præsens in effigie quæ illum repræsented. Secundo, per *apprehensionem* [fidem, imaginationem], quo pacto amicus amico præsens est, quando de illo reipsa cogitat. Tertio, per *effectum vel operationem*, quo pacto sol est nobis præsens per lumen et calorem, quem in terris producit. Quarto, per *seipsum*, quo pacto sol est præsens in cælo.

“Hoc posito, certum est apud omnes, tam Catholicos quam adversarios, Christum præsentem esse tribus prioribus modis in legitimo usu Eucharistiæ”, etc., etc.—BECANUS, Theol. Dogmat., Lib. 3, cap. 6.

* Sess. 13, cap. 1, et can. 1.

† De Sacram. Eucharist., Lib. 1, cap. 1 et 2.

tions, not only of our own doctrine in itself, but also, for its sake, of the doctrines opposed to it. Add to this, that the undoubting firmness of belief required for faith, according to our doctrine on faith, fixes the mind, as it were, in a centre of light, whence it is enabled to survey more steadily and clearly all surrounding objects.

I should not omit to remark, that there is a peculiar difficulty in the study of our Moral theology, which does not exist in the study of Dogmatic—the latter also having its peculiar difficulties. The end of Moral theology is the regulation of men's conduct according to the laws of reason, of revelation, and of the Church, as they apply to all men in common, or to certain states of life in particular. Now, these laws are multifarious, and, in certain circumstances, some of them are modified by others. What is lawful in one set of circumstances may be unlawful in another: what is permitted by one law may be prohibited by another: what is in itself and in the abstract lawful may be practically unlawful.* Hence a person not tho-

* As a learned theologian remarks, treating of the very subject which forms the principal matter of the present article,

“Frequentissimum est ut quæ actiones absque unius alicujus virtutis dispendio elici possent, vetentur nihilominus ac illicite fiant,

roughly acquainted with all, at least the fundamental principles of moral theology, and taking up some one solitary treatise, would be liable to fall into the most serious mistakes in the interpretation of it. Thus in one treatise he would find that certain acts are enjoined by the law purely ecclesiastical, and certain others prohibited by the same law. In another treatise he will find that, according to the universal agreement of theologians, in certain circumstances the laws of the Church are not binding; again, the circumstances which would exempt from the observance of one ecclesiastical law would not exempt from the observance of another. In short, each section of Moral theology has its own set of principles; the application of which to the other parts is always supposed, as a matter of course, without being formally stated. To be secure in rightly understanding any treatise, a man must be acquainted, and well acquainted too, with many others.

But I have allowed myself to be led on from page to page a great deal too far in these preliminary observations. They are not of course addressed to

ob interventum alicujus legis aut virtutis, actionum illarum exercitio interdicentis in quibusdam eventibus"—THEOPHILUS RAYNAUDUS, *de Æquivoc. et Mentali Restrict.*, cap. 4, n. 1.

theologians, but to lay readers—for whom I trust they will not prove altogether irrelevant and worthless. We now come to the immediate question of this article.

Before all things, let us clearly understand the meaning of the terms we use and of the questions we are about to examine. Let us take care to discuss the doctrine of equivocation in language that is not equivocal.

1. In all civilized languages that have been spoken by man, there are many words and forms of speech which have a double meaning: and, as to single words, many of them have three, four, or a larger number of meanings. We need only open at random the dictionary of any language to see this. Thus in English, the wind *blows* in a sense quite different from that in which a flower *blows*: the active verb *wind* has quite different meanings in the followings phrases—to *wind* the horn—to *wind* the steed—to *wind* oneself into the confidence of another—the hound *winds* the fox. So in twilight if we doubt of an object at some distance, whether it be a stump of a tree, a big stone, or a human being, on discovering it to be the latter, we say, it is a man, that is, it is not a stump or a stone:

again, in another sense, we say, he is a man, *i. e.* he is not a *woman*; again, in another sense, he is a man, *i. e.* he is not a *boy*; again, in another sense, he is a man, *i. e.* he is not a pusillanimous person, he is *courageous*, "he has pluck"; again, in another sense, when James the Sixth of Scotland addressed a anatical preacher who was reviling his unfortunate mother, Mary Queen of Scots, "I tell thee, man, come down from that pulpit or speak sense", to which the reply was, "I tell thee, man, I will neither go down from this pulpit, nor speak sense". But it would be mere waste of time to exemplify farther, what every one knows to be a primary fact in all languages.

2. Nevertheless, a speaker or writer can always so select and arrange his words as to convey but one fixed meaning—the verbal context or the circumstances so clearly determining that meaning, that the hearer is not only in no danger of mistaking it, but does not even advert to any other meaning than that intended. This quality of style—the use of words in one exact meaning—is called *precision*. Examples will be found in every page of any standard writer. Thus in Moore's beautiful lines,

"Our *locks*, old friend, now thinly *grow*,
 And some *hang white* and *chill*;
 While some, like *flowers* 'mid Autumn's snow,
 Retain youth's colour *still*.
 And so, in our hearts, though one by one,
 Youth's sunny hopes have *set*,
 Thank Heaven, not all their light is gone—
 We 've some to *cheer* us yet".

Though each of the words marked in Italics (and more might have been marked) has at least two meanings, one literal, the other metaphorical, or one primary, the other secondary, or (in verbs) one active, the other neuter, or one common and popular, the other rare, or both equally common; yet no one would dream of any other than that precisely intended by the poet. Thus, for example, it would never enter into any one's head to doubt whether *locks* did not signify the instrument by which doors are fastened, or whether *cheer* was not used in the same sense as when we say "the speaker was loudly cheered by the meeting", etc., etc. The context and the subject determine the meaning with perfect exactness.

3. Every writer who has any regard for his own literary reputation, will, of course, strive to attain precision as one of the most essential qualities of

style. Words, however, not only may be used, but often are used, and whole sentences are often constructed, in such a manner as to convey two or more meanings. And the selection and structure may be such that the different meanings may be with equal propriety attached to the words; the context, etc., determining no more for one than the other; so that the reader is utterly unable to decide which is the meaning really intended by the writer. This quality of style is called *ambiguity* or *equivocation*. Examples are given in every elementary treatise on composition.

“An *amphibolous* sentence is one that is capable of two meanings, not from the double sense of any of the words, but from its admitting of a double *construction*: [equivocation, as we take it here, may arise from either—it is immaterial from which]: as in the instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable; ‘quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit’; where ‘illud’ may be taken either as the nominative or the accusative. So also the celebrated response of the oracle; ‘Aio te Æacida, Romanos vincere posse’; ‘Pyrrhus the Romans shall, I say, subdue’: which closely resembles (as Shakespeare says) the witch-prophecy, ‘The Duke yet lives that Henry shall depose’. This effect is produced

by what the French call ‘construction louche’, a squinting construction; *i. e.* where some word or words may be referred either to the former or latter clause of the sentence; of which an instance occurs in the rubric prefixed to the service [in the Established Church] for the 30th of January. ‘If this day shall happen to be Sunday (this form of prayer shall be used) and the fast kept the next day following’: the clause in (parenthesis) may belong either to the former or the latter part of the sentence..... The following clause of a sentence from a newspaper, is a curious specimen of Amphibolia:— ‘For protecting and upholding such electors as refused, contrary to their desires and consciences, to vote for Messrs. A. and B., regardless of threats, and unmindful of intimidation’”.*

We of course here consider equivocation, not in its relation to the principles of Logic or Rhetoric, but with reference to the principles of Christian morality.

A person is properly said to *equivocate* who utters an ambiguous proposition, knowing or intending that a sense shall be attached to it different from that in which the speaker himself understands it.

The question now is, whether it be lawful *thus* to equivocate? For it is evident that there can be

* WHATELY, Elements of Logic, Book 3, § 10.

no question as to the lawfulness of using ambiguous sentences which the speaker knows for certain will be taken in the sense intended by him. Is it lawful to use ambiguous language in one sense, knowing or intending that it shall be understood in another sense? And if so, is it lawful as a general rule of conduct in addressing others, or only under certain restrictions and in certain circumstances? And if the latter, what are these restrictions and circumstances?

If, on fair examination of the matter, plain reason—guided of course and enlightened by revelation—leads to an answer, absolute or qualified, in the affirmative, then it is clear that theologians who hold the lawfulness of equivocations, restricted or unrestricted, are unjustly charged with teaching immoral doctrine. If, on the contrary, reason leads to an absolutely negative answer, then truly every man to whom the purity of the Christian Law is dear, will justly condemn the use of equivocation and the doctrine which sanctions it. But before all, let reason be heard; let the matter be examined; let us not be carried away by mere names, by the cry of *Jesuitism*, by sanctimonious cant, by garbled extracts from books, which they who garble are as unfit to interpret, as a man who never studied law

would be to decide on the merits of a chancery suit, or a man who never studied medicine to lecture on the cure of human diseases.

I have given the idea of equivocation as it is commonly defined, not only by theologians, but by other writers, Catholic and Protestant. Theologians, however, draw a distinction—and a vitally important distinction it is—between a *formal* and a *material* equivocation, as some of them phrase it, or as others speak in plainer and less scholastic phraseology, *indeterminable* and *determinable*, or to put it in, perhaps, more orthodox, English, *undiscoverable* and *discoverable*. An undiscoverable equivocation is one, as the term implies, the occult meaning of which, *i. e.* the meaning intended by the speaker, it is morally impossible for the hearer to ascertain. A discoverable equivocation is, on the contrary, one whose occult meaning the hearer can easily perceive; so that, if he does not see it, he has to blame only his own precipitance or dulness. Illustrations of both kinds of equivocation will be given in the course of the following pages.

The occult meaning of the same proposition may be discoverable in one set of circumstances, and undiscoverable in another: just as an expression which would pass for a jest on one occasion, for

example, in a light after-dinner conversation, would be taken as downright serious on another occasion, for example, if uttered from the pulpit or the judicial bench. The meaning of language, at least of spoken language, is not determined by the mere form of words used, but also by the circumstances, and often much more by the circumstances in which the speaker or hearer or both together are actually placed. Not only is this the case in such examples as that just given, where the circumstances of one occasion are of a character so totally different from those of the other occasion, but in various other instances where a far less striking change of circumstances gives a corresponding change to the purport and force of language uttered therein. The age, the rank, the calling, etc., of the person speaking and of the person spoken to; their actual relations to each other, whether habitual, as that of friend to friend, master to servant, servant to master, etc., or accidental and transient, as that of buyer and seller, highwayman and traveller, etc.; the time and the place; the matter and the object of the discourse, as whether it be for the mere gratification of curiosity, or whether it be in the discharge of strict duty, or whether the public welfare or the rights of individuals be concerned,

etc.—all such circumstances contribute more or less to modify and determine the meaning of words. We do not advert to this, any more than we advert to the rules of spelling or syntax in writing a letter: but if we try to form to ourselves images of various occasions and various concurrence of circumstances, we will soon see the truth of the observations just made.

Nothing is more common than for servants to answer inconvenient calls upon their masters, by saying, “He is not at home”. Whether this be right or wrong (of which presently), the phrase is universally understood as equivocal; either as meaning that he really is not at home, or as a civil way of saying that he does not wish to see the present visitor or does not wish to see any one just now—that he is not at home for visitors, or at least for this visitor. Perhaps in two cases out of every three, the reply is not only intended in this latter sense, but is so understood by the inquirer, just as clearly as if the servant said, “He is at home, but cannot see any one, or cannot see you”. Put the same servant into a witness box, let the same question be put to him, and if he gives the same reply, no one would understand him as implying any other than the first sense, that the master really is

not or was not at home; and if he intended the second sense, he would be universally reputed and would truly be a liar, and, if he were testifying on oath, a perjured liar.

If an insolvent, after the surrender of all his goods, which are however quite inadequate to meet the demands of his creditors, is further interrogated by them or by their representative or by some one else who has authority to put the question; and if, on the question being put to him, "Have you not also some money?" he should answer, "I have no money", he would be understood as intending to convey that he really had no money: and if, notwithstanding, it turned out that he had some hundreds or thousands of pounds laid by, he would be looked upon by all men, and justly looked upon, as a liar. Suppose it to be well known that I have some cash in hand, if a person who is notorious for never paying any of his debts, comes up to me and asks me for the loan of twenty pounds; and if he be one who is able and, if provoked, not unwilling to do me an injury, one whom consequently it would be inexpedient for me to offend by a flat refusal; and if I say to him, "I have no money", it would be generally understood that the answer was merely a polite refusal, or that probably it

might have been so. So if a robber attacked me and demanded my purse, a similar answer given to him would be similarly interpreted. If I say that John is a servant of the Earl, the bare words may signify either that John is a hired servant employed by the Earl to perform certain menial offices; or that John, though holding no menial office under him, is an obsequious instrument in his hands, ready to anticipate all his capricious desires, to execute jobs for him, etc. The circumstances will clearly enough determine which meaning I intend. But when I subscribe a letter with, "your obedient servant", no man would for a moment understand me as using the word in either sense, or take the phrase for any thing else than an expression of courtesy.

These illustrations might be extended indefinitely, but let thus much suffice. It is clear that words which in one combination of circumstances have but one fixed meaning, may in another combination of circumstances be so ambiguous, so likely to be intended by the speaker in a sense quite different from that fixed meaning, that the very occasion itself *warns* the hearer not to take them as *certainly* intended in that meaning; warns him that the speaker may be using this form of speech to conceal

what would be detrimental or otherwise inconvenient for him to avow. If I am asked, how is this ascertained? I reply that the answer is contained in the illustrations just given: the thing is ascertained as every other fact (for it is altogether a matter of *fact*) regarding the interpretation of language is ascertained, namely by accurately observing the actual usage of speech among men. Words mean just what men agree they should mean: they mean one thing on this occasion, another thing on another occasion, and are ambiguous on a third occasion, just as men agree to understand them as meaning one thing on one occasion, another thing on another occasion, and having an ambiguous meaning on a third occasion. I speak to intelligent readers, whom I suppose myself not so much instructing in what they are ignorant of, as reminding of what they do not advert to: I therefore think it needless to say that when I speak of men *agreeing* to give meaning to language, I do not mean that kind of formal agreement consisting in an express and tangible act, such as the agreement of two nations in making a treaty, or the agreement of the two houses of parliament in passing a law. I speak of that silent universal *consensus* as to the meaning of words and phrases, which is known, and

known only from the ascertainable fact, that such meaning is universally given.

If I am further asked, how can we know the different circumstances whence this diversity of meanings arises or may arise? Is there any fixed rule, or body of rules, for the purpose? I answer that there not only is not, but cannot be any such fixed rule. *Fact* is our only guide: observe the facts, ascertain what they are; you may perhaps classify them or some of them in some way, you may perhaps discover certain *a priori* congruities in them, or speculate on them; but *they* are the rule.

Mental Reservation, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, may be taken as identical with equivocation. For the former is a suppression of something, a *reservation* of something in the mind, which is necessary to the truth of what is asserted: if what is concealed in the mind be not joined with what is actually asserted, the assertion is false. Thus if a man stole a sheep on *yesterday*, and, on being questioned says, "I did not steal the sheep", meaning that he did not steal it *this day*, here is a mental reservation. It is true that he did not steal it *this day*, but the latter words, which are necessary to the truth of the assertion, are suppressed. Now

either the reserved idea is undiscoverable or discoverable, as before in the case of Equivocation: if discoverable, it then clearly is the same as a discoverable equivocation; if undiscoverable, then though there is perhaps, philologically, some difference between it and the undiscoverable equivocation, yet, as we shall immediately see, in reference to the principles of morality they are both identical. Indeed, in the examples given above, I have taken equivocations and mental reservations indifferently as they occurred to me.

Having thus fully and fairly laid open the question, I now proceed directly to answer the questions proposed.

§ 1.

My first assertion is, that undiscoverable equivocations, or undiscoverable mental reservations, are absolutely unlawful, that the use of either is in no case whatever justifiable.

A lie is absolutely and essentially opposed to the moral law, so that in no conceivable circumstances can it be lawful to tell a lie. The words of one of the common catechisms express the simple doctrine of all approved theologians—"no mo-

tive or reason can excuse a lie"*—no amount of good to be gained, no amount of evil to be avoided.

Now an undiscoverable equivocation or mental reservation *is* a lie. For the essence of a lie consists in this, that the words uttered signify what the speaker knows or believes not to be true.† This kind of equivocation (henceforward we will, to avoid unnecessary repetition, suppose reservation included) has but one real meaning, that namely in which the words are understood, and which is *not* intended by the speaker. The occult meaning which he *does* intend is not a true meaning of the words; for they have no meaning but that which

* "*Omnis* deliberata locutio contra mentem repugnat *naturali juri*"—ZALLINGER, *Jus naturæ privatum*, § xc.

† "Ille mentitur qui aliud habet in animo, et aliud verbis vel quibuscumque significationibus enuntiat. Unde etiam duplex cor dicitur esse mentientis, id est, duplex cogitatio: una rei ejus quam veram esse scit vel putat, et non profert; altera rei quam pro ista profert sciens falsam esse vel putans. Ex quo fit ut possit falsum dicere non mentiens, si putat ita esse ut dicit, quamvis non ita sit; et ut possit verum dicere mentiens, si putat falsum esse et pro vero enuntiat, quamvis revera sit ita ut enuntiat. Ex animi enim sui sententia, non ex rerum ipsarum veritate vel falsitate, mentiens aut non mentiens judicandus sit"—S. AUGUSTINUS, de Mendacio, n. 3 (quoted by CARRIERE, de Jure et Justit. n. 224).

use gives them, and use by the very supposition of the case, does not give them this meaning. The words *might have* this meaning, or they might have it in such or such circumstances, but, as the actual usage stands, they have it not. The speaker gives them the meaning: but he has no authority to do this—at least unless he intimates clearly that he does so. Use *alone* can give meaning to words. Thus if a man should take it into his head to understand by the word *horse* what we understand by the word *man*, and say, “I saw a horse sitting on a sofa, and discussing metaphysics with another learned horse from Maynooth”, the proposition is absurd, and taken seriously—if that were possible—is a lie. Men might have agreed or may yet agree, to use the word *horse* to signify what is now signified by the word *man*, and *vice versa*; but, until such usage takes place, the meaning of each word is that which it actually has, and no other.

It is tolerably evident that, if such equivocations were lawful, the principle that would justify them, would frustrate the end of language as a vehicle of thought, and destroy the distinction between truth and falsehood.

§ 2.

As to discoverable equivocations—

FIRST. It is unlawful to use equivocations in any language or in any country, which are not used, which are not recognized in that language and that country.

The reason is obvious from the elementary principle already stated, that the true meaning of language is that which usage gives to it. Hence suppose that in some foreign language certain phrases have two senses, each, according to the circumstances, common and intelligible; so that men commonly use and are well known to use these phrases, on certain occasions, for the purpose of concealing their sentiments, in the less literal and simple (though still, as we suppose, in the circumstances, common—intelligible—*discoverable*) sense: it would not follow, that this second sense would be intelligible in an accurate translation of the phrases into another language. The usage which gives them a double meaning in one language may not exist in the other. Now the meaning of each language is regulated by *its own* usage. For example,

suppose that in Portugal,* it is customary for a person to disengage himself from a bore in the streets, or from any other unpleasant company, by saying, "I have a particular business at home": in Portugal the phrase is, by the supposition, perfectly intelligible as a courteous way of getting rid of an intolerable social nuisance. Suppose that in Italy or England the words have not, from usage, this second meaning; then to use them in Italy or England with such meaning, would clearly be to use an undiscoverable equivocation.

What I say of different languages applies equally to different countries in which the same language is spoken—though, I presume, instances of this diversity of usage would be much rarer in the latter case.

Hence it is evident that equivocations which are discoverable in one language or country, may be undiscoverable in another. Wherefore, supposing them to be allowable in the former language or country, it does not follow that they are allowable in the latter; and, *vice versa*, supposing them to be unlawful in the latter, it does not follow that they

* I am merely supposing a case. I am ignorant of the Portuguese language.

are unlawful in the former. Wherefore, it does not follow that, because a number of Italian and Spanish divines state that certain equivocations are intelligible, and hence (with the restrictions to be named by-and-bye) allowable in their countries, therefore the same equivocations are intelligible and allowable in ours. Neither does it follow that, because such equivocations are unlawful here, they are therefore unlawful there. The *principles* in which all approved theologians agree, I hold to be perfectly sound; and these very principles lead me to reject some of the decisions of those theologians on particular cases, so far as these countries are concerned. Whether the decisions are just even in the circumstances to which they were intended to apply, it comes as little within my province as it comes within my power to determine.

That there are some discoverable equivocations common to all countries, I have no doubt. To this class, I suppose, every one would refer the celebrated reply of St. Athanasius to the assassins who were employed to look out for him and put him to death. Falling in with him in their pursuit, and not knowing him personally, they asked himself whether Athanasius was far off: "He is not far off", was the ready answer—and truly not more

ready than justifiable. An innocent man pursued for his life might certainly use this equivocation in any language or in any part of the world. Even the blessed Spooner, if one of Archbishop Murray's Maynooth Jesuits had the dagger at his throat, might escape through such a pretty loop-hole; nor would Exeter Hall or any sane body in the world think him a bit the less veracious or in any way the less holy for it.

Abraham's calling Sarai his sister (*Genes.*, xii. and xx.) would be an example of equivocation peculiar to a certain language or people. Sarai was his niece, daughter of his brother Aran; and we know from the Old and New Testaments that it was usual among the Hebrews to call blood relations by the name of brothers or sisters.* Thus Lot is called Abraham's brother (*Genes.*, xiv. 14).

SECONDLY. There are several cases, or rather species or classes of cases, in which equivocations otherwise (with the restrictions to be given) allowable cannot be used.

The principal of these, as stated and fully developed by several theologians, are the following.

* "Aliquid ergo veri tacuit Abraham, non falsi aliquid dixit, quando tacuit uxorem dixit sororem"—S. AUGUSTINE (quoted by BILLUART, de Virt. Relig., Diss. 9, Art. 2).

A witness legally interrogated, whether on oath or not, cannot use any equivocation whatever.* Several theologians affirm the same of an accused criminal.† But I believe that in these kingdoms it is universally understood that the plea of “not guilty”, in criminal trials, at least when the offence charged entails, if proved, capital or some other heavy punishment, is merely a legal form, throwing

* A confessor cannot, *in any conceivable circumstances*, reveal what he has heard under the seal of sacramental confession. By doing so directly or indirectly, he would, according to the universally received doctrine, be guilty of a most heinous crime. This is known and always supposed in every Catholic country, and, I take it, in this country also. If, however, a doubt of this should exist in any case, the matter can be easily settled by the clergyman simply stating the Catholic doctrine before he takes the oath as a witness. The sacredness of the seal of confession is, I believe, respected by our Judges. If the contrary should occur, the confessor is bound to suffer death sooner than reveal confession.

† “Certum et exploratum videtur apud omnes, quod reus in his circumstantiis [*i. e.* a iudice vel superiore legitime interrogatus], non possit negare crimen, nisi hoc sit capitale, id est, tale, ex cujus confessione ei imminet pœna capitis, vel alia huic quodammodo æquivalens, utputa exilii, carceris perpetui, amissionis bonorum, trireremium, etc. Quin etiam si talis pœna reo imminet, nunquam tamen fas esse negare crimen præsertim cum juramento, probabilius tenent D. Thomas, 2. 2. Q. 69. A. 1. Sanchez, *Lib. 6. Consil.* Michel, *Theolog.*, Tom. 2. Part. 2., alique gravissimi Doctores, hac potissimum ratione ducti, etc., etc.” ELBEL, *Theol. Moral.*, Part. 3. n. 144.

the *onus probandi* on the prosecuting party. According to our law, the accused is not bound to criminate himself.

What has been said of a witness judicially examined, is equally true of all persons interrogated by another, who is vested with authority to interrogate, and, in his questions, keeps within the limits of his authority. Hence a servant is bound to answer his master without equivocation, about a robbery committed on the property of the former.

Equivocations cannot be used in the terms of treaties or compacts of any kind, whether public or private, between nations. The same is also true of free contracts between individuals, such as buying and selling, betting, hiring, etc.

Equivocations are unlawful in an avowal or profession of religious faith, whether made voluntarily and without fear of consequences, or on compulsion and under the apprehension of penalties to be incurred from the simple statement of the truth.

It is unlawful to use equivocations whence any injury would ensue to another; more unlawful in proportion to the greatness of the injury and the number of persons injured; and, of course, most unlawful if the commonweal should suffer or be put

in peril. Thus it would be criminal to use ambiguous language (the same is true of looks, gestures, or any other outward sign), which, in one interpretation, would unjustly affect the character of another. It is hardly necessary to say, that this description of equivocation in language and look, and even in silence—for there is an *expressive* silence—occurs often enough in the world.

There is one general principle on which all these assertions rest. It is that in such cases men are not prepared to expect equivocations: the nature of each case, so far from suggesting the probability of equivocation being used therein, would rather lead us to look for strict simplicity of speech. There is an understanding among men that equivocations are not to be used on such occasions; consequently, if they are used, they are, in the circumstances, simply *undiscoverable*. This common understanding or tacit agreement is manifestly based on a common principle of protection against a common danger. For, if equivocations were allowable on such occasions, there would be an end to all security in the social intercourse between men and men individually, between societies and societies, between kingdoms and kingdoms: there would be nothing but universal distrust in the world.

Beside these general reasons, there are particular reasons applying to each case, which, however, it would be tedious, as it is unnecessary, to enter into here. For example, a person using language which may be taken as conveying an unjust imputation on another, sins not only against veracity, but also against justice: for every man has a strict right not only that his character shall not be injured, but also, and as a consequence of this very right, that it shall not be put in danger of being injured.

THIRDLY. Even discoverable equivocations are not to be used habitually or on slight grounds. But in some rare, exceptional cases, when there exists a weighty reason or urgent necessity, it is lawful to use equivocations which are in the *language*, the *country*, and the *circumstances* discoverable.

The *first* part of this assertion, which condemns the habitual use of equivocations, rests on the principle of the reasoning advanced in the preceding paragraphs. It is evident that if such a practice were allowed, no man could trust his neighbour for a single moment: I could not be sure but that every fifth or tenth sentence I hear does not involve an equivocation; and, as I know not in what particular sentence the trap is hidden, I know not in which I

may be caught, and I suspect all. Social intercourse would resemble a journey on a dark night, over a road full of pitfalls: I am not sure when I may tumble in, but I have no doubt that I shall go down somewhere, and I fall into a state of feverish uneasiness which continues to the end. In trying to scan the speaker's mind, the understanding loses its uprightness of attitude and directness of movement, and acquires a wriggling, shuffling, uneasy action. It gets a mean and dishonest turn, like a man who accustoms himself to peep round corners and listen at keyholes. Every motion of the equivocator's tongue becomes as much distrusted as the motion of a pickpocket's fingers. Some trembling wit described the Reign of Terror by saying: "I am suspect, thou art suspect, he is suspect, we are suspect, you are suspect, they are suspect". The habit of equivocation generally established, would do more to destroy confidence in man's honesty and veracity, than Robespierre and his Guillotine ever did to destroy security of life. It would be Fouquier Tinville supplanted by the Father of lies.

A man who practises equivocation is always in the imminent danger of sheer lying. Lie he most certainly will from time to time; and the probability is that in the long run, the habit of equivo-

cation will end in a habit of lying; as the habit of hard drinking often ends in a habit of downright drunkenness.

Lying, though about the most disreputable, is not *per se* one of the greatest sins; but it is, especially if habitual, a most serious social evil in its tendency. A lying companion is, however, not near so unpleasant as an equivocator. There is a certain boldness and manliness about open liars: the very excess of their impudence often turns anger into laughter. I could never read Mr. Macaulay's account* of Barrere's tremendous mendacity with unruffled countenance, heartless scoundrel though he was. But the habitual equivocator is both more despicable and ten times more hateful than the habitual liar. The latter makes his choice "for better for worse": the former woos truth openly, and pays his secret addresses to falsehood, without intending to wed either. To insincerity he adds meanness and hypocrisy; and either of the latter is detestable in every aspect and every relation.

The *second* part of the assertion must be admitted to some extent, by all reasonable men. The only

* Edinburgh Review, vol. 79. The article is not included in the collected edition of Mr. Macaulay's Essays; but I have no doubt, from intrinsic evidence, that it is the production of his pen.

dispute can be about the application of the general rule.

Suppose a minister of state entrusted with a secret, the disclosure of which might entail, or surely would entail, some dreadful evils on the commonwealth. He is asked directly on the matter of the secret, or indirectly and on some other subject, his revelations on which would lead to a knowledge of the secret, or to a grave suspicion about it. The question is proposed by one whom he cannot flatly refuse to answer, without great inconvenience, perhaps without great danger to the public weal: suppose the questioner to be a friendly or neutral power, who would be offended with a refusal, and whom it would be inconvenient to offend. What is the minister to do? If he discloses the secret, he will betray his trust and injure his country: if he refuses to disclose, he will do mischief in another way: if he remains silent, the secret is suspected from his very silence. The question I suppose to be put by a person who has no right whatever to put it. I always suppose this condition: for if a man asks me a question, and has a right to ask it, has a right to get the required information from me, I am *always* bound to answer simply and without equivocation. What then is the minister to do? What

say you, friend Spooner? No pious twaddle, no cant about love of truth. I love truth and hate a lie with all my heart, at least as much as you do: but I undertake to say, there is not a man in Europe, Protestant or Catholic, with an intellect above that of a sparrow, who would not take a flat denial of all knowledge of the secret on the part of that minister, for an equivocation as discoverable, as intelligible, as justifiable, as when the prisoner pleads not guilty, or the servant says his master is not at home. Suppose Lord John Russell or Lord Derby to be the person thus questioned, and in the circumstances which I have described, is there a man of common sense in the three kingdoms who would take the denial of all knowledge of the state secret as really meaning ignorance of it? as any thing else than a routine official answer, which leaves the matter just where it was? If such answer in such circumstances is universally understood not to imply a real denial of knowledge, then it does not imply such denial: it is an equivocation which every one knows to be an equivocation. Words mean, as has been already sufficiently explained, what they are universally understood to mean.

Again, suppose a man comes up to me and inquires about a person, whom I see clearly he is

bent on assassinating. Suppose the intended victim to be my own father, and that I know where he is to be found. If, in reply to the assassin's question, I tell where my father is, he will certainly be murdered: if I positively refuse to tell, I will be murdered myself, or the refusal may lead to a suspicion as to where my father is. Who will say that it is sinful to equivocate in such a case, and thereby save both my father's life and my own?

Acts are signs of ideas as well as words: a man may lie by acts as well as words. If a portion of an army feigns flight in order to create disorder in the enemy's ranks, or to draw them out of a strong position, or to turn their attention from what is passing elsewhere in the scene of action, is this a lie? What is it but an equivocation, which, as every soldier and civilian knows, has been practised in all wars from the earliest ages? It is a discoverable equivocation used for a very weighty reason.

Suppose the case, before alluded to, of a man asking a loan of money which I know he will never repay. I cannot expressly refuse him without exposing myself to the danger of injury from his anger, which may turn out greater to me than the loss of my money. Would it not be a lawful equivocation to say, "I am not able to give you the

money", or "I have not the money in my possession"?

Suppose a lawyer engaged in a case, and entrusted by his client with a weighty secret bearing closely upon it, a secret which it is of vital importance to keep concealed from the opposite party. Suppose a bland and cunning emissary of that party coming to him and trying to pump him, under the cover of some false pretext. Suppose that the lawyer cannot conceal the secret except by equivocation. Is he bound to betray the secret?

Of course it would be always better, nay it would be always a strict duty, to say in such cases, "Sir, your question is impertinent, and I will not answer it", or words to this effect, or to remain silent—if either line would be taken without serious inconvenience, or if silence or refusal to answer were not (as unquestionably either often would be) equivalent to a revelation of the secret, implying that there *was* a secret, which may be all the questioner wants, he knowing well, if there be a secret, what that secret is. I always suppose, as I have stated in my proposition, some weighty reason or urgent necessity for using the equivocation: and I have given the foregoing examples *in limine*, that the reader may clearly understand what I mean by this statement,

may understand this member of the proposition. As to the latter part of it, which restricts the lawful use of equivocations to those that are in the language, the country, and the circumstances discoverable, this is sufficiently intelligible from the explanations already given.

It may be said, at once, that cases like those which I have given by way of illustration are purely speculative, never occurring, "metaphysical cases", as we say in the schools. I should be most delighted to find that they really were so; for then we would have no need of equivocations on any occasion, they would be all alike unlawful to us, always unlawful. I entertain an instinctive dislike of them, so hearty an aversion to them, even in those rare and trying circumstances wherein I am compelled by reason to admit their lawfulness, that nothing could gratify me more than the assurance, if it were true, that no such circumstances ever existed; that it was all a mad fancy of Escobar, who, sepulchred in his cloister, and shut out from communion with his species, conjured up another world and a fantastic humanity of his own, and reasoned and wrote about them as if they were the real ones—endowed as he was with the poet's frenzy, but without the gift of verse, and therefore impregnating

the sober prose of theology with his dreamy creations. If my worthy Spooner—somehow he always reminds me, in one aspect of his character, of Mr. Chester in *Barnaby Rudge*—if he could truly assure me that perplexed circumstances, like those enumerated, never occurred among men, I would say to him: “Good reverend sir, let us shake hands, and blot out from human speech all phrases and words with two meanings, and, if you please, let us make a bonfire of Escobar, and warm our chilled hearts at it”. But, seriously, I fear that there are sly canting knaves in this world, who succeed in forcing honest men sometimes into the necessity of equivocating; and I fear that there would be such characters in the world—even if Spooner left it.

After all that has been said, the reason or proof of our proposition, to which we now come, may be despatched in very few words. I pass over the arguments adduced by many of our theologians from the answers of holy men and even of our Lord himself, recorded in Scripture, and which seem to involve equivocation. One of these examples, in the answer of Abraham regarding his wife Sarai, I have alluded to above. Here we have a perfect illustration of our proposition. There was a clear

equivocation: it was, as we have seen, discoverable in the language, the country, and the circumstances: there was a most urgent reason for using it—"And when he was near to enter into Egypt, he said to Sarai his wife: I know that thou art a beautiful woman, and that when the Egyptians shall see thee, they will say, she is his wife; *and they will kill me, and keep thee*. Say therefore, I pray thee, that thou art my sister"—*Genes.*, xii. 11. So also xx. 11. Among the examples taken from our Lord's words is that in *Mark*, xiii. 32, where, speaking of the day of judgment, he says: "But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father". Another example is from *John*, ii. 19. "Jesus answered and said to them: Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. The Jews then said: Six and forty years was this temple in building, and wilt thou raise it up in three days? But he spoke of the *temple of his body*. When therefore he was risen again from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this", etc. I pass over these and several other like instances of the use of ambiguous language that have been adduced from Scripture, because a full examination of them would extend this article too far, and probably weary the reader;

and because the argument from reason and the nature of the thing is quite conclusive.

These equivocations are not lies. For the words not only may have, but actually have, a double meaning. Nay, the occult meaning, as we call it, is in such equivocations the *less occult* of the two. Thus, in one of the foregoing cases, the dishonest borrower nineteen times out of twenty, not only may see very plainly, not only suspects, but is morally certain that the person who is asked for the money has it, and merely intends to avoid offence and loss by the answer he gives. I do not by so answering deceive the individual who asks me for money; I know that I do not deceive him, and he knows that I know it. If through his own dulness he does not advert to the occult meaning, but understands my words simply, that is his fault, not mine. If I speak to a person in language perfectly unambiguous and clear, intending the obvious natural sense which alone the words are legitimately capable of, and if (as happens often enough) the person I am addressing, through gross stupidity or peculiar obliquity or perversity of mind, understands me in quite a different sense, I am not accountable for his blunder, nor, on my perceiving it, am I as a matter of course (though I may be in

particular circumstances), bound to correct it. I suppose no rational being would question the truth of this assertion. Otherwise the Holy Spirit, foreseeing the erroneous meanings which would be fastened on many of the plainest words of Scripture, would be accountable for those mistakes. Just in the same way, when I utter ambiguous language, which, in the circumstances, all the world knows to be ambiguous, nay, to be rather understood by me in a certain occult (though, as I have said, from this very fact, not occult) sense; if a man understands this notoriously ambiguous—two-meaning—language of mine in one determined meaning, and that moreover, the meaning which usage would teach as rather the one not intended by me—the error of such a man is not imputable to me. I speak to one man in language having obviously one fixed meaning; he takes it in another meaning—I am not to blame. I speak to another man in language obviously ambiguous; he takes it as not ambiguous, and understands it in one meaning—I am just as little to blame. The words in one case have a definite meaning, and are to be so understood; the words in the other case, have an ambiguous meaning, and are to be so understood. The law of speech is the same for both.

But, it may be said, I foresee the error, and, by my equivocation, give occasion to it.

It is true that I foresee the error, and give occasion to it; *but I am not the cause of it*, nor is it imputable to me. I do not intend his error, I do not desire it—for this would certainly be wrong—my sole object is to conceal the truth, which I have a strict right to do, in any case like those enumerated, nay, which, in many of them, it is my strict duty to do. I exercise my right, let him look to himself. He exercises an impertinent curiosity for the mere gratification of curiosity, or for insidious, or dishonest, or truculent, or other improper purposes, which he has no right to do. I, to baffle his unjust attempts, use ambiguous language: if he understands it to be ambiguous, as he easily may, as the nature of the case would lead him to understand it, then he understands aright; there is no error on his part, no deception on mine: if he understands it as not ambiguous, still there is no deception on my part; he errs indeed, but he deceives himself.

A lady foresees that, by her going to the church on Sunday, some puling swain who has formed an absurd attachment for her, will lose the little sense remaining to him, and do in reality what Mr.

Mantilini threatened to do, "fill his pockets with change for a sovereign in half-pence", and drown himself, and "become a body". Is she therefore never to go to church? Is Miss Summerson to become a recluse because Guppy is destroying himself with bear's grease?

I am a vintner, and I foresee that without doubt some of my customers will drink too freely of the wine which I sell to them. Am I therefore to shut up shop, or dispense only tectotal cordials?

The wealthy Brownes, in Mr. Russell's popular song, foresaw that their poorer neighbours the Keggs were running to ruin by trying to imitate their expensive parties. Were the Brownes—seeing that example is so powerful an incentive to imitation—obliged to take small lodgings, sell their plate and furniture, and see no more company?

If I were to write a comprehensive course of Dogmatic and Moral Theology, I have very little doubt that Spooner, if he thought it worth while to notice the production of so obscure an individual, would take all sorts of blasphemies and immoralities out of it, as he has done with theological courses already, before the world. Would it be therefore wrong in me to compose and publish such a work?

Examples of this kind might be multiplied with-

out end, they occur in all states and relations of life. It is evident that if men were bound to abstain from all acts which may be, or certainly will be, an occasion of sin to others, all action would be suspended in the world.

But, it may be urged, the principle just laid down would justify the use of equivocations like those noticed above, not only in the circumstances there delineated, but in all circumstances and as things of common use. For, if the principle be sound, that it is lawful to do an act whence another may take an occasion of erring or sinning, then it must be universally lawful.

I answer, 1^o The aforesaid equivocations are not discoverable on all occasions, but only in circumstances such as those described; and are therefore unlawful, save in those circumstances. All this has been explained fully and clearly before—at least as clearly as I could put it.

2^o We hold, *all* approved Catholic theologians, so far as my acquaintance with them extends, hold, not only with regard to equivocations, but with regard to all acts whatsoever that are *in themselves* indifferent or good, but which may be to others an occasion of error or sin—*first*, that it is not

lawful to perform such acts without some necessity, some reasonable cause. Thus I may toss half-a-crown to a group of three or four boys out of mere wantonness, or to enjoy their scrambling for it. It would be sinful in me to do so from such motive, if I foresee that they will go to the next public house and get drunk upon it. But if a man comes up to me with a knife, and says he will cut my throat unless I give him a half-a-crown, I can lawfully give it to him, though I foresee and am sure that he wants it only for the purpose of getting drunk. I speak of an act in itself indifferent or positively good: for an act in itself evil, cannot become lawful in any case, or for any reason whatever—to save my own life or to save all the world. Theologians hold, *secondly*, that as the error or sinful consequence which my act becomes the occasion of, is greater or less; as my act occasions the evil consequence more or less remotely or indirectly; as my right to do the act is greater or less, etc., in the same proportion must the necessity or other cause I have for doing the act be greater or less. Thus a far weightier cause would be required for my giving money to a man who I know will get dead drunk with it, than for giving it to one who

will only enjoy himself somewhat overmuch, get "hearty", as we say in colloquial phrase in Ireland. Again, a weightier cause would be required for me to give the bottle of whiskey into the man's hand, than merely to give the money which I foresee he will spend in buying the bottle; because my concurrence is, in the latter case, obviously more indirect and remote, and the effect less certain; as, after all, he may use the money for another and laudable purpose.

I am not writing a treatise on the morality of human acts: I therefore throw down these elementary principles as briefly as I think consistent with bare perspicuity. To put the whole subject fully before the non-theological reader, would require evolutions, proofs, exemplifications, running over many long pages.

The application is clear. I cannot use equivocation without a reasonable cause. And as the evils ensuing from the common or indiscriminate use of equivocations would be most serious, I therefore cannot use them without a weighty cause or urgent necessity. Add to this the other restrictions already laid down—especially that general one stated in the proposition I am now defending, that the equivocation must be one which the usage

of speech renders perfectly intelligible in the circumstances.*

§ 3.

I reserve for a separate section the consideration of a difficulty which will occur to some, particularly to sceptical minds, and which at first might appear rather formidable, though, as we shall see, like many other “speciocities” in this world, when tested, found to contain nothing. The difficulty is this:—

SPOONER *loquitur*.

What you have said may be all very true, may look very well upon paper and in the abstract. Reflecting and circumspect men, like you and me, may understand the thing pretty clearly, may see the limitations and checks and chains and cross-bars, which confine the use of equivocations within boundaries very narrow and very palpable indeed; and as we are both of us religious men—for I admit that a Papist may be religious, and that some are so—we, of course, would adapt our speech to the exact rule. But I have a deep and trembling

* See extract at the end of this article.

anxiety for the spiritual welfare of your poor benighted countrymen. Suppose that it became generally known among them that your theologians taught the lawfulness of certain equivocations on certain occasions: suppose that one of your own pupils should, after his ordination and appointment to parochial duties, preach such doctrine to a congregation of famished, brogueless Murrays, MacShanes, and MacToulters. The delicate lines that mark the limits of truth and falsehood, would be utterly lost in their coarse perceptions: with them one equivocation would be as justifiable as another, one would lead to another, and, like the first theft of the horn-book in *Æsop*, quickly generate a fatal habit. Not only among the ignorant masses would this be likely to occur, but as much perhaps, or more, though for a different reason, among the more educated and among theologians themselves. The familiar contemplation of the exceptional cases is apt to generate a familiar use of them, to do away with their exceptional character, and establish them as the rule. The habit of subtle speculations and distinctions begets a facility in finding reasons for every thing: and truth is as much endangered amid the excessive refinements of the mind, as a man's fingers in handling sharp-edged

tools. Hence your Jesuitism and rules for systematic deception.*

* The substance of this paragraph is taken from several books and smaller publications to which I am unable now to refer distinctly. The closing allusion is taken from a report of the trial of *Griffiths v. De l'Espinasse and another*, as reported in the *Times* of August 9, 1852. The defendants were nuns, and represented the convent to which they belonged: the accusation was that of the brutal ill-treatment of the girl Griffiths in the convent. The trial took place at Guilford in England, last August, before Chief Justice Jervis and a special jury. Mr. Chambers, counsel for the prosecution, in the course of his address to the jury at the close of the trial, alluding to the evidence of one of the nuns, thus delivered himself—

“It appeared to him, that this looked very much like saying one thing and meaning another, and he felt compelled to make this remark, and he asked the jury from their own observation to confirm him as to the truth of it, that the ladies who had been examined, although evidently most acute and intelligent persons, had not given their evidence with that candour and openness which ought to be exercised, and that the mode in which they did give it led him to fear that they had been studying a book of which *everybody* had probably heard, which professed to make persons skilled in the art of saying black was white and white was black, in such a manner as to avoid stating a direct falsehood, and evading the truth by giving an answer with a mental reservation, and in another sense to that which was conveyed by the answer”.

The learned judge, in his charge to the jury, with a degree of fairness which must have very much scandalized Lord Campbell, thus comments on the above passage in Mr. Chambers' speech—

“While he admitted that the case had been fairly conducted on both sides, he must at the same time state his opinion that the

ANSWER.

I. This is not one of the subjects on which preachers are accustomed to address the faithful. As I have said below of Mr. Chambers' mysterious volume, I have never heard or read of any such discourse. In truth, the people do not so much require instruction on topics of this kind. Theological disquisitions and distinctions are unsuited to their capacity and habits of mind: the great truths of religion, the great principles of morals, the great duties of life in reference to God, their neighbours, and themselves, these topics so simple and clear, are

learned counsel for the plaintiff had in one instance rather departed from that course, and had endeavoured to create a prejudice by alluding to some books which, according to his statement, had a tendency to teach the art of disguising the truth. What kind of books the learned counsel alluded to he was at a loss to know, whether they were books of logic or not, he was unable to say; he could only say that he had never read such books, and he did not believe the learned counsel either had had time to read them".

I think I should know something of a book bearing on a theological topic, and of which "*everybody* had probably heard". I have never seen such a book, I have never read of it, I have never heard of it: and I make bold to say that the "learned counsel" never saw it, never read it, never heard of it. Was this assertion of his an equivocation, or was it——?

what the people require to have explained to them, and impressed on them in simple and clear language. If I were to address the doctrine and reasoning of the preceding pages to an ordinary congregation, I would probably confound them a good deal; but, beyond this, I would do them no harm—or good either. Of course *if* a clergyman preaches on a subject which his audience is likely to misunderstand, or *if* he preaches on any subject in a mystified style which is likely to mislead them, it is but a truism to say that they are in danger of taking up erroneous opinions. The rule is, either the subject is one which you can put in a plain intelligible light, or it is not: if the former, there is no danger; if the latter, then let it alone. Nothing can be more unfair than to reason on purely practical matters, to form an estimate of human conduct, on hypotheses that are but imaginary and barely possible, if even possible.

II. The duty of observing strict veracity, and the sin and odiousness of lying, especially of habitual and deliberate lying, are certainly fit subjects for the pulpit: nor can the Christian preacher, too strongly commend the one and reprobate the other. But if he does touch on equivocation, he should reprobate it too; his plain and simple teaching

should be condemnatory. Thus the eminent divine, from whom the extract at the end of this article is taken, concludes his dissertation on the subject.

“This opinion [which, as above explained, allows the use of certain discoverable equivocations in certain extreme cases] I have recorded and established at great length and with all the arguments by which it is sustained, rather as a theological exercise, than with the intention of defining any thing on this most weighty and perilous matter—leaving others to decide. For, though this opinion appears to me the more probable, nevertheless, as the use, especially the frequent use of equivocations even purely material [discoverable] practically exposes to the danger of formal [undiscoverable] equivocations and lying; just as frequent swearing exposes to perjury: therefore, as the Scripture counsels us, in order to avoid the danger of perjury, not to accustom our mouth to swearing, nay, not to swear at all; so we should counsel men, in order to avoid the danger of lying, not to use even material equivocations except in the most rare and extreme cases”.*

Another very able and eminent divine is still more explicit.

* MAYOL, in Decal. See extract at the end of this article.

“To a person asking, *is it lawful to use equivocation or mental reservation?* the answer should be *it is not lawful*”.*

The renowned Caramuel, Pascal's own Caramuel, whom the *Christian Examiner* for last July calls the “buffoon and jack-pudding of casuistry”, Caramuel, the prince of lax divines, thus opens his chapter on Mental Reservations.

“I have an innate aversion to mental reservations. For if they are restricted within the boundaries of piety and sincerity, they are unnecessary If they be used in circumstances which do not determine their meaning, they subvert human society and security, and are to be condemned as pestilent: in as much as, once admitted, they open the way to all kinds of lying and perjury”.†

* “Quærenti an liceat uti æquivocatione vel restrictione mentali, dici debet id non licere”—ANTOINE, Theol. Moral. Tractat. de Virtut. Moralib. c. 4.

† “Est mihi innata aversio contra restrictiones mentales; si enim continentur intra terminos pietatis et sinceritatis, necessariae non sunt. . . . Quod si tales dicantur, ut etiam ibi admittendæ sint, ubi desunt circumstantiæ consignantæ, tollunt humanam societatem et securitatem, et tanquam pestiferæ damnandæ sunt. Quoniam semel admissæ aperiunt omni mendacio omni perjurio viam”—CARAMUEL, Theol. Fund. n. 2881.

The writer of the article above referred to in the *Christian Examiner*, gives in a note the following brief notice of Caramuel's life.

III. In all sincerity and from the bottom of my heart, I dislike putting forward charges which deeply affect the moral character of large bodies of men, especially of men holding high and responsible positions in Church or State. This kind of argument, whatever may be its intrinsic weight, rarely produces any other effect than that of embittering controversy, of irritating individuals, very often of

“He wrote seventy-seven large volumes. He converted 2,500 heretics. He fought against the Swedes at Prague, at the head of his troop of drilled ecclesiastics. He was the Envoy of the King of Spain to the Emperor. He shone at Salamanca, Alcalá, and Louvain. He was successively titular Abbot of Melrose, and Vicar-General of the Cisterians in England, Abbot of Dissenburgh, Bishop of Niessy, and Suffragan to the Archbishop of Mayence, Vicar-General to the Archbishop of Prague, Bishop of Königsgratz. The year after Pascal had been quoting him in Paris, Alexander the Seventh, gave him the bishopric of Campagna, and to supply his printing expenses, the King of Spain that of Vigevano, in which he died in 1682”.

It may be added that he was one of the first who denounced the too-celebrated work of Jansenius. He is said to have been an excellent mathematician and engineer; and his proficiency in the latter capacity was turned to account in some of his military operations. He was a brave soldier and a learned Bishop, and I trust he is now with the blessed; but as a theologian he at no time ranked high, and his works are now a mere curiosity—for a curiosity they certainly are.

confirming instead of removing their prejudices. It uniformly proves, if it proves at all, one melancholy truth, which needs not proof, the depravity of human nature and the depths of guilt to which, under the pressure of strong temptation, men sometimes fall: but rarely does it prove any thing else. To prove any thing else it were better to use some other arguments: for by other arguments, sound and conclusive, every sound cause is always sustainable. It were better to confine discussions to the question of the truth or falsehood of principles and opinions, without including the character or conduct of persons. The odour of charity, while it sweetens controversy, so far from weakening, rather, like music in battle, adds vigour to every blow that is struck for the sacred cause of truth.

But as there may arise certain extreme cases in which we are not only justified in using certain equivocations (if, indeed, they can be truly called equivocations), but as in a manner compelled to use them: as a man is sometimes driven to kill his assailant, in order to defend his own life: as private infamy must sometimes be divulged, in order to prevent public calamity; so the very charges wrongfully brought against ourselves, we are sometimes compelled to fling back in the teeth of our

calumniator, and fasten them upon him or upon the party which he represents, or with which he is identified; thus putting him to shame, silencing him with his own words, and slaying him with the very weapon he had forged for our destruction. "Wo to you scribes and pharisees, hypocrites: because you tithe mint, and anise, and cummin, and have left the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith—— Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thy own eye, and then shalt thou see to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye". Why will Spooner and his party provoke retort, invite it, extort it? The tree is known by its fruits. Has any evidence been produced, though land and sea have been raked for it, to prove that the teaching of Maynooth has had any other than a wholesome influence on the morals of the clergy and people? Is Maynooth more to blame for the hedge-firing at landlords in some parts of Ireland, than Oxford and Cambridge are to blame for the secret poisonings of children by their own mothers, and for other domestic tragedies that have occurred in some parts of England?* Are forni-

* While I am correcting the proof of this sheet, Sir Francis Head's work, "A Fortnight in Ireland", has just come to hand. I have only had time to throw a hasty glance over the book: but I

cation, and adultery, and all acts that exclude from the kingdom of Heaven more common in Ireland than in England? We shall see whether the first of the two crimes just named, is of frequent occurrence in any of the English Colleges. Let the inquiry be instituted and the comparison made: let every member of this college, including professors and students, from the oldest to the youngest, be interrogated on oath, sifted and scrutinized by the most able cross-examiner England can produce; the one answer from all should necessarily be, that the commission of fornication by any member of the college, or a probable suspicion of such a crime or of any thing bordering on it, would not only lead to instant and ignominious expulsion, but would blast the guilty individual more than if lightning from heaven fell upon him, and consumed him to ashes. It is true, that some of the Catholic clergy in some places have, from time to time, comported themselves on the political arena with intolerable violence and tyranny both of speech and conduct. It is true, and I do not deny it, or wish to deny it, though I wish it were deniable:

see that the gallant Baronet actually attributes the crimes of the peasantry and the social degradation of Ireland to the priesthood, and through them to Maynooth!

but I submit that political violence, or any other sort of misconduct, in a handful of individuals out of between two and three thousand, is a very pitiful argument for making out a case on any side. On one little scene of clerical despotism which was enacted some time ago, I need not say when or where, I happened soon after to have ample opportunities, on various occasions, of hearing the comments of numerous clergymen of all shades of politics, and from all quarters of the kingdom; there was but one opinion among them all, without a single dissentient voice, and that opinion was condemnatory in the strongest degree. One excited individual, who shouts loud and gesticulates violently, will make a greater noise and attract more notice than a thousand calm and sensible men, who sit quiet and hold their tongues. Those clerical despots, were their number ten times greater than it is, were not made so by Maynooth teaching. Not to speak of the considerable proportion of them (if I can call a part considerable, when the whole is insignificant), who were not educated in Maynooth, what they are, that they are, not in consequence of our teaching, certainly not in consequence of my little share thereof, but in spite of it. I have been credibly informed, indeed I have seen

direct evidence of the fact, that there are people in England who attribute many of the social evils existing in Ireland, such as they are, to Maynooth; resembling in this Byron's "hoarse Fitzgerald", who, if the "Rejected Addresses" are to be trusted, used to attribute all kinds of public and private disasters to Napoleon Buonaparte.

"Base Buonaparte, filled with deadly ire,
Sets one by one our playhouses on fire:
Some years ago he pounced with deadly glee on
The Opera House—then burnt down the Pantheon:
Nay, still unsated, in a coat of flames,
Next at Millbank he crossed the river Thames.
Who makes the quartern loaf and Luddites rise?
Who fills the butchers' shops with large blue flies?
Who thought in flames St. James's court to pinch?
Who burnt the wardrobe of poor Lady Finch?
Why, he, who, forging for this isle a yoke", etc.

But to come to the extracts which these remarks are introduced to preface—I confine myself to a few, and these few, I repeat, are published with no small pain and reluctance.

The learned philosopher, already quoted in these pages, Sir William Hamilton, writes as follows in the late collected edition of his *Essays*.

“The Heads [of houses in Oxford] have, for themselves, voluntarily incurred the crime of broken trust and perjury, in a degree infinitely higher than was ever anticipated as possible by the legislature; and, for others, have, for their interested purposes, necessitated the violation of their oaths by all members of the University.

“Now, taking it for granted that, *without a motive*,* no body of magistrates would live, and make others live, in a systematic disregard of law, that no body of moral censors would exhibit the spectacle of their own betrayal of a great public trust, and that no body of religious guardians would hazard their own salvation and the salvation of those confided to their care: on this ground we showed, that while every motive was manifestly against, no motive could possibly be assigned for, the conduct of the Heads, in so long exclusively maintaining their intrusive system, and never asking for it a legal sanction; except their consciousness, that it was *too bad to hope for the solemn approval of a house of Convocation, albeit composed of members of the collegial interest*, and too profitable not to be continued at every sacrifice.

* The Italics in all the following extracts are in the original. I add none of my own.

“Rather indeed, we may now add, than hazard the continuance of this profitable system, by allowing its merits to be canvassed even by a body interested in its support, the Heads have violated not only their moral and religious obligations to the University and country, but in a particular manner, their duty to the Church of England. By law, Oxford is not merely an establishment for the benefit of the English nation; it is an establishment for the benefit of those only in community with the English Church. But the Heads well know that the man will *subscribe* thirty-nine articles which he cannot believe, who *swears* to do and to have done a hundred articles which he cannot, or does not, perform.* In this respect, private usurpation was for once more (perversely) liberal than public law. Under the illegal system, Oxford has ceased to be the seminary of a particular sect; its governors impartially excluding all religionists or none. Nor is this all. The natural tendency of the academical

*“Nay the oath for observance of the *Statutes* is, by the academical legislature, held a matter of far more serious obligation than the subscription of the *Thirty-nine Articles*. For by Statute (T. II., § 3), the intrant is not allowed to take the *oath* until he reach the age of *sixteen*; whereas the *subscription* is lightly required even of boys matriculating at the tender age of *twelve*’—Sir William Hamilton’s note.

ordeal was to sear the conscience of the patient to every pious scruple; and the example of the 'accursed thing' thus committed and enforced by 'the Priests in the high places', extended its pernicious influence, from the Universities, throughout the land. England became the country in Europe proverbial for a disregard of oaths; and the English Church, in particular, was abandoned, as a peculiar prey, to the cupidity of men allured by its endowments, and educated to a contempt of all religious tests.* As Butler has it:—

‘They swore so many lies before,
That now, without remorse’
They take all oaths that can be made,
As only things of course’.†

This was written in 1831. In another article, first published in 1835, by the same writer, the following passage occurs.

“Of all nations in the world, past or present, Pagan or Christian, the English is the one infamous

* “This melancholy consequence came out more obtrusively, after the observation in the text was written”—*Sir William Hamilton's note.*

† “Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, etc., by *SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON*”. London, 1852 (*page 453, etc.*).

for a contempt of religious obligations; and if on any national wickedness the wrath of God is to be visited, we may soon have reason to lament with Jeremiah, that ‘because of swearing the land mourneth’. Confining ourselves to Episcopal authorities:—Bishop Sanderson (*in his Prelections on the obligations of an Oath*, delivered in the University of Oxford, nearly two centuries ago) warns his countrymen, that ‘as the harvest of universal perjury is already white and ready for the sickle, so perfidious and profane a people ought to dread an utter extirpation at the hands of the divine justice’; and he mainly attributes the grievous calamities of his generation to the endemic crimes of useless swearing and hypocritical perjury. Bishop Berkeley, in his *Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain*, near a century thereafter, enumerates among the principal causes of our decline, false swearing:—‘a national guilt which we possess in a very eminent degree; there being no nation under the sun where solemn perjury is so common—in so much that men now-a-day break their fast and a custom-house oath with the same peace of mind’. He then calls on the legislature to adopt means towards its prevention; ‘for whatever means are taken, so long as we lie under such a load of guilt

as national perjury, and national bribery, it is impossible we can prosper'.

"But if the perjury of England stand preëminent in the world, the perjury of the English Universities, and of Oxford in particular, stands preëminent in England",* etc., etc., etc.

These seem to be very matured testimonies; that of Sir W. Hamilton is republished and persevered in after the lapse of several years. They are strong, and I could wish to believe them exaggerated. But they proceed from men eminently qualified to pronounce an opinion on the matter, and men whom, I suppose, no one would think of charging with any unworthy feeling of hostility.

The following extract is taken from the Report of the Oxford University Commission, recently published.

"The question which naturally arises on reviewing this contrast between the statutable obligations and the practice of the Colleges, is, whether they possess any power of altering regulations which have thus been habitually disregarded for centuries, and which must continue to be disregarded.

"In approaching this question, we must observe

* *Ibid.*, p. 527.

that the Head and Fellows of all Colleges are bound to the inviolable observance of all these Statutes by Oaths, increasing in stringency and solemnity in proportion as the Statutes become more minute, and less capable of being observed".

An extract from one of these oaths is then given ; and a little farther on the Report proceeds to state that the oaths "were imposed in an age when, as the preface to the Laudian Code, in quaint but expressive language reminds us, the obligations to observe them might be dispensed with by ecclesiastical authority".* The Commissioners, writes the Westminster Review,† commenting on this passage, speak "as if unwilling to believe that there was ever more reality in them than there is at present... and they adopt as their own the narrow insolence of Archbishop Laud". The same Review very justly and sensibly adds:—"Surely, if it was ever reasonable to impose oaths at all, it was so at a time when there was an existing authority which could dispense with them on pressing occasions; when they were taken with an implicit acknowledgment that they could and would be so dispensed with; and taunts of perjury came with an ill grace from

* Report, etc., p. 146.

† N. 4., *New Series*, p. 332 (Octob., 1852).

men who, acknowledging no such authority, yet confess themselves abundantly guilty of it".

As to other vices beside that of perjury, I shall confine myself to two extracts from the Evidence—I should remark, by the way, that the Evidence, which occupies something more than half the volume, was all presented in writing, and therefore is not open to the charge of precipitance to which oral testimony is sometimes exposed. The first extract is from the Evidence of the Rev. Mark Pattison, M.A., *Subrector and Tutor of Lincoln College, Oxford*.

"The three great temptations of the place I suppose to be fornication, wine, and cards, or betting. Without exaggerating the turpitude of the first-named vice, yet every one who is aware of the amount of moral and intellectual prostration traceable to it here, must wish that every protection against temptation should be afforded to the weak and unsteady. It may be left to any one to estimate what amount of such protection is given by the necessity of being within doors at midnight", etc.—*Evidence*, p. 43.

The next extract is from the evidence of the Rev. W. E. Jelf, B.D., *late Student and Censor of Christ Church, Oxford*.

“Intoxication, banished from civilized society in the larger world, still exists, though much diminished, yet to a considerable extent, in the very last place where it ought to be tolerated..... The Bullingdon Cricket Club still exists, and unless it be very much changed from what it was when I used to hear of its proceedings, the scenes which take place, and the songs which are sung at its dinners, held, I think, once a week, are a curse and a disgrace to a place of Christian education. Nor are these clubs and supper parties evils merely as being occasions of intoxication and obscenity to men already depraved, but they are violations of a principle which to my mind ought always to be kept in view by University and College authorities, viz., to keep the atmosphere as clear as possible from whatever may lead astray those entering on their academical life. It is this which, in my opinion, justifies and even calls for the removal of a man whose example or persuasion is misleading others to evil; and I am convinced that there is no more powerful instrument of evil than supper parties, etc. Take the case of a young man coming up from home with good intentions of living regularly and working hard, looking back with regret to school follies and idleness (and I firmly believe

most men do come up with such feelings); looking to the University as a place where, by God's grace, he may carry out the solemn promises of making progress in religious and useful learning and training, with which he gladdened his father's heart as he left home: he is invited by an old schoolfellow to meet a few friends at supper; he goes in ignorance of what a supper party really is; the result is that, if not made drunk himself, he sees others drunk, he hears conversation and songs which no one can hear without pollution; he forms an impression of University life and University habits very different from what he expected, and unless he is of more than ordinary firmness, he becomes entangled in the vortex, and then in his turn entangles others. I do not know how the Bullingdon Club is managed now, but I know that, shortly before I left Christ Church, schoolboys who came up to matriculate, were taken up there and made drunk, and this always seemed to me sufficient to settle the question of its being allowed to exist no longer"—*Evidence*, p. 182.*

* It is right to acknowledge that, for having my attention directed to these and other passages in the *Report* and *Evidence*, I am indebted to the periodical quoted above. I have, however, copied the extracts out of the original.

I will quote no more of this kind. These extracts, which I leave without comment, are intended only for those who deal in such arguments on the other side. They are a mere *argumentum ad Spooner*. If he flings Italian divines, as he garbles and misinterprets them, at me; I fling Oxford, as it really is, as it is delineated by its own friends and members, at him. Let him desist from annoying us with paper pellets, and we shall not rake him with leaden bullets.

IV. But, after all, the real question is, whether the doctrine as laid down be true. I admit that, if the misapplication of any principle would, from its vagueness and uncertainty of application, become universal and inevitably universal: I admit that such a consequence would be a serious objection to the truth of the principle, and indeed fatal to the establishment of it as a practical rule of conduct. I deny that the doctrine objected to is of this description. It appears to me clear and defined in itself and in its application; and if it does not appear so to others, the fault lies not in the doctrine, but in the expounder. But it is no objection to any principle of morals, to say that unscrupulous men will abuse it, or that, if publicly preached to such and such an audience or in such and such

circumstances, it will lead to mischief. One or two examples will put this beyond all possibility of controversy.

It is the common, indeed I might say the universal, opinion of our theologians, and, I would suppose, of Protestant theologians and writers on Ethics, that it is lawful to defend one's life, if there be no other way of saving it, by slaying the murderer who attempts to take it. Our theologians, however, rigorously insist on the condition, that there be no other way of saving one's own life. Hence, if the person attacked can save himself by flight, or by merely maiming his assailant, he is not justified in killing him. Now it is very easy to see, what I have no doubt has often actually happened, that this doctrine may be misapplied, that men may be killed, when the flight of the person attacked, or the wounding of the assassin, would present an easy escape from the dreadful alternative; or men may be killed in a fierce assault where there is no intention of committing murder.

There is no doubt that persons in immediate danger of perishing from hunger (who are, as theologians say, in *extreme necessity*), can take from their neighbours whatever quantity of food is

required to ward off that danger. All theologians and, I suppose, all reasonable men are agreed on this. Now suppose that this doctrine were preached, especially if preached vehemently and without emphatically guarding against the misconstruction of it—suppose it preached in a district just now suffering under severe distress, there would be great danger of its being misapplied; and, if the inhabitants of the district were not over scrupulous in their dealings, it is morally certain that many would misapply it, and turn a principle of the law of nature into an excuse for violating the law of nature by theft. The Church has condemned the proposition which asserts the lawfulness of taking relief out of another's property, in a case of heavy or severe want (*grievous necessity*): and many theologians assign as the main ground of the condemnation the danger of abuse to which such a permission, if granted, would be liable—in as much as cases of this kind occur so often in many if not in all countries, and the facility of feigning them to others or to ourselves, is so great and so tempting.

Many other examples occur to me, but I will conclude with one which, independent of its felicity (as I think) of illustration in the matter before us.

is in itself highly interesting. I allude to the celebrated question of the right of resistance on the part of the people against a tyrannical government.

To resist and overthrow not only a usurping and illegitimate government, but a government legitimately established, which is exercising its powers to the destruction of law and the public welfare, is, in certain extreme cases and under certain stringent conditions, justifiable on the part of the people. This is a fundamental principle in the political Ethics of the Whigs, and held, long before that party came into existence, by several of our most eminent theologians; though with wide differences both in evolution of the details of the proposition and in its application. Now it is pretty evident, that the public preaching of this doctrine from the pulpit or the platform would, in many cases, be productive of the most serious evils. Suppose an excitable people suffering under wrongs which supply abundant ground for earnest remonstrance and complaint, though not sufficient for resistance—even if they had any hope from resistance: suppose the doctrine of the right to fly to this last terrible resource put before them in the colouring of a vivid and warm rhetoric: the two forces, of oppression on one side, and of demagoguery on the other, both impel in one

direction, and to one tragic result. It often happens that the popular mind becomes so exasperated, whether from real or imaginary wrongs, so strongly disposed to explode in a general revolt and its consequent vengeance and barbarity, that the duties of obedience and patience are the only ones fit to put before them; that any other teaching, however true in the abstract, however harmless in other circumstances, however cautiously conveyed in word and manner, will be but the application of the match to the mine.*

Are we then to give up every doctrine because it is liable to be abused and perverted?

V. As to what is said of the danger to which theologians themselves, and other learned men are exposed, in the habitual contemplation of extreme cases, and threading of the mazes of casuistry; I, who, being a bit of a casuist, ought to know something of the matter, should rather infer the directly contrary effect on an upright and honest mind. I should rather imagine, that increased knowledge would impart to such a mind increased light, vigour, and activity, in the way that leads to manly truth and purity of thought, word, and action, and leads to God. A knave will of course become the

* See next article.

greater knave the more he learns, and turn every thing good and bad to account in perfecting his dishonest art; as a Boa Constrictor swells and thrives on whatever it eats, a rabbit, kid's horns, or a piece of a blanket; as Arius took heresy out of the Bible, and Clootz took atheism out of the glorious harmonies of creation—as my worthy antagonist takes all sorts of immoralities out of the Maynooth class-books. Spooner would have the march of intellect to be, what some one called it, the “rogue's march”—to which popular tune let him be herewith drummed out of these pages, never again to darken them with the shadow of his name. “*Tu commences m'embeter avec ton Etre Supreme*”, said Billaud once to Robespierre. Spooner, you are a bore to me with this monotonous cant of yours. I hope our gracious Queen will make a Bishop of you, and thus afford your unquiet spirit a place of rest in “the fat slumbers of the Church”, so that we may hear of you no more.

That God may give you grace to see the better way, and that we may both meet together in Heaven, is the serious and sincere prayer of a heart that wishes you all lower good, and cannot wish you a higher. Farewell.

NOTE referred to in page 288.

This note, being very long, and not bearing on the merits of the main question discussed in the preceding article, is, on account of the length (not anticipated when the above page was printed off) to which the article has extended, suppressed for the present.

NOTE referred to in page 348.

“Secundo potest quis uti æquivocatione tantum materialiter, et restrictione mentali aliquo modo apparenti et sensibili, quando scilicet verba quæ profert sunt ambigua, seu habent duplicem significationem, unam communem, alteram particularem veram, sed occultam, et ab eodem intentam, quam circumstantiæ hic et nunc occurrentes faciunt, juxta intentionem etiam interrogantis: ex quibus proinde facile devenire posset in cognitionem sensûs a proferente usurpati, si prudenter et diligenter ea verba et circumstantias examinaret, ac ponderaret. Quod si tunc ob imprudentiam, ob præcipitationem judicii, ob inertiam et omissionem considerationis illarum, mentem loquentis non intelligat, et non in alio quam in sensu communi ea verba accipiat, id non provenit ex loquente, nec ex æquivocatione tanquam ex causa per se, sed solummodo ex illius ignavia et inconsideratione. Et hujusmodi æquivocationes mate-

riales non sunt mendacia, neque militant contra præceptum negativum non mentiendi, cum verba semper accipiantur secundum propriam significationem, ac verum sensum quem ex se habent, aut quem sensibilibus hic et nunc patiuntur, et tunc ex circumstantiis occurrentibus nec loquens fallat audientem, sed ipsemet se fallat ex ignorantia aut inconsideratione: ad summum esse possunt omissiones contra præceptum affirmativum veritatis dicendæ, non obligans tamen pro semper ad proferenda verba secundum sensum communem et determinatam significationem in omni prorsus casu, sed ex iusta causa potest homo occultare veritatem. Licet enim nunquam licitum sit negare veritatem et audientem positive fallere ex intentione, attamen juxta omnes auctores licitum est veritatem occultare, ut docet D. Augustinus (contra Mendac., c. 10), et D. Gregorius, Papa (Pastoral. P. 3, c. 12), et constabit exemplis Christi Domini ac Sanctorum statim referendis: proindeque licitum est permittere quod audiens aliquando fallatur ex seipso, quando adest iusta causa ipsi occultandi veritatem quam manifestare non expedit, et dum vult plus sapere quam oportet sapere.

“Requiritur igitur iusta et rationabilis causa gravisque acurgens necessitas utendi hujusmodi æquivocationibus materialibus, scilicet ad impediendam vel auferendam periculosam aut valde nocivam alterius veritatis cognitionem ab audiente, ex qua oriretur loquenti vel aliis gravissimum damnum, cui nec silentio, neque alia via, quam istis æqui

vocationibus occurri potest hic et nunc in istis circumstantiis et angustiis.

* * * * *

“Requiritur præterea ad usum licitum hujusmodi æquivocationum materialium, quod interrogatus non teneatur ex justitia aut religione, aliave obligatione veritatem aperire, et determinate respondere ad mentem et juxta sensum ab interrogante intentum absque amphibologiis.

* * * * *

“Probat. ratione. Si hujusmodi restrictiones mentales sensibiles, et æquivocationes mentales forent illicitæ et peccaminosæ, hoc ideo esset quia sunt mendacia, aut quia sunt contra id quod convictus humanus exposcit, ac contra naturam vocum et finem locutionis, aut tandem quia, ex earum usu introducuntur plura mala et inconvenientia. Atqui nihil horum dici potest. Ergo non sunt illicitæ et peccaminosæ.

“Prob. minor sigillatim quoad omnes suas partes. Mendacium definitur a D. Augustino et D. Thoma et ab aliis communiter: *Falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi, seu dicendi falsum assertive*. Atqui hujusmodi definitio non competit æquivocationibus pure mentalibus. Ergo, etc., Prob. minor. In eis non invenitur falsa vocis significatio, cum verba aut ex se aut ex circumstantiis patiantur et habeant vere sensum ac intellectum a loquente intentum. Celatur et occultatur quidem verum, sed non

dicitur falsum; ibi significatio verax aliud ex alio vult intelligi, neque ea verba æquivoca proferuntur a loquente cum intentione dicendi falsum assertive, eundi contra suam mentem, et fallendi positive audientem aut interrogantem, veritatem simpliciter negando; sed tantum permittit ut ipse se fallat ex inconsideratione circumstantiarum, occultando veritatem duntaxat, quam non tenetur, nec expedit ipsi manifestare ob justissimas causas, quam tamen occultationem hic et nunc deprehendere possit, si ad omnia sollicite et diligenter attenderet. Nec refert quod loquens tunc intendat et peroptet quod audiens non advertat neque cognoscat sensum occultum verborum. Non refert, inquam, cum habeat justissimam causam id intendendi et faciendi, nec aliquo præcepto tunc ad contrarium obligetur, et, ut ait D. Thomas (2, 2, q. 40, art. 3): *Esset inordinata voluntas, si quis vellet nihil sibi occultari.*

“Insuper hoc genus restrictionis mentalis sensibilis et æquivocationis pure materialis non est contra naturam vocum, utpote fini locutionis nullatenus contrarium. Verba enim æquivoca non unam tantum, sed plures habent significationes; æquivoca namque definiuntur a philosophis, ea quorum nomen commune est: ratio vero significata per nomen est diversa. Unde cum verba illa ambigua ex se aut ex circumstantiis hic et nunc occurrentibus, significant sensibiliter etiam hunc intellectum et sensum occultum quem intendit proferens, nihil falsi dicitur, nihilque fit contra earum vocum naturam, finem locutionis, et contra id

quod convictus humanus aliquando non exposcat, aut saltem non patiatur.

“Tandem ex hujusmodi æquivocationem usu non oriuntur mala et inconvenientia, cum valde restringatur ex quatuor conditionibus supra allatis, quæ rarissimum eum faciunt, nempe (1) quod sit justissima causa, et urgentissima necessitas, cui alia via nullatenus occurri possit; de qua necessitate in particulari an sit sufficiens, judicare debent viri probi et periti. Item (2) quod respondens non teneatur tunc ex justitia, aut religione, aut obedientia aut aliquo præcepto veritatem nude declarare, sed jus habeat illam celandi, et permittendi quod audiens ex seipso fallatur. Item (3) quod hujusmodi veritatis occultatio ita prosit loquenti ut tamen aliis injuste non obsit, neminique damnum afferat. Tandem (4) quod verba sensibilibus referant hunc sensum a loquente intentum, etc. His sane repagulis obviatur omnibus inconvenientibus quæ evenire possunt aut timeri, cum æquivocationum usum non reddant hominibus familiarem, sed rarissimum, ac in paucissimis duntaxat casibus licitum”—MAYOL, *Exposito Octavi Præc. Decal.*, Præloquium Secund.

I have given the preceding long extract as a specimen of the way in which our approved writers handle this question. A specimen it is, moreover, of fair and solid reasoning, though indeed of such Latin style as Quintilian would not approve of.

**The Right of Resistance
to the Supreme Civil Power:**

IS IT IN ANY CASE ALLOWABLE?

The Right of Resistance.

AFTER having concluded the preceding article, it occurred to me that the doctrine of the right of resistance, to which allusion is made towards the end of it, would be an interesting subject for a short separate paper. I do not undertake to argue the question one way or other: at least, if I do fall into arguments, they shall be very few and very brief. I rather propose simply to state what I conceive to be the approved doctrine and views of our theologians on the subject.

I know of no exposition of this kind in our language, with the exception of that contained in the English translation of a work* of Balmez — a

* "Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their effects on the Civilization of Europe. Written in Spanish, by the Rev. J. Balmez. Translated from the French Version, by C. J. Hanford and R. Kershaw". London: Burns, 1849.

This work is very thoughtful and replete, without being overloaded, with apposite erudition. It would be, however, greatly improved by compression. I think Dr. Balmez pushes those influences of the Church which I would call *accidental* and indirect, too far, dwells

Spanish divine of great promise, who died some years ago in the flower of life. But the author does not undertake to give, his object not requiring, an exact theological statement. He rather refutes certain theories, and rebuts certain charges. Mons. Parisis, formerly Bishop of Langres, now, I think, of Arras in France, treats the question in a dogmatic form, and with much more doctrinal precision, in a little pamphlet* published about three years ago. By far the ablest and most sensible discussion of the topic that I have seen from the pen of a Protestant writer, is that contained in the last chapter of Sir James Mackintosh's fragment on the English Revolution of 1688.† Mr. Plumer Ward wrote a hasty, gusty, ranting reply‡ to this chapter, both matter and manner of which contrast very strikingly with the calm, deep, philosophic wisdom and chaste eloquence of Sir James. The reasoning

too vehemently and exclusively on them. It should always be kept before the mind, that the end of the Christian Church and Christian Religion, is the sanctification and salvation of men.

* "*La Démocratie devant L'Enseignement Catholique*". Paris, 1849.

† *Miscellaneous Works*, vol. II., p. 317.

‡ "*An Historical Essay on the real character and amount of the precedent of the Revolution of 1688*", etc. By R. Plumer Ward, Esq., 2 vols. 1838.

of the latter in several places so much resembles that of some of our theologians, St. Thomas in particular,* that I suspect he had looked into those writers; a suspicion which is confirmed by the fact that, in his other philosophical productions, he has shown himself by no means unacquainted with them.† On some points, however, his statements would not pass for accurate with us; especially his assertion that on the same principles on which the “morality of a war between independent nations” is to be tried, “the justice of a war made by a people against their own government must be examined”. In the latter case, no allusion is made to the strict Christian duty of obedience which subjects owe to their rulers, and which one independent nation does not owe to another. But it is not improbable that he took this for supposed, and that his comparison starts from the point when, all doubts on the question of duty being settled, there remain but the question of expediency, and the calculation of chances. Other important points of difference he gives, and gives well. See extract at the end of this article.

* *De Regimine Principum*, Lib. 1.

† “Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy”. Notes and Illustrations.

The following is Sir James's account of the doctrine held by the clergy of the Anglican Church, at least in former times.

“The English law, like that of most other countries, lays down no limits to obedience. The clergy of the Established Church, the authorized teachers of public morality, carried their principles much farther than was required by a mere concurrence with this cautious silence of the law. Not content with inculcating, in common with all other moralists, religious or philosophical obedience to civil government as one of the most essential duties of human life, the English Church perhaps alone had solemnly pronounced that in the conflict of obligations no other rule of duty could, under any circumstance, become more binding than that of allegiance. Even the duty which seems paramount to every other—that which requires every citizen to contribute to the preservation of the community—ceased, according to their moral system, to have any binding force, whenever it could not be performed without resistance to established government. Regarding the power of a monarch as more sacred than the paternal authority from which they vainly laboured to derive it, they refused to nations

oppressed by the most cruel tyrants,* those rights of self-defence which no moralist or lawgiver had ever denied to children against unnatural parents. To palliate the extravagance of thus representing obedience as the only duty without an exception, an appeal was made to the divine origin of government—as if every other moral rule were not, in the opinion of all theists, equally enjoined and sanctioned by the Deity. To denote these singular doctrines, it was thought necessary to devise the terms of “passive obedience”, and “non-resistance”—uncouth and jarring forms of speech, not unfitly representing a violent departure from the general judgment of mankind. This attempt to exalt submission so high as to be always the highest duty, constituted the undistinguishing loyalty of which the Church of England boasted as her exclusive attribute, in contradistinction to the other Reformed communions, as well as to the Church of Rome. At the dawn of the Reformation it had been promulgated in the Homilies or discourses appointed by the Church to be read from the pulpit to the

* “Interpretation of *Romans*, xiii. 1—7, written under Nero. See, among many others, South, Sermon on 5th November, 1663”.
[Note by Sir J. M.].

people;* and all deviations from it had been recently condemned by the University of Oxford with the solemnity of a decree from Rome or from Trent", etc. etc.†

The doctrine of the absolute unlawfulness of resistance to the supreme civil power, in any circumstances, which Mackintosh here ascribes to the Anglican clergy, has been also ascribed to some French Catholic divines who flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or in the latter half of the sixteenth. Carriere, the ablest of living French Moralists, manifestly leans to the same opinion. Though barely touching the question incidentally, in his work on "Justice and Rights", he lets out his own mind sufficiently in asserting roundly, that "for a considerable time *all* orthodox writers maintain that rebellion is *never* lawful".‡ By "rebellion" he cannot mean resistance to lawful authority not abusing its power; for that such resistance is never lawful, all theologians at all times have held as a manifest law of the

* "Homilies of Edward the Sixth, and Elizabeth". [*Id.*]

† "Parliamentary History, July 20, 1683". [*Id.*]

‡ "Nunc observare sufficiat....a multo tempore jam propugnare omnes orthodoxos nunquam licere rebellionem"—CARRIERE, de Jure et Justit., n. 773.

Gospel; besides that the context of the passage precludes any such restricted interpretation. He can only mean any resistance to lawful authority (it is of this kind of authority he speaks, of the *tyrannus administrationis*, as opposed to the *tyrannus usurpationis*); and if he intended to assert that all modern Catholic divines hold, that it is never lawful to rise against such authority, how much soever abusing its power to the ruin of the commonwealth, the assertion is certainly false. Without naming the two writers quoted above, Balmez and M. Parisi (the latter of whom wrote since the publication of Carriere's work), Bishop Bouvier, whose works have been long well known and universally read in the French seminaries, makes, in his "Institutes of Philosophy", the exceptional case to be noted hereafter.* I could name some others who wrote about the time when Carriere's work first appeared or since then.

DOCTRINAL EXPOSITION.

§ 1.

Obedience and respect to the Supreme Temporal Power are a duty imposed on all subjects, not only

* "Institutiones Philosophicæ", Edit. 8va, p. 583.

by the dictates of right reason, but by the solemn law of the Gospel, not only as a matter of expediency, but as in itself a sacred and conscientious obligation.

This is not merely a theological conclusion or common and certain doctrine among divines. It is a doctrine clearly revealed and always explicitly taught and firmly maintained as a part of the Christian Revelation by the Catholic Church.

The texts of Scripture bearing on this point are familiar to all. It may not be superfluous, however, to quote the more direct and explicit of them here in full. Though we receive our faith from the teaching of the Church, and though we hold that it is impossible for men to form a body of Christian doctrine from the Scripture without the assistance of the Church; yet we by no means hold that the Scripture is obscure on all things. On the contrary, we hold that some doctrines are most clearly contained therein, and may be gathered therefrom with undoubting certainty.

“Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the *ordinance of God*. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation. For

princes are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. Wilt thou, then, not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same. For he is *God's minister* to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, fear; for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only from wrath [*i. e.* fear of punishment], but also *for conscience sake*. For therefore also you pay tribute. For they are the ministers of God serving unto this purpose. Render therefore to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour"—*Rom.*, xiii. 1—7.

"Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers, to obey at a word, to be ready at every good work"—*Tit.*, iii. 1.

"Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake; whether it be to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of the good: for so is the will of God, that by doing well you may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men"—*I. Peter*, ii. 13, 15.

These texts are tolerably clear. It would be needless to accumulate extracts from the various documents in which the solemn teaching of the Church is set forth. I shall therefore confine myself to one extract from the "Encyclical Epistle" of the late Pope Gregory the Sixteenth, issued in 1832. It is a dogmatical bull addressed *ex cathedra* to all the Bishops of the Church, and universally received, and therefore forming a defined immutable rule of belief for all doctrines expressly taught and defined in it.

"Since we have learned, that in writings scattered among the people, certain doctrines are proclaimed, destructive of the loyalty and obedience due to princes, and kindling everywhere the torch of revolt; we must take the greatest care that the people be not deceived thereby, and drawn from the path of right. Let all reflect that, according to the admonition of the Apostle, 'there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore, he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation'. Wherefore, the laws of both God and man cry out against those who, by the basest machinations of revolt and sedition, en-

deavour to destroy allegiance to princes, and to deprive them of their thrones.

“For this reason manifestly, and that they might not defile themselves with so great a sin, the early Christians, even amid the rage of persecutions, showed themselves well-deserving of the Emperors and the Empire, not only by the fidelity with which they executed the commands not opposed to religion which were imposed on them, but by their courage and the shedding of their blood on the field of battle. ‘Christian soldiers’, says St. Augustine,* ‘served an unbelieving Emperor: but when there was a question of the cause of Christ, they acknowledged only him who is in heaven. They distinguished between the eternal Lord and the temporal, and yet, on account of the eternal Lord were subject to the temporal’. These things the invincible martyr, Mauritius, chief officer of the Theban legion, had before his eyes when, as Eucherius related,† he thus answered the Emperor: ‘We are your soldiers, Emperor, but yet, as we frankly avow, servants of God: and now this imminent peril of our lives has not driven us to

* S. Augustin. in Psalm, 124, *n.* 7.

† S. Eucher. apud Ruinart, Act. SS. MM. de SS. Maurit. et Soc.

rebel, for we prefer rather to die than to kill'. This loyalty of the early Christians to their princes, appears still more glorious, when we consider, with Tertullian,* that the Christians at that time were not deficient either in numbers or power, if they wished to declare themselves open enemies.....

"These illustrious examples of inviolable subjection to princes, which flowed necessarily from the most holy precepts of the Christian religion, are the condemnation of the detestable arrogance and wickedness of those who, burning with an immoderate and unrestrained passion for license, direct all their energies to weaken and pull down all the rights of the supreme powers, bestowing on the people slavery under the show of liberty".†

* Tertullian, in Apolog. cap. 37.

† As my limits are narrowing, I give only a portion of the original.

"Cum autem circumlatis in vulgus scriptis doctrinas quasdam promulgari acceperimus, quibus debita erga principes fides atque submissio labefactatur, facesque perduellionis ubique incenduntur; cavendum maxime erit, ne populi inde decepti a recti semita abducantur....Quocirca et divina et humana jura in eos clamant, qui turpissimis perduellionis seditionumque machinationibus a fide in principes desciscere, ipsosque ab imperio deturbare connituntur.... Præclara hæc immobilis subjectionis in principes exempla, quæ ex sanctissimis Christianæ religionis præceptis necessario proficiscerantur, detestandam illorum insolentiam et improbitatem condemi-

This is the clear, certain, immovable Catholic doctrine; the doctrine to be always preached to the people.

§ 2.

1. The duty of obedience exists and urges altogether irrespective of the religion of the person or persons invested with the supreme power. Whether they be Pagan or Christian, Protestant or Catholic, they are still *God's ministers*, and we are bound to be subject to them *for conscience sake*.

This is evident from the preceding extract from the Encyclical of Gregory the Sixteenth, and from the words of St. Paul, which were written at a time when the sovereign power was entirely vested in Pagans, and very wicked Pagans too.

2. The duty of obedience just stated, is of obedience to *lawful* authority, that is, authority not usurped or seized on without right.

As to the usurper, we consider him either as engaged in the struggle for mastery, not yet possessed of it; or we consider him as now successful, and actually in possession of the supreme power.

nant, qui projecta effrenataque procacis libertatis cupiditate æstuant, toti in eo sunt, ut jura quæque principatuum labefactent, atque convellant, servitutem sub libertatis specie populis illaturi".

In the former case, not only is it not a duty to obey him, but it is a strict duty not to acknowledge him as the sovereign; a duty which springs from, or rather is identical with, the obligation of allegiance to the rightful sovereign. In the second case, if the contest be over and there be no further reasonable and certain hope of reinstating the lawful ruler, then, though we are not bound to obey the usurper in virtue of any allegiance we owe him or of any claim he has (as a legitimate ruler would have) to our obedience; yet we are bound to obey him on the principle of expediency. For it is evident that, in this case, continued resistance would be injurious to the public weal, would perpetuate strife and anarchy, without hope of attaining a compensating good: it would be doing an act whence nothing but pure evil would follow—for, by the supposition of the case, there is no hope of success.

A usurped sovereignty gradually acquiesced in by the people, and settled into the social system, ultimately acquires a prescriptive right and becomes legitimate, or the same as legitimate. For, though an individual cannot acquire a title to property by *mala fide* prescription; in the case before us, the public good, the stability, order, and peace of

society require that a dynasty, though founded in usurpation, yet now fixed for a length of time, and accepted by the people, should not be for ever justly liable to overthrow. If this were not admitted, there is hardly a government on earth that would be legitimate. It is a maxim of law, universally admitted (out of the Court of Chancery), a principle of natural equity and reason, that *lites debent aliquando terminari*. The length of time required for such prescriptive right, would depend very much on circumstances—the amount of evil that would ensue from disturbing the existing order of things, the impossibility of reëstablishing things as they were, etc.

3. The duty of obedience to the supreme power involves, and principally involves, the duty of obedience to the laws, so far as the legislator demands obedience.

But, as has often happened, unjust laws may be enacted by lawful authority, acting in this case unlawfully. Now a law may be unjust in two ways. First, the legislator may exceed his power, and command a thing to be done or omitted, which he has no right to command, though the thing itself may be done or omitted without sin. Thus if a law were enacted prohibiting the use of flesh meat

throughout the Empire, and commanding all her Majesty's subjects to confine themselves to vegetable diet, such a law would be unjust—the legislature not having power to impose so excessive a restriction on human liberty and happiness, and one in no way conducive to the public welfare—though men would not sin by observing such a law. Secondly, the legislator may command a thing to be done or omitted, which it would be sinful to do or omit. Of this kind were the laws enacted against the Christians in the early ages, commanding them to sacrifice to idols, and prohibiting the worship of God.

Either kind of law is unjust, and by the very fact, null and void, having no legal force in conscience, inducing no obligation of its own, or, as we say, *vi legis*. But

In the latter case, if the law commands a thing to be done which I cannot do without sin, then, of course I am bound to disobey the law, as the early Christians did in the example given, even at the risk of my life. If the law prohibits an act which I cannot omit without sin, violence may be used to prevent me, in which case my omission is not voluntary, and therefore not sinful. Moreover,

there are religious duties of purely ecclesiastical precept, such as that of hearing Mass on Sunday, which I am not bound to perform, if serious injury would ensue, etc. It is unnecessary to go farther into this.

As to the former case, though I am not bound by the law itself to do or omit what it enjoins or prohibits, an obligation might arise, and often would arise from other and extrinsic sources. Thus I might be bound to do or omit the act, in order to avoid disedification, strife, injury to others, etc., etc.

It is the common opinion of our theologians, that in a case of doubt as to the justness of the law, it is to be obeyed; we are to act as if it were just. *In dubio præsumptio stat pro superiore.*

§ 3.

In the fifteenth Session of the Council of Constance (A.D. 1414), the following proposition was condemned:—

“ Any tyrant lawfully and meritoriously can and ought to be slain by any of his vassals or subjects, even through secret plots, and cunning blandishments, and flatteries, notwithstanding any oath

made to him or compact entered into with him, and without awaiting the sentence or mandate of any judge whomsoever".*

This proposition, which is condemned as erroneous in faith and morals, heretical, scandalous, etc., was, it is said, selected out of many others advanced about that period by more than one writer, and embodies the *virus* of several of them.

§ 4.

The definition of the duty of obedience to the legitimate supreme civil power in all things lawful, and without respect to the religion professed by

* There is another proposition, from the writings of Wycliffe, condemned elsewhere by the same Council; but, so far as it appertains to the matter before us, the doctrine evolved in the condemnation is sufficiently contained in the general doctrine of obedience stated above in the first section. The proposition is: "The common people can at will correct delinquent lords [or masters or rulers]". The following is the original of both propositions:

"Quilibet tyrannus potest et debet licite et meritorie occidi per quemcunque vassallum suum vel subditum, etiam per clanculares insidias, et subtiles blanditias vel adulationes, non obstante quocunque præstito juramento, seu confœderatione factis cum eo, non expectata sententia vel mandato judicis cujuscunque".

"Populares possunt ad suum arbitrium dominos delinquentes corrigere".

that power, together with the condemnation of the preceding proposition, constitute, so far as I know, the defined and solemn teaching of the Church on the submission of subjects to their rulers. On the question we now proceed to open, as well as some of the points already touched upon, the Church has issued no formal definition. Theologians have discussed them, and drawn conclusions more or less probable or certain.

We have seen that obedience is the law. We have now to inquire whether the law admits of any exception, whether obedience is a duty and resistance sinful in every case and in all circumstances whatsoever. The Church, as I have said, has issued no definition whatever on the question, has left it open. Many theologians have written on it, the great majority, however (so far as I have been able to examine them), pass it over in silence: it seems not to have come in their way, not to have occurred to them to treat of it at all. Of those that have treated of it, many have touched it but lightly and incidentally. With the exception of the few French divines and others alluded to above, the following is, I think, a fair and sufficiently full statement of the prevailing opinion among them.

The question is about resistance to an established and legitimate government which abuses its power. I suppose as absurd and exploded among all reasonable men the monstrous doctrine, that the people, as first invested by the law of nature with sovereign power, can at will revoke the authority delegated by them to kings or other fixed forms of government. This doctrine is sometimes advanced by persons who, I have no doubt, do not advert to the full meaning of it, or to the frightful consequences with which it is pregnant—revolution enthroned, anarchy in permanent sitting. I pass over this and other such wild and mischievous doctrines.

The common opinion of a large number of our theologians, then, is, that it is lawful to resist by force, and if necessary to depose, the sovereign ruler or rulers, in the extreme—the very extreme—case wherein the following conditions are found united.

I. The tyranny must be excessive—intolerable. Or, as some propose this condition, the evils inflicted by the tyrant must be more injurious to the community, all things considered and compared, than the good influences of the government are beneficial. For with regard to this latter

clause, it is to be kept in mind, that the influence of a fixed government, so long as it retains any thing at all of the form and action of a government, is naturally and necessarily productive of immense good. Any kind of government deserving the name is preferable to no government at all: the latter state being that of simple anarchy and universal lawlessness. Should a government become purely destructive, if this were possible, it ceases to be a government: it no longer governs, but merely destroys and ruins.

II. The tyranny must be manifest, manifest to men of good sense and right feeling, not as in the conceptions of the brawling, mob-impelling patriot and furious revolutionist, who sees, or pretends to see in every ruler a necessary enemy of the people, in every law a snare for liberty, in every distinction of rank a violation of the immutable natural law of equality, in every accumulation of wealth a robbing of the poor. The passion of the genuine revolutionist is always for change, and change accomplished but feeds his morbid passion; as a man in high fever tosses about on his bed, and his restless movements but increase the violence of his distemper. He contemplates the defects and evils of the present until they expand before his diseased vision

into gigantic dimensions and hideous shapes; and then he forms to himself, in the future, perfect constitutions, a sinless people, a beatified world, and fancies that he will realise them at a single blow, and reach them at a single bound. He little thinks of the blood, and tears, and broken hearts, and the raging of all the loosened passions, and the wreck of all that is most beautiful and God-like in the human soul, through which he must pass to reach, if he ever reach, the grand delusive picture, to find it but a picture and a delusion at last. He resembles a man who starts impulsively from his lowly cottage for a glorious city which he sees on the distant hills, not adverting to the pathless valley of horrors that lies between, with its roaring wild beasts, and hissing serpents, and its precipices, and chasms, and quagmires, leading, after all, to a passing form conjured up by the sunbeams sporting with the mountain mist. He keeps not before his mind what, if he has not learned from revelation, the past history of the human race might have taught him, the sad truth—so sad in itself, so consoling in its promise—that this is a fallen world; that its doom is labour, and suffering, and sickness, and death; that all is imperfect here, and must be so; that if we try to build up a tower to reach the

sky, an overruling power baffles the attempt, stops the work, and scatters the workmen. There is a state of perfect happiness for us: through the gates of death we reach it, and only thus. Here we are tried, and our trial is in suffering. I am sure that many men of the best intentions, and finest affections of heart, dream these dreams of better days even here below for the poor fallen children of Adam. We all dream them at some time in early, trusting, hopeful, impassioned life. But we ought to take care that men whose only dream is of gold and notoriety and dominion; men of cold and crafty natures, who know well how to assume, without themselves feeling, the language that kindles innocent enthusiasm, as marble statues may be enveloped in soft and delicate raiment; men who traffic in the most noble and generous impulses of the heart, and coin the most sacred language and feelings of holy religion and deep earnest faith, into purchase money for popularity and influence—we ought to take care that such men shall not buy us by “winning words” or more dishonourable bribes, to promote their hollow triumph, and to grace it. We all dream wild dreams: but happy is he who sometimes discovers that they are but dreams, and has moral courage to avow this, and good sense to turn

to the cold rough realities of life, and take them as they are, and wait patiently for the time when he shall behold the better vision which will not be a dream. We are put here not to build up constitutions, and found empires, and restore the world, and cure its incurable evils, but to do our little work, each in his own little sphere of occupation, into which Providence, under the appearance of an accidental concurrence of events, has placed him. If all did this, the world would be the better for it, though each did no more.

III. The evils inflicted by the tyrant must be greater than those which would ensue from resisting and deposing him. The evils of a revolution, at least of a violent revolution, are twofold. First, there are the evils inherent in the revolutionary movement itself—the unsettling of society, the horrors of civil war, etc., etc. These evils would, of course, be greater or less according to circumstances. Secondly, there are evils which may arise after the revolution is completed, at least so far completed that the tyrant is effectually deposed, and his tyrannical system swept away. After all this there may be a new tyranny, under the same or a different form of government, worse than the preceding or as bad: there may be the want of means

for establishing any fixed form of government; there may be a protracted anarchy; there may be a foreign invasion to restore or avenge the fallen tyrant, etc., etc.

IV. There must be no other available way of getting rid of the tyranny except by recurring to the extreme course.

V. There must be a moral certainty of success.

VI. The revolution must be one conducted or approved by the community at large. On one hand, it would be unlawful for a small section or faction of the nation, to rise up in revolt against the will of the majority. On the other hand, the refusal of a small party in the state to join with the overwhelming mass of their countrymen, would not render the resistance of the latter unlawful. In matters of this sort, mathematical completeness is not required; nor is an insignificant portion, standing by itself, taken into account.*

To any person accustomed to the study of ques-

* The above is not copied from any one writer, but rather the result of general reading made many years ago. But, though having lost the references or not having taken all, I have no doubt of its substantial accuracy. Meantime see SUAREZ, *Defens. Fid. L. 6, c. 4, et de Charit. D. 13, Sec. 8.* ESTIUS, in *Sent. D. 44.* SYLVIVS, in 2, 2, Q. 64, ^A. 3. MALDERUS, de *Justit. et Relig. T. 3, c. 1, D. 4, etc., etc.*

tions of this kind, the reasons for each of the preceding conditions will occur at once upon the slightest reflection. They are chiefly derived from the obligation to obedience in cases of doubt; from the duty of not staking tremendous results on a doubtful issue, and of not exposing the community to infinitely greater evils on doubtful grounds, and for an uncertain good; from the awful horrors and infinite evils of unsuccessful revolt; and from the great evils that always necessarily and certainly accompany even a successful one, and the danger of still greater that may ensue. I could write at considerable length, in establishing and illustrating each of the conditions: but I have not purposed to write more than an exposition of doctrine; and I would probably but weary the reader, certainly would weary the learned and intelligent reader, by attempting more. For I could tell him little or nothing which his own reflections would not suggest. The following passage from the work of Sir James Mackintosh, already quoted, contains the germ of almost all that need be said on the subject: the clearness of the style is not greater than the weight and wisdom of the matter; and I have no doubt that it will be acceptable to the reader

“ But there are certain peculiarities of great im

portance in point of fact, which in other respects permanently distinguish them [civil and foreign war] from each other. The evils of failure are greater in civil than in foreign war. A state generally incurs no more than loss in war: a body of insurgents is exposed to ruin. The probabilities of success are more difficult to calculate in cases of internal contest, than in a war between states, where it is easy to compare those merely material means of attack and defence which may be measured or numbered. An unsuccessful revolt strengthens the power and sharpens the cruelty of the tyrannical ruler; while an unfortunate war may produce little of the former evil, and of the latter nothing. It is almost peculiar to intestine war that success may be as mischievous as defeat. The victorious leaders may be borne along by the current of events, far beyond their destination; a government may be overthrown which ought to have been only repaired; and a new, perhaps more formidable, tyranny may spring out of the victory. A regular government may stop before its fall becomes precipitate, or check a career of conquest when it threatens destruction to itself: but the feeble authority of the chiefs of insurgents is rarely able, in the one case, to maintain the courage, in the

other, to repress the impetuosity, of their voluntary adherents. Finally, the cruelty and misery incident to all warfare, are greater in domestic dissensions, than in contests with foreign enemies. Foreign wars have little effect on the feelings, habits, or condition, of the majority of a great nation, to most of whom the worst particulars of them may be unknown. But civil war brings the same, or worse evils into the heart of a country, and into the bosom of many families; it eradicates all habits of recourse to justice and reverence for law; its hostilities are not mitigated by the usages which soften wars between nations; it is carried on with the ferocity of parties who apprehend destruction from each other; and it may leave behind it feuds still more deadly, which may render a country depraved and wretched through a long succession of ages. As it involves a wider waste of virtue and happiness than any other species of war, it can only be warranted by the sternest and most dire necessity. The chiefs of a justly disaffected party, are unjust to their fellows and their followers, as well as to all the rest of their countrymen, if they take up arms in a case where the evils of submission are not more intolerable, the impossibility of reparation by pacific means more apparent, and the

chances of obtaining it by arms, greater than are necessary to justify the rulers of a nation in undertaking a foreign war. A wanton rebellion, when considered with the aggravation of its ordinary consequences, is one of the greatest of crimes. The chiefs of an inconsiderable and ill-concerted revolt, however provoked, incur the most formidable responsibility to their followers and their country. An insurrection rendered necessary by oppression, and warranted by a reasonable probability of a happy termination, is an act of public virtue, always environed with so much peril as to merit admiration".

**The Christian Priesthood a true
Priesthood:**

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S OBJECTION.

The Christian Priesthood:

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S OBJECTION.

OUR condition and our social intercourse would be much more agreeable, to say nothing of higher advantages, if all persons bearing the name of Christian united in the profession of the one faith and in the communion of the one church. Hostile contentions and controversies there would still be among men; but not on those topics which, from their connection with our deepest interests and final destiny, are calculated to stir the soul to its very depths, to absorb and kindle to the highest pitch of ardour our thoughts and most generous affections—topics, too, the discussion of which is so often stained with the deepest traces of some of our worst passions, wearing the mask of zeal in the holiest of causes. But as divisions unavoidably exist, and the war of creeds must be carried on, and controversies flourish, it is pleasant to have to deal with an opponent like Dr. Whately. He may

reason from narrow principles or false principles, he may reason weakly, he may reason sophistically—but at any rate he *reasons*. You find yourself at once in decent and rational company with him. It is not fist to fist, and bellowing to bellowing, and rant to rant, and abuse to abuse; but it is mind to mind, and argument to argument. You cannot open his books, without seeing that they are the productions of a thinking and fair-minded writer—however erring—of a philosopher and a gentleman. It is pleasant to meet a man of this stamp even as an opponent and in the thorny ways of controversy, though it were pleasanter to meet him as a friend and on our own side. I do not think I could conclude these volumes more gracefully than by a brief—it must be very brief—examination of a favourite argument of his against the Roman Catholic idea of the Christian Priesthood.

Dr. Whately's volume of Bampton Lectures contains a sermon delivered by him at Oxford upwards of thirty years ago — "Christ the only Priest under the Gospel". The main object of the discourse is to prove that there is, under the New Law, no real priesthood, no priesthood for offering sacrifice, except that of Jesus Christ. The following is Dr. Whately's argument compressed — the

portions of the discourse itself which contain the argument being too broken and diffuse for transcription.

OBJECTION.

The name by which the Jewish and Gentile priests are uniformly designated in the Scripture is ἱερεὺς (*Hiereus*, Priest). This is the name by which our Lord himself is also designated, when spoken of as a priest. On the contrary, no member of the Christian ministry, of whatever grade, is ever called *hiereus*.* the names by which they are designated are, Ἐπισκοπος (*Episcopos*, Bishop, *lit.* Overseer or Superintendent), Πρεσβυτερος (*Presbuteros*, Priest, *lit.* Elder), and Διακονος (*Diaconos*, Deacon, *lit.* Minister).

This marked diversity in the mode of designating the members of the Christian hierarchy, from that of designating the Jewish and Gentile priests, and the great High-priest Jesus Christ himself, manifestly implies some marked diversity in the office and functions of the respective priesthoods.

* For sake of the mere English reader (to whom the present discussion may be, I think, perfectly intelligible), I give this word throughout in the English character.

Now the characteristic function of the Jewish priest was to offer sacrifice, "to make intercession and atonement for offenders"—*Bampt. Lect.*, p. 421. To teach and preach, "made no part of his especial duties". For, "it was not so much the family of Aaron, as the whole tribe of Levi, that seem to have been set aside for the purpose of *teaching* the Law: and even to these it was so far from being in any degree confined, that persons of any tribe might teach publicly in the synagogues on the Sabbath day; as was done by our Lord himself, who was of the tribe of Judah; and Paul, of the tribe of Benjamin; without any objection being raised. Whereas, an intrusion into the priest's office would have been vehemently resented. As to the Pagan priests, *their* business was rather to conceal, than to explain, the mysteries of their religion"—*Ibid.*, p. 427.

This function of offering sacrifice is therefore that which the name of *Hiereus* specially, or rather exclusively designated, in those to whom the name was applied: consequently, as the name is never applied to the priests of the New Law, but other names indicating entirely different functions, this function does not belong to the priesthood of the New Law. "The office of priest, in that

sense of the word, which we are now considering, viz., as equivalent to *Hiereus*, being such as has been described, it follows that, in *our* religion, the *only* priest, in that sense, is Jesus Christ himself"—*Ibid.*, p. 426.

This is Dr. Whately's argument, which he has repeated or alluded to in various ways, in several of his subsequent productions. It has been taken up also by other Protestant divines, as by Mr. Litton in his "Church of Christ in its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry", etc. It is, however, an objection of old date, having been long since noticed, though briefly, by Bellarmine, *de Missa*, *Lib.* 1. *cap.* 17.

ANSWER.

I. The argument belongs to that class which are not, and from their own nature cannot be, *decisive* of the question. Though, I admit, the objection would be a very troublesome and perplexing one, *if* we had no solid proof that the offering of sacrifice is a function of the Christian priesthood. But if there be (as I am sure there is, though, of course, I cannot be expected to enter into it here) a solid proof of this, then, so long as that proof remains unrefuted, the present objection has no

force of proof on the other side. It amounts simply to this: there is a change of language in designating the priesthood of the New Law, for which change I am unable to account: the reason of it may be what Dr. Whately assigns—but it may not be: the fact of the change is plain in Scripture, the ground of it is not recorded (see the observations, *n.* 242 of the article on the “Supremacy of St. Peter”, in the present volume). We can, however, show very weighty reasons for the propriety and expediency of altering the title of the Christian priesthood, in the commencement of the Christian Church, even on the supposition of the sacrificial function belonging to it.

II. Dr. Whately's own statements supply a clear and cogent reason for not using the word *Hiereus* in designating the Christian minister. It was the office of sacrifice, making intercession and atonement, that, among the Jews specially, among the Gentiles exclusively, constituted the *Hiereus*: it was *as* having this function, not as teaching or expounding religious doctrines, that, among Jews and Gentiles, a man was called a *Hiereus*. The word suggested the idea of the sacrificial function, and suggested that idea exclusively, among the Gentiles, and, I might say, exclusively among the

Jews too. Now, whether the sacrificial function belonged to the Christian ministry or not, the office of preaching and teaching not only belongs to it, but belongs to it exclusively, forms a most prominent and striking feature of it. Nay more, the office of the Christian ministry is not merely to preach and teach, but—what constitutes a great and essential distinction between it and the Jewish—to preach and teach through the whole Earth, to announce the Gospel to all creatures, Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian; to make converts and disciples from all religions, from all ranks, in all places. Yet more, the Christian ministry was not only to preach and teach in this way, but also to baptize “all nations”. The great work of the ministry in the Apostolic age was founding, extending, and consolidating the new Church. Farther still, the code of laws by which the Jews were governed was drawn up by the Divine Legislator himself, and went into the most minute details, regulating social duties and temporal concerns, as well as the duties and ceremonies of religion, for a small insulated compact people, of one race, and one tongue, and one polity. The Christian ministry scattered over the whole Earth, without any such code of detailed divinely-written laws, would have

an amount of inspection, legislative and executive action, work of all kinds, that should make the widest difference between it and the Jewish ministry. From all this follows the expediency of not all at once, and until the true idea of the Christian Church became generally known and established, giving a name to the Christian priesthood, which might create in the minds of many an erroneous impression of its nature and office.

III. Though we hold the sacrifice of the Mass to be a true sacrifice, and the Christian priesthood to be a true priesthood; yet there are some important points of difference between them and the Jewish. 1. The Jewish sacrifices were bloody, the sacrifice of the Mass is unbloody. 2. The victim in our sacrifice is the same as in the sacrifice of the cross, though offered up in a different manner; the victims in the Jewish sacrifices, though typical of the victim in the one great sacrifice, were, it need not be added, entirely different. 3. The Jewish priests offered sacrifice in their own name, and not as standing in the place of another and higher priest: the Christian priest offers sacrifice in the name of Christ, representing him, who is the principal offerer. Hence, 4. the Jewish priests succeeded one to another: our priests do not succeed

to Christ, but, as has just been said, represent him. Hence if the Apostles had used the word *Hiereus* to designate the Christian priest, while the Jewish sacrifices still continued to be offered up in the temple of Jerusalem, there would have been danger not only, as we have seen in the last paragraph, of producing a false idea of the office of our priesthood, but also of the nature of our sacrifice, both as to the victim and the oblation.

It is true, that Christ is frequently called a Priest, *Hiereus*, in the New Testament, though his sacrifice was so different from that of the Jews.

But, 1^o observe that Christ is nowhere called Priest or Highpriest, *Hiereus* or *Archiereus*, except in the Epistle to the Hebrews; and that one of the principal objects of this very Epistle, is to *explain* the nature of the priesthood and sacrifice of our Lord, and show how they differed from the Aaronic priesthood and sacrifice. I take it as a very remarkable circumstance, and, so far from furnishing ground for objection, strongly confirming the preceding reasoning, that our Blessed Lord, though admittedly and truly a Priest, in the strictest sense of the word, is yet never, not even once, called by the title of *Hiereus*, in the whole of the New Testament, except in the very epistle where the nature

and office of his priesthood are fully explained, and distinguished from those of the Jewish priesthood, and thereby most carefully guarded against being confounded with them. The significance of this circumstance becomes still stronger, when we consider that the nature and function of Christ's priesthood would have been less liable to be misunderstood, than those of the subordinate and vicarious priesthood of his own ministers: in as much as the doctrine of the atonement was the fundamental doctrine, the keystone of the whole Christian system, and therefore entering into the elements of daily Christian instruction; and in as much as it is much more comprehensible than the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice. To call the Apostles and other ministers of the Gospel, at that time, priests, would have constantly exposed the Jews to fall into the mistake of supposing them priests such as their own were, unless an explanation were constantly added to the name.

2^o. It is a fact that there were among the Jewish converts, some very grave misconceptions on the priesthood of Christ: as is evident from the pains which St. Paul takes to explain the doctrine to them.

As to what Dr. Whately says, as if anticipating a part of the preceding answer, that—

“The mere circumstance that the Christian religion is very *different* from all others, would, of itself, have been no reason against this [giving the same name of *Hiereus* to the same office]; for the difference is infinite between the divinely-instituted religion of the Jews and the idolatrous superstitions of the heathen; and yet, from similarity of office, the word *Hiereus* is applied by the sacred writers to the ministers of both religions”—*p.* 420.

I answer, 1^o. The difference I insist on for not giving the same name of *Hiereus* to the Christian priest, which the Jewish priest was called by, is not a difference of *religion*, but a difference, or rather several differences, in the nature and offices of the *priesthood* itself. And I note these differences as a reason for *deferring* the appellation for a time, until the danger of confounding different things under a common name would have ceased—as it did cease very soon on the destruction of the temple.

2^o. The heathen priests were called priests by the whole heathen world, and were called so for ages. It is one thing to give to a class of men a title by which they are universally known, in their own community and out of it: there is no possibility of mistake there; it is but following the established usage and law of speech. It is another thing to

give all at once to a newly created order of men the name of a long established order, both differing in several most important respects. It is on the former principle that the late Whig Ministry styled the Bishop of Rome "Sovereign Pontiff", in the bill introduced by them some years ago for opening diplomatic relations with His Holiness. They of course did not believe the Pope to be *Sovereign Pontiff*, but they gave him the title (which, by the way, the Tories afterwards expunged) as that by which he is designated through the whole Catholic world.

3°. Something might be added on the difference between the heathen priests and the Jewish: but it would lead to speculations, so far as the present question is concerned, unnecessary. I will only remark that the Gentiles were not always all heathens; that there were believers in the true God among them, true priests, and true sacrifices, as in the case of Job and Melchisedech. In the lapse of time the darkness of heathenism enveloped the whole world, outside the chosen people.

I close this short article with the following extract from Bossuet's "Exposition":—

Our Christian sacrifice is "a sacrifice exceedingly different from the sacrifices of the Jewish law; a

sacrifice, spiritual, and worthy the sanctity of the new alliance; a sacrifice, in which the victim is seen only with the eye of faith; in which, the word is the sword, that mystically separates the body and the blood; and in which, consequently, the blood is shed but mysteriously, and death exhibited only as a memorial; a sacrifice, however, that is truly real, because Jesus Christ is really therein contained, and really, in it, under these symbols of his passion, offered up to his Eternal Father; a sacrifice, still, of commemoration, which, so far from detaching us, as the Protestant pretends it does, from the sacrifice of the cross, does, on the contrary, by all this variety of circumstance, attach us even the more forcibly to it: because not only is the former, in our belief referred wholly to the latter, but it subsists solely by this relation; and from it derives the whole of its sacred efficacy.

“Such is the express doctrine of the Catholic Church, inculcated to the faithful by the Council of Trent. *The Sacrifice of the Mass*, says the holy synod, *was established in order to represent that which was once accomplished on the cross; to perpetuate its memorial to the end of ages; and to apply to our souls its salutary virtues, for the remission of those sins which we every day commit* (sess. 22).

Far, therefore, from believing that the sacrifice of the cross was incomplete, the Church, on the contrary, believes it to have been so perfect and so fully satisfactory, that every subsequent institution of religion is designed but to commemorate it; and to apply its sanctifying influence to the souls of men.

* * * *

“ It is to the article merely of the real presence that the whole controversy between the Catholic and Protestant, upon the subject of the Eucharist, ought properly to be reduced ”.*

* “ Exposition of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church”. Translated by the Rev. John Fletcher.

THE END.

ERRATA IN VOLUME III.

Owing to the extreme haste with which the greater part of this volume was passed through the press (indeed the whole of the portion of the article on the Supremacy contained in it having been literally printed off as it was written), several errors have crept in. I here confine myself principally to the more important of such as I have observed.

Page.	Line.		Read.
13	— 11	<i>for</i> supposed . . .	supposes.
57	— 18	<i>— concepta</i> . . .	<i>conceptu</i> .
74	— 15	<i>— degrees</i> . . .	decrees.
80	— 12	<i>— know</i> . . .	knows.
133	— 5	<i>— seceding</i> . . .	receding.
173	— 20	<i>— he</i> . . .	it.
243	— 12	<i>— the</i> . . .	<i>very</i> .
252	— 10 & 11	<i>— the same</i> . . .	different.
257	— 3	<i>dele</i> not.	
271	— 2	<i>from bottom—for</i> here . . .	in this sense.
288	— 17	<i>for</i> at least . . .	even.
296	— 17	<i>dele</i> the.	
358	— 14	<i>for</i> John . . .	Jahn.
359	— 4	<i>— implicitly</i> . . .	simply.
—	— 5	<i>— ηαυ</i> . . .	εαυ
197	For "Province of Faith", as heading of the chapter, read "Some General Observations on the Nature of Faith".		
235	line 9, and page 237, line 21, the marginal numbers, 7 and 8 are omitted.		

Page.

- 265 Read sentence beginning line 3, thus:—“ Even though this assertion were true, it by no means follows that what was, *on the present occasion*, promised to Peter, was also, on the present occasion, promised to the rest”, etc.
- 276 Add to concluding sentence of text :—“ and that its insecurity arises from its bad foundation”.
- 277 Several sentences have been dropped from the end of this page, which I cannot now accurately supply.
- 305 For member of sentence beginning in middle of line 8, read :—“ so to be appointed is to receive supreme authority, and, if the same”, etc.

ERRATA IN VOLUME IV.

Page.	Line.	Read.
5	— 10 <i>for</i> retraction . . .	retractation.
43	— 4 <i>dele</i> that exercise were.	
64	— 12 & 13 <i>dele</i> and different.	
88	— Note <i>for</i> veiga . . .	virga.
205	— 5 — powers . . .	power.
228	— Note — Antifehonius . . .	Antifebronius.
251	— 3 — paternal . . .	fraternal.
280	— last line, <i>for</i> not well acquainted	unacquainted.
293	— 1 <i>for</i> deposit . . .	deposit.
309	— 12 <i>dele</i> the comma after <i>orthodox</i> .	
326	— 4 from bottom, <i>dele</i> but.	
354	— last line but one, <i>for</i> thereof .	therein.
367	— 7 <i>for</i> them . . .	it.
402	— 7 — into . . .	in.

1047

~~922~~ 204
M76

